Taking Practical Action: An Analysis

The principle focus regarding terrorism, aviation security and the FAA has so far been on major airports and commercial aircraft with good reason. Terrorist’s main goal is to cause fear and distrust among a population in the institutions that are necessary to modern living as well as to gain as much press coverage as possible for whatever cause on the terrorist agenda. Commandeering a vehicle that can carry a couple hundred of people and with the potential to create significant damage accomplishes those means. However, there is another layer of aviation that is not as regulated as the larger commercial airports, therefore providing services to a different class of aircraft and has not been the focus of attacks by terrorist. This layer is known
The second type knows what needs to be done however has no idea how to do it. The third type of manager does nothing, pertends that eveything will be allright. Here is why GA security is important no mjatter what type of manager runs the facility: “Taking Practical Action” stipulated the following: no manager wants to be in charge of an airport that a terrorist attack was launched from. Furthermore, as airport security is stregthened among the larger commercial airports, threat forcces are going to be drawn to easier venues to launch their attacks such GA’s and cargo airports. Finally If an attack is traced back to a particular GA airport expect some community backlash along with elected representatives both local and nation to be compeled to do something- usually at a cost to the airport which could cause the facility to be shut down (Price, Taking Pratical Action, 2007).
To expand on Point two from the previous paragraph regarding GA aiports as the next target Jeff Prices article “ Corperate Aviation: A Threat Closer Than You Think,” addresses sme of the more routine threats that primarily occur from the cockpit . These threats/occurances include but are notlimited to; Theft of the aircraft; murdering the pilots, causing the plane to crash:
• Avoid the “Cookie Cutter approach (one size fits all) and “feel good” legislation which appears that something is being done but does nothing to bolster security (especially when there are already regulations in place that need to be enforced) (Price, 2007)
• Imagination: If the good guys can think of it, so can the bad guys (using a cooperate jet to collide with a commercial aircraft).
• Awareness: Though not as coordinated as a commercial airport, there is still a rhythm to the daily activities such as deliveries.
• Increased co-operation between GA facilities and their larger commercial counter-parts.
Any recommendation to enhance GA, corporate aircraft or any aviation security must occur within an environment/culture that stipulates security as paramount, if not then the best technology/practices are rendered ineffective. Additionally, if one is like the third type of GA airport manager that ignores what needs to be done no matter what the practical reasons may be, there is a caveat from the federal government: If you will not/cannot do what needs to be done- WE will and it will cost