systemic factors within the dynamic international system. Gaddis argues that the Cold War ended due to the emergence of individual political actors who were able to harness “intangible” qualities within themselves and their societies (Gaddis 2005, 107). These virtues- fearlessness, frankness, and dramatic skill, among others- allowed these actors to expose the material realities caused and hidden by the ideological struggle (Gaddis 2005, 107 & 119). Moreover, they permitted these actors to discuss the issues of the Cold War evolutionarily. While most viewed concepts such as Mutually Assured Destruction and bipolarity as concrete structures of global politics, revisionists sought new ideas (Gaddis 2005, 123). The resulting expansion of discussion ended détente, allowing the Cold War to conclude. Gaddis focuses upon the actions of Reagan, Wałęsa, John Paul II, Deng Xiapong, and Thatcher to support his arguments (Gaddis 2005, 121). His consideration of Reagan best examples how “intangible” character traits allow individuals to revise the international system. Reagan relied on the power of words and ideas while attempting to reshape the politics of the international community (Gaddis 2005, 123).
Gaddis asserts that Reagan understood the stagnatic nature of détente within the framework of the Cold War, and that his concentrated effort to abandon the policy was successful due to his oratory skill (Gaddis 2005, 123). Reagan’s public focus on the transitory character of Communist political ideology dramatically shifted American perception of the conflict. His “Evil Empire” speech reminded his domestic audience of the Soviet leadership’s illegitimacy and reiterated the inferiority of the communist system (Gaddis 2005, 124). More importantly, Reagan’s introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative questioned the concept of security through vulnerability; challenging the basis of SALT I and the existence of nuclear weapons entirely (Gaddis 2005, 125). Reagan’s individual maneuvering of the complex issues surrounding the Cold War garnered Gorbachev’s trust and exposed the failure of the Brezhnev Doctrine, leading to the conclusion of the conflict (Gaddis 2005, 128 & …show more content…
130). “Actors” also argues for the potential of weak leaders to cause change within the international system by highlighting instances in which a world leader’s failures complicated interstate political issues. Gaddis’s evaluation of Brezhnev’s leadership capabilities explicitly mentions the Soviet dictator’s drug-related incapacity and argues that the USSR was critically weakened by his miscalculation of the country’s means and ends (Gaddis 2005, 110 & 219). Brezhnev’s inability to comprehend the complexity of Cold War politics resulted in military control of Soviet foreign policy (Gaddis 2005, 110). Gaddis determines the USSR’s focus on offensive strategy after SALT I to be the result of this military influence, therefore partially blaming Brezhnev’s weakness for American skepticism toward SALT II (Gaddis 2005, 110). Gaddis later characterizes Gorbachev as lacking the conviction of his contemporaries, and attributes Reagan’s influence over him to this malleability (Gaddis 2005, 127). While concentrating this chapter on the individual’s influence on global politics, Gaddis does retain vestiges of his former realism. After introducing his intention to discuss the importance of individual actors to the end of the Cold War, he couches his argument within a systemic framework. Gaddis says that “[These actors] COULD (sic) hardly have [ended the Cold War] had the stage not been set by the collapse of détente” (Gaddis 2005, 108). He then provides several pages’ worth of international systemic processes which contributed to the end of détente. Among the factors included are: the continued emergence of democratic states, wider access to state sponsored higher education, and the development of mass communication (Gaddis 2005, 109). Gaddis argues that these systemic trends weakened elite authority across the globe, ushering the abandonment of détente and the end of the Cold War (Gaddis 2005, 109). The Oxford Handbook of International Relations defines realist scholars as those who identify the state as the primary actor in the international system (Reus-Smit & Snidal, 2008). With this definition in mind, Gaddis’s ‘challenge’ to the realist interpretation of international affairs is better characterized as a philosophical development, rather than an outright denunciation. As outlined above, Gaddis makes clear his belief in the importance of systemic factors to the international system. Realists believe these factors to determine the nature of global politics (Reus-Snidal, 2008). For example, Kaplan argues the fate of mankind to be predetermined by certain geographic realities- and is therefore classified as a geopolitical realist (Kaplan 2012). Gaddis never disputes the importance of political trends or a state’s actions to international affairs. Rather, he specifically mentions their importance throughout the entire chapter. His challenge to orthodox realism lies in his insistence on the importance of the individual within the system, which continually fluctuates depending on external (see: systemic) factors (Gaddis 2005, 107). Gaddis argues that “trends hardly every converge automatically,” and that actors work as catalysts for these trends (Gaddis 2005, 121). The addition of the individual actor into Gaddis’s interpretation provides a more complex understanding of the variables that shape international order by breaking from the limitations of neoclassical realism. The importance of individual action on the international system is exhibited throughout history.
In accordance with Gaddis’s arguments, the past provides many examples of actors who shaped the world around them through their character. Metternich’s role in the preservation of the Austrian state serves as one of the best examples of this influence. His organization of the Congress of Vienna and diplomatic skill resulted in the establishment of both the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance (Kissinger 1994, 85). Kissinger argues that systemic state-building trends weakened Austria during the nineteenth century, but that Metternich’s construction of the Congress system facilitated European peace and rejected power politics (Kissinger 1994, 85). Bismarck serves as another historical example of Gaddis’s individualist argument. Kissinger repeatedly credits the first unification of Germany to Bismarck’s personal political prowess (Kissinger 1994, 187). The decline of both Austria and Germany after the removal of Metternich and Bismarck provides evidence of their unique political
ability. Gaddis’s ability to isolate significant influences on the international system is based upon his understanding of the complex relationship between systemic factors and individual actors. His consideration of factors outside ideological and economic trends incorporates the anarchic nature of international relations comprehensively; factoring a degree of uncertainty into interstate politics that is absent from Kaplan’s geopolitical argument. Gaddis’s attention to the dynamic nature of the international system due to individual actors strengthens his analysis of the Cold War, revealing its causes comprehensively.