The Contribution of Speech Act Theory to the Analysis of Conversation
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The Contribution of Speech Act Theory to the Analysis of Conversation: How
Pre-sequences Work
Francois Cooren
Universite de Montreal
Language and Social Interaction scholars (whether ethnomethodologists, ethnographers, or conversation analysts) often criticize speech act theorists for using invented sentences and fictional situations to illustrate their points, a practice which, according to these detractors, fails to capture the complexity and sequentiality of human interactions. In contrast, speech act theorists tend to accuse their opponents of falling into empiricism by collecting and analyzing naturally occurring pieces of interaction without truly explaining the inferential mechanisms by which interlocutors succeed or fail to coordinate their activities. In what follows, I will show how these two approaches to Language and Social
Interaction could actually benefit from each other. Contrary to what even Searle (2002) claims, speech act theory can contribute to our better understanding of some important interactional phenomena that have been discovered and highlighted by conversation analysts for the last thirty years.
More precisely, I propose a reconsideration of the critique Schegloff (1988) addressed to Searle in his analysis of pre-sequences and indirection. Contrary to what Schegloff contends, speech act theory can explain the inferential mechanisms by which inter locutors come not only to produce and understand pre-sequences, but also to mistake them for requests for information. Although Schegloff is right to point out that the phenomenon of pre-sequences has not been anticipated by Searle's (1969, 1979) theory, he is wrong to think that this model is ill equipped to explain the logic of the produc tion and (mis)comprehension of this conversational phenomenon. Interestingly enough, speech act theory—and this is the analytical power of this theory—could even help us anticipate forms of pre-sequences that have not yet
The Contribution of Speech Act Theory to the Analysis of Conversation: How
Pre-sequences Work
Francois Cooren
Universite de Montreal
Language and Social Interaction scholars (whether ethnomethodologists, ethnographers, or conversation analysts) often criticize speech act theorists for using invented sentences and fictional situations to illustrate their points, a practice which, according to these detractors, fails to capture the complexity and sequentiality of human interactions. In contrast, speech act theorists tend to accuse their opponents of falling into empiricism by collecting and analyzing naturally occurring pieces of interaction without truly explaining the inferential mechanisms by which interlocutors succeed or fail to coordinate their activities. In what follows, I will show how these two approaches to Language and Social
Interaction could actually benefit from each other. Contrary to what even Searle (2002) claims, speech act theory can contribute to our better understanding of some important interactional phenomena that have been discovered and highlighted by conversation analysts for the last thirty years.
More precisely, I propose a reconsideration of the critique Schegloff (1988) addressed to Searle in his analysis of pre-sequences and indirection. Contrary to what Schegloff contends, speech act theory can explain the inferential mechanisms by which inter locutors come not only to produce and understand pre-sequences, but also to mistake them for requests for information. Although Schegloff is right to point out that the phenomenon of pre-sequences has not been anticipated by Searle's (1969, 1979) theory, he is wrong to think that this model is ill equipped to explain the logic of the produc tion and (mis)comprehension of this conversational phenomenon. Interestingly enough, speech act theory—and this is the analytical power of this theory—could even help us anticipate forms of pre-sequences that have not yet