Taylor Vs Somerset Health Authority
Establishing a limited time frame for the claimant to recover damages is severely restrictive as hours or minutes should not be a relevant factor in situations involving the death of a beloved person. In Taylor v Somerset Health Authority, the claim for damages failed despite the claimant learning of the victim’s death within minutes. This requirement is seen as undeveloped as the trauma of losing a loved one does not make any difference regardless of the time limit. It is foreseeable that viewing the gruesome sight of a dead body might cause a psychiatric illness, even more so when the immediate victim had a close relationship with the claimant. Despite witnessing the death of the victim, it may not be sufficient for the claimant to recover damages if not deemed close enough to the event caused by the negligence, as seen in Taylor v A Novo. The case of Galli-Atkinson v Seghal saw a mother’s
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appeal allowed as the court held that the immediate aftermath of an accident may comprise a number of components and as long as the events retained sufficient proximity to the accident, recovery was not an issue. This principle should be applicable in every case as it is difficult to predict what happens following an incident. It would be seen as an injustice if certain claimants were able to recover damages just by being in the right place at the right time when others were unfortunately unable to do the same. The controversial prerequisite that the psychiatric injury must be caused by direct perception should be abolished. It should not matter how the claimant learns of the event as the close tie of love and affection between the claimant and the immediate victim renders the requirement insignificant. It is unjustified if a claimant who fears for the safety of a loved one and consequently suffers a psychiatric illness is unable to recover compensation on the basis he or she found out through a medium of third party communication. The Alcock rule should no longer apply as technology has become so advanced that it is common for news of shocking events to be relayed to anyone around the world. A claimant who is not present at the scene of the accident but has viewed or heard of the horrific scenes should be allowed to recover damages as the knowledge of a loved one being at the event would surely affect the nervous system.
Additionally, the uncertainty of whether the loved one has died coupled with the feeling of helplessness would intensify the mental torture. Medical evidence has indicated that hearing of the victim’s death or injury in an accident rather than witnessing it may produce a more severe response as the human mind is inclined to imagine events as worse than the reality. This was acknowledged by Lord Ackner when stating that simultaneous broadcasts of disasters could not be ruled out as the equivalent of direct perception. Therefore, the law should be reformed so that it would not be mandatory that the psychiatric injury occurred through sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath as long as the claimant provides evidence of the close relationship with the victim. If no prior relationship existed, recovery might be excluded as there was a lack of reasonable foreseeability on the part of the defendant. The categorisation of primary and secondary victims has provoked academic and judicial criticism due to the uncertainty in its application. Page v Smith enables a primary victim to recover damages without the policy considerations required for a secondary victim. The primary victim is not subjected to the control mechanisms and the defendant is liable even if the psychiatric injury was unforeseeable in a person of ordinary fortitude. The distinction is poorly defined as Lord Oliver gave his own interpretation of who qualified as primary victims. However, Lord Lloyd defined the primary victim as someone who could recover compensation for the psychiatric illness if within the range of foreseeable physical injury. There should be a standard guideline of how the claimant is entitled to recover damages for the psychiatric injury and the law must consider this final reform. The third proposal is to remove the distinction between the primary and secondary victim and place all victims of negligently inflicted psychiatric injury in the same class.
The confusion regarding the primary victim is evidence that this proposal would improve the law. Lord Lloyd’s definition made the reasonable foreseeability of physical injury a prerequisite of liability that the primary victim must show. As a result, a person who has suffered psychiatric illness but was never at risk of physical harm cannot be defined as a primary victim. This person would also face difficulties in recovering as a secondary victim if there was no other person physically involved in the accident as the immediate victim. The distinction suggests that physical injury deserves more legal support than psychiatric illness and this has been rejected by medical professionals. The law should be framed in such a way that as long as the psychiatric illness was caused by the defendant’s negligence and it is recognised by medical evidence, the claimant should be entitled to recover
compensation. The ordinary fortitude requirement for the secondary victim represents another hurdle in recovering damages as there is a presumption that a normal standard of susceptibility to psychiatric illness exists in society. Primary victims automatically receive compensation although they may be more vulnerable to psychiatric illnesses yet they would receive nothing if they were secondary victims. For secondary victims who have failed to satisfy the control mechanisms, their only chance of recovery is to prove they qualified for primary victim status. This would be burdensome for claimants who were not exposed to physical harm and the normal fortitude condition does not consider the severe psychological reactions that some claimants may experience. With all victims of psychiatric injury now having the same status, a threshold of psychiatric injury should be established where in order to recover damages, the psychiatric illness suffered must exceed the severity of psychological impact. This threshold of damage required will be regulated after reviewing the nature and symptoms of all recognisable psychiatric illnesses. The courts will then scrutinise the psychological assessment and the circumstances as to whether the harm suffered by the claimant was reasonably foreseeable due to the defendant’s negligence. If the injury has exceeded the threshold, the courts will further look at the nature of the relationship between the claimant and the victim and the closer the tie, the more likely for recovery of compensation. This reform will also dismiss the conception that mental trauma is more plausible when combined with physical injury. The new approach that incorporates the reforms above will produce a refined legal framework to address the prevalent issues.
