Tet Offensive Research Paper
There are a number of battles the United States has participated in over the past years. Of the many battles, the United States military branches won in a decisive manner. However, there is one particular battle that comes to mind in which the United States military as a whole failed to utilize the intelligence that was provided to ward off a surprise attack. The battle that comes to mind is the Tet Offensive. This battle took place in Vietnam in January 1968 between North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, against the allied forces of South Vietnam and the United States. This passage will explain that if the United States’ and South Vietnamese’s military commanders acted upon the intelligence that was received prior to the lunar New Year’s holiday,
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both the United States and South Vietnamese military would have been better prepared to combat the surprised attacks on January 30, 1968. The purpose of this paper is to explain that if the allied military forces used the intelligence that was presented to them, the outcome of the Tet Offensive would have ended with a decisive victory by the U.S. and South Vietnamese allied forces by strategically placing personnel in key position and defeating the North Vietnamese and Vietcong surprise attacks.
Background
On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon declared that major operations were needed to neutralize North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. In order to do so, U.S. Commanders had to increase levels of service members in South Vietnam from 120,000 to 400,000 in order to achieve mission success. In February of 1966, General William Westmoreland argued the U.S. presence had succeeded in preventing the immediate defeat of the South Vietnamese government (Sears, 2008). In previous years, the celebration of Tet, the lunar New Year holiday had been the occasion for a formal truce in South Vietnam’s long-running conflict with North Vietnam and their Communist allies. In early January 1968, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces coordinated offensive surprise attacks aimed at breaking the stalemate in Vietnam. 70,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces coordinated a series of fierce attacks on more than 100 cities and towns in South Vietnam. Although U.S. and allied forces managed to hold off the communist attacks, news coverage of the offensive, including the battle of Hue shocked and dismayed the American public. This news thwarted the support of the American people for the Vietnam initiative. Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese achieved a strategic victory with the surprise attacks and marked a turning point in Vietnam War and the beginning of the slow, painful American withdrawal from the region (History.com, 2009).
North Vietnam and the Vietcong
The North Vietnamese and Vietcong conducted one of the greatest surprise attacks against the United States and allied forces in U.S. military history. The Tet Offensive of January 31, 1968 was a turning point in modern American military history and changed the way we view military intelligence and the impact that it can have on the battle field. The North Vietnamese knew that the fire power and the mobility of the U.S. Forces were too much for the North and the Vietcong to handle. Thus, they would comprise an elaborate plan that would change the course of the Vietnam War. Under “General Vo Nguyen Giap, leader of the Communist People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), planned the offensive in an attempt to foment rebellion among the South Vietnamese population and encourage the United States to scale back its support of the Saigon regime” (History.com, 2009). A year prior to the surprise attacks on January 31, 1968, PAVN and Vietcong smuggled weapons and ammo into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh trail. North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) smuggled stockpiles of weapons, equipment and ammunition through fake funeral processions. NVA and VC also conducted deception attacks on American Forces into South Vietnam. The NVA and VC would conduct small attacks in order to create a diversion that would allow other NVA and VC to have freedom of movement to smuggle weapons and ammo into the country. During the celebration of Tet, NVA and Vietcong personnel were also crossing the Demilitarized Zone to enter South Vietnam; blending in with the general population as if they were there to partake in the festivities was a part of their plan to stage an unforgettable attack. They were able to accomplish this because U.S., South Vietnamese forces and police personnel were far below their usual state of readiness level. The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff had authorized 50 percent leave for the celebration of Tet; making it possible for large numbers of Vietcong to enter South Vietnamese cities without causing alarm (Interim Report, 1968).
United States and Allied Forces
Under the leadership of General William Westmoreland, the United States’ militaries that were located in South Vietnam were unaware of the attacks they would soon ensue. There were multiple HUMINT Collection and Communications Intelligence reports that provided indicators and warnings of possible attacks during the Lunar New Year timeframe (January 30-31, 1968). However, General Westmorland and other higher echelon officers underestimated the capabilities of the NVA and Vietcong. By not taking the intelligence gathered by American intelligence sources, General Giap’s plan would ultimately change the way the American public view US involvement in a negative manner. This surprise attack would lead to an unrecoverable blow on the credibility of the Johnson administration. “There was evidence that the enemy was engaging in his much advertised “winter-spring campaign” and was preparing for a series of coordinated attacks, probably on a larger scale than before. There was evidence in early January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet Holiday” (Interim Report, 1968). There was a multitude of indicators that were primarily ignored by the U.S. Intelligence community and policy makers due to cognitive biases and political circumstances (HC Intelligence, 2013). Even though a cease fire truce was signed, reports of preplanned attacks continued to be gathered through HUMINT and Communication Intelligence efforts. U.S. and allied forces ignored reports because of cease fire truces being honored in the past.
