policy makers anticipated a move by Japan but did not foresee that the attack would be against the United States directly. This was ultimately due to a breakdown in communication and lack of accountability between the Army officers and Navy analysts who failed to keep track of the Japanese aircraft carriers. 9/ 11 was a tactical surprise. Prior to September 11, it was evident that a significant terrorist attack on the U.S. was a certainty as the United States was engaged in a war with Al Qaeda throughout the 1990s. In 2001, the CIA had received increased reporting from U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East regarding a pending attack by Al Qaeda against the U.S. but were unaware of the exact location and when they would strike (Johnson & Wirtz, 2015,
policy makers anticipated a move by Japan but did not foresee that the attack would be against the United States directly. This was ultimately due to a breakdown in communication and lack of accountability between the Army officers and Navy analysts who failed to keep track of the Japanese aircraft carriers. 9/ 11 was a tactical surprise. Prior to September 11, it was evident that a significant terrorist attack on the U.S. was a certainty as the United States was engaged in a war with Al Qaeda throughout the 1990s. In 2001, the CIA had received increased reporting from U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East regarding a pending attack by Al Qaeda against the U.S. but were unaware of the exact location and when they would strike (Johnson & Wirtz, 2015,