Summary Of The Trolley Problem
The Trolley Problem, originally proposed by Philippa Foot prompted a range of responses.
More specifically from Judith Jarvis Thomson, who presented a variation and response to this scenario. One of Thompson’s adaptation encapsulates the notion of a bystander who has the option to either remain inactive and let five people die or to reroute the trolley, by means of flipping a switch that would cause the trolley to move towards the direction of the other track with one worker, hence killing them (Graham, 2017).
On that account, the bystander should do nothing and allow the five track workers to die.
The bystander’s required action may be explained through the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) in which suggest that there is a moral distinction
between doing and allowing harm. Foot’s rationalisation on the principle is comprised of the contrast between negative rights, which refers to “rights to non-interference” and positive rights, which are “rights to goods or services” (Liu, 2012). Foot, who claimed that negative rights are considered morally significant as opposed positive rights, insinuated that doing harm is tantamount to defying negative rights and allowing harm assents to the violation of positive rights (Lui, 2012). Foot further implied that as negative rights are regarded as mo1re vital than positive rights, doing harm is more difficult to give reasons for as opposed to allowing harm. Thus, the bystander should let the five people to die instead of killing one individual as it is morally worse to do harm than to allow harm to occur.
Another justification as to why it is morally better to allow harm, in this case, letting five die than doing harm by means of killing one is the difference in number of moral evils produced, presented by Liu (2012). Liu (2012) states that killing a person produces three moral evils: “cause the loss of a life and corresponding authority over that life and unjustly interfered the victim’s autonomy.” In comparison to allowing a person to die, which only produces two moral evils: “cause the loss of a life and the corresponding authority”. The weighted variation between these two instances stems from the fact that the act of killing results in an unfair interference of the individual’s autonomy. Autonomy, defined as one’s own authority of what they are able to control, including their life, body and property is regarded as having a high worth (Liu, 2012). Hence, the bystander pulling the lever, killing one person, would mean that they have impeded and removed the individual’s authority of self-control.
On the contrary, James Rachels expressed that the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is morally irrelevant by means of a set of situations they put forward that objected and criticised the principle. The first scenario involves killing, wherein Smith drowned his cousin in the bathtub. Whereas the other case is of Jones who also intended to drown his cousin, although discovered him already unconscious and withheld from saving him, hence, letting the individual die (Woollard & Howard-Snyder, 2016). It can observed that Smith committed harm and violated a negative right, whilst Jones has allowed harm and infringed a positive right. Furthermore, Rachel suggested that Smith and Jones’ actions are merely the same, both incorrect and thus, that allowing harm is not any better than doing harm.
Nevertheless, in this case of the Trolley Problem, the bystander should not take part and permit the five track workers to die as there is a clear moral difference between the two concepts, as explored through the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In addition to this, Liu (2012) enhanced this supportive argument by claiming that breaching a negative right produces more moral evil than breaching a positive right. However, upon further consideration, Rachels contested the principle and conveyed that there is no difference in morality between allowing and doing harm.
More specifically from Judith Jarvis Thomson, who presented a variation and response to this scenario. One of Thompson’s adaptation encapsulates the notion of a bystander who has the option to either remain inactive and let five people die or to reroute the trolley, by means of flipping a switch that would cause the trolley to move towards the direction of the other track with one worker, hence killing them (Graham, 2017).
On that account, the bystander should do nothing and allow the five track workers to die.
The bystander’s required action may be explained through the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) in which suggest that there is a moral distinction
between doing and allowing harm. Foot’s rationalisation on the principle is comprised of the contrast between negative rights, which refers to “rights to non-interference” and positive rights, which are “rights to goods or services” (Liu, 2012). Foot, who claimed that negative rights are considered morally significant as opposed positive rights, insinuated that doing harm is tantamount to defying negative rights and allowing harm assents to the violation of positive rights (Lui, 2012). Foot further implied that as negative rights are regarded as mo1re vital than positive rights, doing harm is more difficult to give reasons for as opposed to allowing harm. Thus, the bystander should let the five people to die instead of killing one individual as it is morally worse to do harm than to allow harm to occur.
Another justification as to why it is morally better to allow harm, in this case, letting five die than doing harm by means of killing one is the difference in number of moral evils produced, presented by Liu (2012). Liu (2012) states that killing a person produces three moral evils: “cause the loss of a life and corresponding authority over that life and unjustly interfered the victim’s autonomy.” In comparison to allowing a person to die, which only produces two moral evils: “cause the loss of a life and the corresponding authority”. The weighted variation between these two instances stems from the fact that the act of killing results in an unfair interference of the individual’s autonomy. Autonomy, defined as one’s own authority of what they are able to control, including their life, body and property is regarded as having a high worth (Liu, 2012). Hence, the bystander pulling the lever, killing one person, would mean that they have impeded and removed the individual’s authority of self-control.
On the contrary, James Rachels expressed that the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is morally irrelevant by means of a set of situations they put forward that objected and criticised the principle. The first scenario involves killing, wherein Smith drowned his cousin in the bathtub. Whereas the other case is of Jones who also intended to drown his cousin, although discovered him already unconscious and withheld from saving him, hence, letting the individual die (Woollard & Howard-Snyder, 2016). It can observed that Smith committed harm and violated a negative right, whilst Jones has allowed harm and infringed a positive right. Furthermore, Rachel suggested that Smith and Jones’ actions are merely the same, both incorrect and thus, that allowing harm is not any better than doing harm.
Nevertheless, in this case of the Trolley Problem, the bystander should not take part and permit the five track workers to die as there is a clear moral difference between the two concepts, as explored through the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In addition to this, Liu (2012) enhanced this supportive argument by claiming that breaching a negative right produces more moral evil than breaching a positive right. However, upon further consideration, Rachels contested the principle and conveyed that there is no difference in morality between allowing and doing harm.