The Surprise Attack
Early January 30, 1968, VC forces attacked 13 cities in central South Vietnam, just as individuals within South Vietnam began to celebrate the lunar New Year. Twenty-four hours later, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces struck a number of targets throughout South Vietnam, including other cities, towns, government buildings and U.S. and South Vietnamese military bases. There were over one hundred total attacks. Attacks also targeted the U.S. embassy in Saigon. A Viet Cong platoon got inside the complex’s court yard before U.S. forces destroyed enemy forces (History.com, 2009). NVA and VC also attacked the presidential palace, the airport, and the ARVN headquarters. The strikes on all of the major cities of Hue and Saigon had a significant psychological impact, as the North Vietnamese troops were not as weak as President Johnson and his administration suggested. One of the most important targets, from a symbolic and propagandistic point of view was the assault of the National Radio Station. The Vietcong troops brought with them a tape recording of Ho Chi Minh announcing the liberation of Saigon and calling for a “General Uprising” against the Thieu government. At 0300 on January 31, twelve Vietcong Sappers approached a Vietnamese Navy Head Quarters in two civilian cars, killing two guards and advancing towards the base gate. The sound of gun fire alerted base sentries and sounded the alarm. A .30-caliber machine gun that was on the second floor of the headquarters building disabled both cars and killed or wounded Vietcong Sapper while the Navy security force organized a security counter attack (Sherwood, 2015).
Battle of Hue
A significant point in the Tet Offensive is the Battle of Hue. In the early morning of January 31, 1968, a division sized force of North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldiers launched a devastating coordinated attack on the city of Hue. “At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky, and two battalions from the PAVN 6th Regiment attacked the western bank of the fortress-like Citadel on the northern side of the city. Their objective was to capture the Mang Ca Garrison (ARVN 1st Division headquarters in the Citadel), the Tây Lộc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The PAVN 4th Regiment launched a simultaneous attack on the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound in the new city on the south side of the river” (Shulimson et al., 1997). Three U.S. Marines Corps Battalions protected the air base at Phu Bai along Highway 1. At the same time, during the night of January 30-31, the North Vietnamese struck the city of Hue; the Marines faced rocket and mortar fire at the Phy Bai airfield. While fighting ensued, the Marines caught the enemy forces attempting to withdraw and took fire. Seeing and opportunity to trap the North Vietnamese, Cheatham reinforced Company H with his Command Group and Company F. Heavy street fighting followed the Marinesall the way through the city for three weeks. Many of the Marines of Task Force X-Ray had very little or no urban experience. A lot of the U.S. was not trained for urban close-quarters combat, so this battle was especially tough for the Marines.
“Due to Huế's religious and cultural status, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city, for fear of destroying the historic structures. Also, since it was still monsoon season in that area of the country with heavy rain and low clouds on many days during the battle. It was virtually impossible for the U.S. forces to use air support. But as the intensity of the battle increased, the policy was eliminated. The communist forces were constantly using snipers, hidden inside buildings or in spider holes, and prepared makeshift machine gun bunkers. They organized local counterattacks and, during the night, they prepared explosive booby traps. Sometimes booby traps were even placed under dead bodies” (Shulimson et al., 1997). The Battle of Hue was one of the bloodiest and longest battles in the Vietnam War. Passing through the city of Hue was Highway 1, an important supply line for U.S. and Allied forces. This highway ran from the coastal city of Da Nang to the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone. Early in their occupation, VC conducted house-to-house searches, arresting civil servants, religious leaders, teachers and other civilians connected with American forces or the South Vietnamese regime. They executed any and every one that who was not in line with their ideology or their cause.
“The toughest fighting in Hue occurred at the citadel, which the Communists struggled fiercely to hold against superior U.S. firepower. In scenes of carnage recorded on film by numerous television crews on the scene, nearly 150 U.S. Marines were killed in the Battle of Hue, along with some 400 South Vietnamese troops. On the Communist side, an estimated 5,000-8,000 soldiers were killed, most of them hit by American air and artillery strikes”. Mass graves were discovered evidence of the massacre after U.S. and allied forces regained control of the city on February 26, 1968. There were more than 2,800 bodies and 3,000 residence missing. (History.com, 2009).
