Terrorism: Secret Intelligence Service and National Security
Security Challenges
Intelligence and Policy in the New Strategic Environment
Sandy Gordon
Western intelligence services face a significant broadening in the nature of threat. Previously, intelligence was predominantly focused on state-on-state threat, and to a lesser extent human generated threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. Now new types of threats are emerging, such as pandemic disease and global warming. In parallel, new technologies and doctrines have re-shaped the contribution of intelligence to strategic decision-making. The revolution in military affairs has given rise to powerful strategic tools such as effects based operations (EBO), mirrored by the concept of intelligence-led policing in law enforcement. Some advocates of intelligence change argue that the role of intelligence be expanded to provide the analytical power-house for ‘whole of government’ decision-making in relation not just to traditional threats, but also to this new range of threats—a kind of EBO for the whole of government. This article argues for a more limited view of intelligence and its role—one that recognises the inherently human, and hence secretive, quality of intelligence as a means for dealing with human-generated competition.
A nation’s intelligence apparatus is only one small part of the wider machinery for delivering policy and executive action. Traditionally, the role of intelligence within this wider structure was to counter threat from some kind of human collective opposition—whether a country, a crime group or a terrorist organisation. Intelligence was regarded as a highly specific undertaking to give advantage over that threat in the form of knowledge, insight and predictive capacity. According to this model, advantage was sought over a human threat capable of learning and adapting. Intelligence therefore needed to be secret to deliver an advantage. To protect the ‘intelligence advantage’, countries also developed counter-intelligence organizations
Intelligence and Policy in the New Strategic Environment
Sandy Gordon
Western intelligence services face a significant broadening in the nature of threat. Previously, intelligence was predominantly focused on state-on-state threat, and to a lesser extent human generated threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. Now new types of threats are emerging, such as pandemic disease and global warming. In parallel, new technologies and doctrines have re-shaped the contribution of intelligence to strategic decision-making. The revolution in military affairs has given rise to powerful strategic tools such as effects based operations (EBO), mirrored by the concept of intelligence-led policing in law enforcement. Some advocates of intelligence change argue that the role of intelligence be expanded to provide the analytical power-house for ‘whole of government’ decision-making in relation not just to traditional threats, but also to this new range of threats—a kind of EBO for the whole of government. This article argues for a more limited view of intelligence and its role—one that recognises the inherently human, and hence secretive, quality of intelligence as a means for dealing with human-generated competition.
A nation’s intelligence apparatus is only one small part of the wider machinery for delivering policy and executive action. Traditionally, the role of intelligence within this wider structure was to counter threat from some kind of human collective opposition—whether a country, a crime group or a terrorist organisation. Intelligence was regarded as a highly specific undertaking to give advantage over that threat in the form of knowledge, insight and predictive capacity. According to this model, advantage was sought over a human threat capable of learning and adapting. Intelligence therefore needed to be secret to deliver an advantage. To protect the ‘intelligence advantage’, countries also developed counter-intelligence organizations
Links: Among Environment, Population and Security, Lanham, MD, Bowman and Littlefield, 1998, ‘Introduction: A Theoretical Overview’. - 56 - Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) - 57 - - 58 - Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) 3 Kevin Rogers ‘Developments in Australian Strategic Criminal Intelligence’ in Ratcliffe (ed) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2004), p23. Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) - 59 - Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) Security Challenges Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007) - 61 - - 62 - Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007)