A Defense of Dualistic Realism Author(s): James Bissett Pratt Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 14, No. 10 (May 10, 1917), pp. 253-261 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2940171 . Accessed: 09/12/2012 17:17
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VOL.
XIV, No. 10.
MAY 10,
1917
THE
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
A DEFENSE OF DUALISTIC REALISM1
dualistic view which I shall try to defend maintains that co1nsciousness and the world of physical objects in space are essentially different from each other in kind; and that the psychical may be defined as consisting of non-physical entities which, though they may be spatial, are not in space, and which exist only as functions of one or more individual persons or organisms. This view is so simple and so commonly held that it needs little elucidation. It involves two factors, namely, an empirical view of the make-up of consciousness, and the double thesis that there is a real, three-dimensional space, common to different minds, and that consciousness