Lessons Learned
The main lesson that was learned from the Tet Offensive was to pay attention to the intelligence that is presented before you.
“There was evidence in January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet holiday…it was evident that other attacks were imminent, and some targets had been identified” (Interim Report, 1968). Despite enemy security measures, communications intelligence was able to provide clear warning that attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever, were an immediate threat. There were U.S. and allied government officials felt that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lack the resources and means to pull of such an elaborate attack. Washington and Saigon expected attacks on some cities but they didn’t expect the offensive to affect the cities, the civilian command, control centers, radio stations and police headquarters as primary objectives. The general picture presented was an enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope and intensity. The main lesson learned during the Tet Offensive is to acknowledge the intelligence that is gathered from single source reporting. If General Westmoreland and other officers within the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would have planned for the attack via HUMINT and Communications reporting, the outcome of the Tet Offensive would have been different. By not acknowledging the intelligence, indications and warnings of the enemy, it allows unsuspecting enemies to conduct spectacular attacks such as the Tet Offensive. Another lesson learned is to never underestimate your enemy. If you underestimate your enemy, you will not know the enemy’s capabilities until it actually occurrs. In the case of the Tet Offensive, The U.S. and South Vietnamese forces underestimated the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong and the U.S. and allied forces paid a heavy
price.
Alternate ending
An alternate ending to the Tet Offensive is quite simple. In this alternate ending, General Westmoreland and the allied forces would act upon the reported intelligence. The South Vietnamese government would not allow over 50 percent of their force to take leave and would have personnel in place to counter the enemy’s attack. The North and South Vietnamese will still sign the cease fire truce, only to conduct deception operations. By continuing to sign the cease fire truce, this action will not alert the enemy that U.S. and allied forces are aware of their plan to attack on the Tet holiday. All U.S. and allied forces will be stage in places around Saigon, the city of Hue, and extra security will be positioned in and around the U.S. Embassy, and military compounds within South Vietnam. Also, extra security will be placed around the surrounding cities and especially the Ho Chi Minh trail. When the Vietcong attempt to launch their offensive attack, the necessary units and equipment will be in place to counter the offensive. Upon this alternate ending, the North Vietnamese military and Vietcong will retreat back to North Vietnam, therefore giving the U.S. and Allied forces a decisive victory on Tet. Another implication to this alternate victory is the Johnson administration would have look as if they were winning the war in Vietnam, thus garnering the support from the American populace. Not only garnering the support of the American public, but this initiative would have left an American presence in the region for years to come. President Johnson would have ran for another presidential term and most likely got re-elected.
Conclusion
both the United States and South Vietnamese military would have been better prepared to combat the surprised attacks on January 30, 1968. The purpose of this paper is to explain that if the allied military forces used the intelligence that was presented to them, the outcome of the Tet Offensive would have ended with a decisive victory by the U.S. and South Vietnamese allied forces by strategically placing personnel in key position and defeating the North Vietnamese and Vietcong surprise attacks.
Background
On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon declared that major operations were needed to neutralize North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. In order to do so, U.S. Commanders had to increase levels of service members in South Vietnam from 120,000 to 400,000 in order to achieve mission success. In February of 1966, General William Westmoreland argued the U.S. presence had succeeded in preventing the immediate defeat of the South Vietnamese government (Sears, 2008). In previous years, the celebration of Tet, the lunar New Year holiday had been the occasion for a formal truce in South Vietnam’s long-running conflict with North Vietnam and their Communist allies. In early January 1968, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces coordinated offensive surprise attacks aimed at breaking the stalemate in Vietnam. 70,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces coordinated a series of fierce attacks on more than 100 cities and towns in South Vietnam. Although U.S. and allied forces managed to hold off the communist attacks, news coverage of the offensive, including the battle of Hue shocked and dismayed the American public. This news thwarted the support of the American people for the Vietnam initiative. Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese achieved a strategic victory with the surprise attacks and marked a turning point in Vietnam War and the beginning of the slow, painful American withdrawal from the region (History.com, 2009).
