Tet Offensive In Vietnam War Analysis
Alternate Outcome
US intelligence community had several chances to change the outcome of the Tet Offensive. Gathering and dissemination of intelligence were critically overlooked. The imagery of massing of large enemy formation along with built up supply lines we key indicators that could have been eliminated. The capture of two VC soldiers that had propaganda reporting for the occupation of South Vietnam could have to be correlated with other reporting which could have to identify the true threat. The massing of enemy troops at Khe Sang outpost along with North Vietnam diplomatic feint could have been assessed as diversionary tactic waiting to exploit a greater threat.
During the battle of Huế, if commanders did not understand battlefield
how could they have been so effective in minimizing casualties and take back the city. Commanders knew that bridge crossing could only support a certain amount of weight and needed to reposition armor so they could be effective in battle. If the commanders did not take weather and terrain into consideration, how would reinforcement been able to land in nearby landing zones? When the enemy took over the city the commanders already knew the strengths and weaknesses of the city, so they understood the formidable defense of The Citadel and the Mang Ca Garrison.
Conclusion
Throughout history, intelligence on the battlefield has shown to be the decisive factor in defeating the enemy, yet some lessons are harder to learn than others. Intelligence gathering and reporting should be taught at all levels and to every US troop on the battlefield. There is always that one in a million chance that the information that was collected could change the tide of the war. As an intelligence community, we must rid ourselves of arrogance and egotism to effectively collaborate with one another. The Tet Offensive was a failure on the US intelligence community that must be taken as a lesson learn to move forward to better understand and eradicate the threat.
US intelligence community had several chances to change the outcome of the Tet Offensive. Gathering and dissemination of intelligence were critically overlooked. The imagery of massing of large enemy formation along with built up supply lines we key indicators that could have been eliminated. The capture of two VC soldiers that had propaganda reporting for the occupation of South Vietnam could have to be correlated with other reporting which could have to identify the true threat. The massing of enemy troops at Khe Sang outpost along with North Vietnam diplomatic feint could have been assessed as diversionary tactic waiting to exploit a greater threat.
During the battle of Huế, if commanders did not understand battlefield
how could they have been so effective in minimizing casualties and take back the city. Commanders knew that bridge crossing could only support a certain amount of weight and needed to reposition armor so they could be effective in battle. If the commanders did not take weather and terrain into consideration, how would reinforcement been able to land in nearby landing zones? When the enemy took over the city the commanders already knew the strengths and weaknesses of the city, so they understood the formidable defense of The Citadel and the Mang Ca Garrison.
Conclusion
Throughout history, intelligence on the battlefield has shown to be the decisive factor in defeating the enemy, yet some lessons are harder to learn than others. Intelligence gathering and reporting should be taught at all levels and to every US troop on the battlefield. There is always that one in a million chance that the information that was collected could change the tide of the war. As an intelligence community, we must rid ourselves of arrogance and egotism to effectively collaborate with one another. The Tet Offensive was a failure on the US intelligence community that must be taken as a lesson learn to move forward to better understand and eradicate the threat.