In "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?"[1], Thomas Nagel offers a challenge to reductionist accounts of mind by highlighting what he calls "the subjective character of experience". In this paper I will be describing what Nagel meant by the term "subjective character experience" as well as provide a breakdown of his famous example of "what it is like to be a bat?". I will also be focusing on the reasons why Nagel believes consciousness cannot be scientifically explained and reflect my point of view on Nagel 's theory on subjective character experiences and consciousness. {MORE} To begin with, Nagel argues that every creature that is capable of having experiences there is something it is like to be that creature. "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism -- something it is like for the organism... We may call this the subjective character of experience."[621] To take a closer look at this passage, we need to briefly direct our attention to other theorists such as Smart. Smart 's theories suggest that everything in this world could to be described with a scientific or mechanical explanation. Thus, consciousness could also be described scientifically, since our experience of things is just a brain state.[584] The problem with materialism or reductionism of Smart 's view is that they ignore what is special about mind-body problem, they ignore subjective consciousness. They provide an explanation of how the mind works scientifically at the expense of excluding consciousness from the picture. Nagel challenges this supposition in order to show the special mental property that connects one 's mind and body. "Consciousness makes the mind-body intractable."[620] It seems as consciousness doesn 't belong anywhere in the concept of a universe of physical objects. Humans appear in that physical world, as do
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