North Vietnam and the Vietcong
The North Vietnamese and Vietcong conducted one of the greatest surprise attacks against the United States and allied forces in U.S. military history. The Tet Offensive of January 31, 1968 was a turning point in modern American military history and changed the way we view military intelligence and the impact that it can have on the battle field. The North Vietnamese knew that the fire power and the mobility of the U.S. Forces were too much for the North and the Vietcong to handle. Thus, they would comprise an elaborate plan that would change the course of the Vietnam War. Under “General Vo Nguyen Giap, leader of the Communist People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), planned the offensive in an attempt to foment rebellion among the South Vietnamese population and encourage the United States to scale back its support of the Saigon regime” (History.com, 2009). A year prior to the surprise attacks on January 31, 1968, PAVN and Vietcong smuggled weapons and ammo into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh trail. North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) smuggled stockpiles of weapons, equipment and ammunition through fake funeral processions. NVA and VC also conducted deception attacks on American Forces into South Vietnam. The NVA and VC would conduct small attacks in order to create a diversion that would allow other NVA and VC to have freedom of movement to smuggle weapons and ammo into the country. During the celebration of Tet, NVA and Vietcong personnel were also crossing the Demilitarized Zone to enter South Vietnam; blending in with the general population as if they were there to partake in the festivities was a part of their plan to stage an unforgettable attack. They were able to accomplish this because U.S., South Vietnamese forces and police personnel were far below their usual state of readiness level. The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff had authorized 50 percent leave for the celebration of Tet; making it possible for large numbers of Vietcong to enter South Vietnamese cities without causing alarm (Interim Report, 1968).
United States and Allied Forces
Under the leadership of General William Westmoreland, the United States’ militaries that were located in South Vietnam were unaware of the attacks they would soon ensue. There were multiple HUMINT Collection and Communications Intelligence reports that provided indicators and warnings of possible attacks during the Lunar New Year timeframe (January 30-31, 1968). However, General Westmorland and other higher echelon officers underestimated the capabilities of the NVA and Vietcong. By not taking the intelligence gathered by American intelligence sources, General Giap’s plan would ultimately change the way the American public view US involvement in a negative manner. This surprise attack would lead to an unrecoverable blow on the credibility of the Johnson administration. “There was evidence that the enemy was engaging in his much advertised “winter-spring campaign” and was preparing for a series of coordinated attacks, probably on a larger scale than before. There was evidence in early January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet Holiday” (Interim Report, 1968). There was a multitude of indicators that were primarily ignored by the U.S. Intelligence community and policy makers due to cognitive biases and political circumstances (HC Intelligence, 2013). Even though a cease fire truce was signed, reports of preplanned attacks continued to be gathered through HUMINT and Communication Intelligence efforts. U.S. and allied forces ignored reports because of cease fire truces being honored in the past.
The Surprise Attack
Early January 30, 1968, VC forces attacked 13 cities in central South Vietnam, just as individuals within South Vietnam began to celebrate the lunar New Year. Twenty-four hours later, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces struck a number of targets throughout South Vietnam, including other cities, towns, government buildings and U.S. and South Vietnamese military bases. There were over one hundred total attacks. Attacks also targeted the U.S. embassy in Saigon. A Viet Cong platoon got inside the complex’s court yard before U.S. forces destroyed enemy forces (History.com, 2009). NVA and VC also attacked the presidential palace, the airport, and the ARVN headquarters. The strikes on all of the major cities of Hue and Saigon had a significant psychological impact, as the North Vietnamese troops were not as weak as President Johnson and his administration suggested. One of the most important targets, from a symbolic and propagandistic point of view was the assault of the National Radio Station. The Vietcong troops brought with them a tape recording of Ho Chi Minh announcing the liberation of Saigon and calling for a “General Uprising” against the Thieu government. At 0300 on January 31, twelve Vietcong Sappers approached a Vietnamese Navy Head Quarters in two civilian cars, killing two guards and advancing towards the base gate. The sound of gun fire alerted base sentries and sounded the alarm. A .30-caliber machine gun that was on the second floor of the headquarters building disabled both cars and killed or wounded Vietcong Sapper while the Navy security force organized a security counter attack (Sherwood, 2015).
Battle of Hue
A significant point in the Tet Offensive is the Battle of Hue. In the early morning of January 31, 1968, a division sized force of North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldiers launched a devastating coordinated attack on the city of Hue. “At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky, and two battalions from the PAVN 6th Regiment attacked the western bank of the fortress-like Citadel on the northern side of the city. Their objective was to capture the Mang Ca Garrison (ARVN 1st Division headquarters in the Citadel), the Tây Lộc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The PAVN 4th Regiment launched a simultaneous attack on the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound in the new city on the south side of the river” (Shulimson et al., 1997). Three U.S. Marines Corps Battalions protected the air base at Phu Bai along Highway 1. At the same time, during the night of January 30-31, the North Vietnamese struck the city of Hue; the Marines faced rocket and mortar fire at the Phy Bai airfield. While fighting ensued, the Marines caught the enemy forces attempting to withdraw and took fire. Seeing and opportunity to trap the North Vietnamese, Cheatham reinforced Company H with his Command Group and Company F. Heavy street fighting followed the Marinesall the way through the city for three weeks. Many of the Marines of Task Force X-Ray had very little or no urban experience. A lot of the U.S. was not trained for urban close-quarters combat, so this battle was especially tough for the Marines.
