Terrorism at sea
Legal aspects of terrorism at sea
Glen Plant*
INTRODUCTION
On 7 October 1985, four armed men claiming to represent the Palestine Liberation Front took control of the Italian-flag cruise liner Achille Lauro on the high seas about thirty miles off Port Said and held the crew and passengers hostage. They had boarded her in port in Genoa posing as legitimate passengers. They demanded the release of fifty Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and threatened to blow up the ship if intervention were attempted, and to start to kill the passengers if their demands were not met.1 Subsequently a Jewish American passenger, Mr Klinghoffer, was shot dead and his body thrown overboard. Several days later the four men gave themselves up to the Egyptian authorities, following negotiations between them, with the aid of an intermediary, while the ship was lying off Port Said. These negotiations resulted in an offer to the terrorists of a safe conduct to Tunisia in return for their leaving the ship without further violence. On 11 October an Egyptian civilian aircraft was intercepted by US military aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea and instructed to land at an airforce base in Sicily. Four Palestinians on board were detained by the Italian authorities and subsequently indicted and convicted in Genoa for offences related to the hijacking of the ship and the death of Mr
Klinghoffer.2 Italy, which had apparently not been consulted about the interception operation, refused a request from the United States for their extradition.3 The President of the UN Security Council condemned the attack in a statement on behalf of all its Members.4
Before the 1980s ships were not generally regarded as high-risk terrorist targets. This was not because security in ports or on ships was better than in airports and on aircraft—favourite terrorist targets in the past. On the contrary, although a number of countries, including the United Kingdom and France, operated fairly efficient port security
Glen Plant*
INTRODUCTION
On 7 October 1985, four armed men claiming to represent the Palestine Liberation Front took control of the Italian-flag cruise liner Achille Lauro on the high seas about thirty miles off Port Said and held the crew and passengers hostage. They had boarded her in port in Genoa posing as legitimate passengers. They demanded the release of fifty Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and threatened to blow up the ship if intervention were attempted, and to start to kill the passengers if their demands were not met.1 Subsequently a Jewish American passenger, Mr Klinghoffer, was shot dead and his body thrown overboard. Several days later the four men gave themselves up to the Egyptian authorities, following negotiations between them, with the aid of an intermediary, while the ship was lying off Port Said. These negotiations resulted in an offer to the terrorists of a safe conduct to Tunisia in return for their leaving the ship without further violence. On 11 October an Egyptian civilian aircraft was intercepted by US military aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea and instructed to land at an airforce base in Sicily. Four Palestinians on board were detained by the Italian authorities and subsequently indicted and convicted in Genoa for offences related to the hijacking of the ship and the death of Mr
Klinghoffer.2 Italy, which had apparently not been consulted about the interception operation, refused a request from the United States for their extradition.3 The President of the UN Security Council condemned the attack in a statement on behalf of all its Members.4
Before the 1980s ships were not generally regarded as high-risk terrorist targets. This was not because security in ports or on ships was better than in airports and on aircraft—favourite terrorist targets in the past. On the contrary, although a number of countries, including the United Kingdom and France, operated fairly efficient port security