appeal allowed as the court held that the immediate aftermath of an accident may comprise a number of components and as long as the events retained sufficient proximity to the accident, recovery was not an issue. This principle should be applicable in every case as it is difficult to predict what happens following an incident. It would be seen as an injustice if certain claimants were able to recover damages just by being in the right place at the right time when others were unfortunately unable to do the same. The controversial prerequisite that the psychiatric injury must be caused by direct perception should be abolished. It should not matter how the claimant learns of the event as the close tie of love and affection between the claimant and the immediate victim renders the requirement insignificant. It is unjustified if a claimant who fears for the safety of a loved one and consequently suffers a psychiatric illness is unable to recover compensation on the basis he or she found out through a medium of third party communication. The Alcock rule should no longer apply as technology has become so advanced that it is common for news of shocking events to be relayed to anyone around the world. A claimant who is not present at the scene of the accident but has viewed or heard of the horrific scenes should be allowed to recover damages as the knowledge of a loved one being at the event would surely affect the nervous system.
Additionally, the uncertainty of whether the loved one has died coupled with the feeling of helplessness would intensify the mental torture. Medical evidence has indicated that hearing of the victim’s death or injury in an accident rather than witnessing it may produce a more severe response as the human mind is inclined to imagine events as worse than the reality. This was acknowledged by Lord Ackner when stating that simultaneous broadcasts of disasters could not be ruled out as the equivalent of direct perception. Therefore, the law should be reformed so that it would not be mandatory that the psychiatric injury occurred through sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath as long as the claimant provides evidence of the close relationship with the victim. If no prior relationship existed, recovery might be excluded as there was a lack of reasonable foreseeability on the part of the defendant. The categorisation of primary and secondary victims has provoked academic and judicial criticism due to the uncertainty in its application. Page v Smith enables a primary victim to recover damages without the policy considerations required for a secondary victim. The primary victim is not subjected to the control mechanisms and the defendant is liable even if the psychiatric injury was unforeseeable in a person of ordinary fortitude. The distinction is poorly defined as Lord Oliver gave his own interpretation of who qualified as primary victims. However, Lord Lloyd defined the primary victim as someone who could recover compensation for the psychiatric illness if within the range of foreseeable physical injury. There should be a standard guideline of how the claimant is entitled to recover damages for the psychiatric injury and the law must consider this final reform. The third proposal is to remove the distinction between the primary and secondary victim and place all victims of negligently inflicted psychiatric injury in the same class.
The confusion regarding the primary victim is evidence that this proposal would improve the law. Lord Lloyd’s definition made the reasonable foreseeability of physical injury a prerequisite of liability that the primary victim must show. As a result, a person who has suffered psychiatric illness but was never at risk of physical harm cannot be defined as a primary victim. This person would also face difficulties in recovering as a secondary victim if there was no other person physically involved in the accident as the immediate victim. The distinction suggests that physical injury deserves more legal support than psychiatric illness and this has been rejected by medical professionals. The law should be framed in such a way that as long as the psychiatric illness was caused by the defendant’s negligence and it is recognised by medical evidence, the claimant should be entitled to recover
compensation. The ordinary fortitude requirement for the secondary victim represents another hurdle in recovering damages as there is a presumption that a normal standard of susceptibility to psychiatric illness exists in society. Primary victims automatically receive compensation although they may be more vulnerable to psychiatric illnesses yet they would receive nothing if they were secondary victims. For secondary victims who have failed to satisfy the control mechanisms, their only chance of recovery is to prove they qualified for primary victim status. This would be burdensome for claimants who were not exposed to physical harm and the normal fortitude condition does not consider the severe psychological reactions that some claimants may experience. With all victims of psychiatric injury now having the same status, a threshold of psychiatric injury should be established where in order to recover damages, the psychiatric illness suffered must exceed the severity of psychological impact. This threshold of damage required will be regulated after reviewing the nature and symptoms of all recognisable psychiatric illnesses. The courts will then scrutinise the psychological assessment and the circumstances as to whether the harm suffered by the claimant was reasonably foreseeable due to the defendant’s negligence. If the injury has exceeded the threshold, the courts will further look at the nature of the relationship between the claimant and the victim and the closer the tie, the more likely for recovery of compensation. This reform will also dismiss the conception that mental trauma is more plausible when combined with physical injury. The new approach that incorporates the reforms above will produce a refined legal framework to address the prevalent issues.