“Due to Huế's religious and cultural status, Allied forces were ordered not to bomb or shell the city, for fear of destroying the historic structures. Also, since it was still monsoon season in that area of the country with heavy rain and low clouds on many days during the battle. It was virtually impossible for the U.S. forces to use air support. But as the intensity of the battle increased, the policy was eliminated. The communist forces were constantly using snipers, hidden inside buildings or in spider holes, and prepared makeshift machine gun bunkers. They organized local counterattacks and, during the night, they prepared explosive booby traps. Sometimes booby traps were even placed under dead bodies” (Shulimson et al., 1997). The Battle of Hue was one of the bloodiest and longest battles in the Vietnam War. Passing through the city of Hue was Highway 1, an important supply line for U.S. and Allied forces. This highway ran from the coastal city of Da Nang to the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone. Early in their occupation, VC conducted house-to-house searches, arresting civil servants, religious leaders, teachers and other civilians connected with American forces or the South Vietnamese regime. They executed any and every one that who was not in line with their ideology or their cause.
“The toughest fighting in Hue occurred at the citadel, which the Communists struggled fiercely to hold against superior U.S. firepower. In scenes of carnage recorded on film by numerous television crews on the scene, nearly 150 U.S. Marines were killed in the Battle of Hue, along with some 400 South Vietnamese troops. On the Communist side, an estimated 5,000-8,000 soldiers were killed, most of them hit by American air and artillery strikes”. Mass graves were discovered evidence of the massacre after U.S. and allied forces regained control of the city on February 26, 1968. There were more than 2,800 bodies and 3,000 residence missing. (History.com, 2009).
Lessons Learned
The main lesson that was learned from the Tet Offensive was to pay attention to the intelligence that is presented before you.
“There was evidence in January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet holiday…it was evident that other attacks were imminent, and some targets had been identified” (Interim Report, 1968). Despite enemy security measures, communications intelligence was able to provide clear warning that attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever, were an immediate threat. There were U.S. and allied government officials felt that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lack the resources and means to pull of such an elaborate attack. Washington and Saigon expected attacks on some cities but they didn’t expect the offensive to affect the cities, the civilian command, control centers, radio stations and police headquarters as primary objectives. The general picture presented was an enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope and intensity. The main lesson learned during the Tet Offensive is to acknowledge the intelligence that is gathered from single source reporting. If General Westmoreland and other officers within the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would have planned for the attack via HUMINT and Communications reporting, the outcome of the Tet Offensive would have been different. By not acknowledging the intelligence, indications and warnings of the enemy, it allows unsuspecting enemies to conduct spectacular attacks such as the Tet Offensive. Another lesson learned is to never underestimate your enemy. If you underestimate your enemy, you will not know the enemy’s capabilities until it actually occurrs. In the case of the Tet Offensive, The U.S. and South Vietnamese forces underestimated the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong and the U.S. and allied forces paid a heavy
price.
Alternate ending
An alternate ending to the Tet Offensive is quite simple. In this alternate ending, General Westmoreland and the allied forces would act upon the reported intelligence. The South Vietnamese government would not allow over 50 percent of their force to take leave and would have personnel in place to counter the enemy’s attack. The North and South Vietnamese will still sign the cease fire truce, only to conduct deception operations. By continuing to sign the cease fire truce, this action will not alert the enemy that U.S. and allied forces are aware of their plan to attack on the Tet holiday. All U.S. and allied forces will be stage in places around Saigon, the city of Hue, and extra security will be positioned in and around the U.S. Embassy, and military compounds within South Vietnam. Also, extra security will be placed around the surrounding cities and especially the Ho Chi Minh trail. When the Vietcong attempt to launch their offensive attack, the necessary units and equipment will be in place to counter the offensive. Upon this alternate ending, the North Vietnamese military and Vietcong will retreat back to North Vietnam, therefore giving the U.S. and Allied forces a decisive victory on Tet. Another implication to this alternate victory is the Johnson administration would have look as if they were winning the war in Vietnam, thus garnering the support from the American populace. Not only garnering the support of the American public, but this initiative would have left an American presence in the region for years to come. President Johnson would have ran for another presidential term and most likely got re-elected.
Conclusion