The ASF Framework Analysis

Another challenge is an outdated ASF framework to operationalize a force. It is now fourteen years since the ASF Framework was formulated and the operating environment has changed since then. The framework outlines the scenarios to guide the deployment of the ASF. However, these scenarios do not conform to the current environment. Currently, all the UN/AU peacekeeping missions in the African continent fall into scenario five and under chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, scenario one to four have become obsolete, because they are not applicable to the current environment in the African continent. The UN/AU employ these scenarios to argument multidimensional peacekeeping missions, scenario five. For the reason that the current environment
For example, the formation of African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (ACIRC) in 2013 by fourteen African countries. This initiative came because of the AU and ECOWAS embarrassment for their inability to act responsively in Mali, which compelled French troops to save the government of Mali. Again, the initiative came to make the AU more reactive as an interim arrangement for the ASF, because the ASF was not ready to deploy in any African crisis. Apparently, the ACIRC has not deployed in any African crisis since its establishment. It has been only engaged in training exercises alike the ASF. Therefore, both two, the ASF and ACIRC are security mechanisms of the AU that will reduplicate and compete for the same resources and efforts. Additionally, some “heavyweight” countries in Africa in terms of instruments of national power, such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya are not members of the ACIRC. Therefore, this will affect the effectiveness of the ACIRC, due to lack of consensus among the AU member states on decisions to deploy the force. Although, it is an ideal initiative that would act as an interim arrangement for the ASF, the ACIRC will confront the same challenges alike the ASF. The member countries have resources’ constraints, same authorizing authority, the AU, besides political will, commitment, and consensus of the AU member states. This means that, the non-consent of non-members of the ACIRC who are the majority of the AU member states will directly affect the deployment of the force, if the deployment of the force impinges on their