Summary Of What Is Good And Why Kraut

In What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being, Richard Kraut argues against a “conative” conception of the good. According to him, this view is attractive because it emphasizes the satisfaction of desires and volitions, giving agents “a starring role to play” in creating their own good (114). The conative theory proposes that when an agent (rationally) desires something, that thing is good for them precisely because it is the object of their desire (or conation) (118). A proponent of this view might accept that sometimes we ought to desire an object because it will prove good for us. However, they will maintain that other times, even if the object is not intrinsically “worth wanting,” it is good for us in virtue of being what we desire (118).
He asserts that the theory's emphasis on desire and “the execution of a rational plan, regardless of its content” is misguided (120). Kraut illustrates the superiority of his view, developmentalism, with the “principle of addition for goods” (172). As formulated by developmentalism, this principle states that the greater number of ways a life flourishes, the better (173). The conative view holds that a greater amount of successful conation is what makes a life better. Kraut objects to the conative formulation, arguing that one pursues a desired object because of its perceived value, not to fulfil a desire for the good of desire-fulfillment (174). Developmentalism inverts the relationship between desire and good, stating that we ought to conform our desires to “realize our capacities” (176). This, or our flourishing, is the ultimate good