The great arms race during the 1950s and the ‘60s caused the conflict of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 which strained the nation and the world. The fourteen days that the United States government and the Russian government interacted emphasized the seriousness and the intense rivalry between the two super powers. The idea of a mass nuclear war, a third world War, or the wipe out of the whole population of Earth developed and loomed in the minds of the government officials who were involved in this crisis. In a memoir written by Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General during the time of the Cuban crisis, described the heated and disputed ideas and actions taken by the American government. The missiles …show more content…
that were discovered were indeed situated in Cuba; however, it is evident that the full picture extended overseas to countries and areas such as Turkey, Berlin, and Russia. The Cuban Missile Crisis represents the American ability to handle foreign relationships and the result of egotistical battles fought between super powers that hold the key to destruction of mankind. Before the start of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the rise of the Communist regime threatened the American government, an avid advocate of democracy.
Therefore, the revolutionary uprisings and the conquest of Cuba by Fidel Castro, the communist dictator of the country irked the Eisenhower administration. A failed invasion of Cuba known as the Bay of Pigs contributed to the advent of the conflict. Presented during the Eisenhower administration but approved during the Kennedy administration, this attempted overthrow of Castro naturally and ideologically pushed Cuba to extend a hand toward Russia in hopes of protection. This newly presented opportunity for the Soviets opened Cuban doors for the entry of intermediate range Soviet missiles- 90 miles away from American territory, thus setting forth the full Cuban Missile …show more content…
Crisis. During this critical period, President John F. Kennedy collected special members into a newly created group called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm.) Consisting of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McCone, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, President Kennedy’s adviser on national-security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, Attorney General and brother of President Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy and many more officials, this group continually “met, talked, argued, and fought together during that crucial period of time” (Kennedy 25). It was from this collected group of intellectuals that sources were identified, possible decisions argued, photographs released and debated, and the fate of the world handled.
The discovery of the missiles and the secrecy in which the Soviets worked was a major instigator of the crisis. The Central Intelligence Agency came in with photographs taken by U-2 aircrafts which convinced the CIA of implantations of atomic weapons in Cuba. The photographic missions continued throughout the following two weeks and used as evidence and basis of action. The initial Soviet reaction was that of oblivion and rejection of any sort of involvement in this case. On September 11, 1962, Moscow even extended to release a statement saying that the transfer of nuclear missiles to any country outside the Soviet Union was unnecessary, including Cuba. This created greater suspicions and distrust between the two countries especially because personal contact with Soviet representatives and Khrushchev himself did not reveal the complete truth- only the photographs and American intelligence showed the missile placements. This was particularly seen in Robert F. Kennedy’s interaction with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. At the initial contact, Dobrynin refused to say anything known about the military installations but only ventured to say that he had been told by Khrushchev that there were none. This interaction that continued beyond one meeting proved to be essentially useless (Gow 72). However, differing views on this interaction exist. In one way, Dobrynin showed signs of deception but in another, the frequent meetings were able to deliver personal American opinions about the matter. The Ambassador was used as a channel to Khrushchev and also a tester to see the general direction of the Soviet. In his memoir, Attorney General Kennedy frequently reflects on his conversations with the Ambassador demonstrating frequent foreign communication that showed explicit firm but suggested peace. Possibly the greatest challenge and question that arose during this conflict is whether or not the United States should use military actions and whether a naval quarantine would be strong enough. The Ex Comm was filled with differing opinions; however, it was evident that some sort of action needed to be taken. Discussing the potential military actions, Attorney General Kennedy stated to the President that “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.” (Kennedy 25). If the United States did decide to use an air strike to rid of the missile site in Cuba, the world would view it as act of imperialism, an act of a large and powerful country oppressing the smaller.
The Ex Comm’s final decision after intense debate turned up a more peaceful yet demonstrative quarantine. This was after a series of interactions between President Kennedy and Khrushchev which consisted of accusations of threat and warnings. On October 24th, the advent of the blockage brought forth the first naval ship to ship interaction between the Soviets and the Americans. On the 500- mile blockage line, The U.S confronted two Soviet ships, the Gagarin and the Komiles spotted with a submarine situation in between the two. Within 30 minutes of the blockade, fourteen other Soviet ships reached the vicinity of the blockade. However, these confrontations did not spark any militaristic action. These ships either stood still or turned back to head back to the Soviet. This decision and careful act by the Soviets sparked hope in the American government with the possibility of peaceful negotiations. Yet the construction of a missile base in Cuba sped up and continued with even more workers building on the site. Members of the Congress and the military leaders of the Ex Comm pressed for stronger retaliation. President Kennedy in turn heightened U-2 aircraft activity, sending in low flying planes into Cuban air space as a warning and warned the Pentagon about further military actions. 250,000 men, 2,000 air sorties, and 90,000 Marines and Airborne were assigned to the invasion force.
In a particularly emotional and extensive letter written by Khrushchev, he expressed desires of creating peaceful negotiations, realizing the consequence of a war. This letter, received on October 26th, was followed up by a less personal and official letter stating further negotiation terms. If the United States wanted missiles out of Cuba, then the Soviets wanted weapons out of Turkey. The United States would not go along with the deal of “missile for missile” exchange (Gow 78). It was an old desire of President to remove those missiles but was never carried out right away; however, the removal of the missiles in Turkey would not suffice during this precarious period in which the United States was pressured. This emphasized the fact that the war was not situated in the western hemisphere alone, but on a global scale. That the Cold War and arm race was grander than what it appeared to be. In a letter from Dobrynin to R. Kennedy, he compared the Turkish missile placement of the United States to that of Soviet missile placement in Cuba thus stating that the Soviet competition was supposedly balancing the threat. All the more, there was further confusion when a Soviet missile shot down a U-2 plane flying over Cuba, killing the pilot, Rudolf Anderson Jr. This pushed the United States into giving the Soviet a final warning and taking a step closer to world wide destruction.
A letter written by Robert F. Kennedy and Secretary McNamara, accepted the some conditions offered by the Russians and proposed other American contributions. The letter listed that the Russians remove the missiles out of Cuba under the inspection of the United Nations and the America would, also under arrangement through the United Nations, remove the quarantine and give assurances the an invasion of Cuba would not occur. Finally, terms were accepted and Khrushchev declared a statement on a Moscow radio broadcast ending the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 28th 9:00 A.M. delivered to Secretary of State Rusk at 11:00 A.M (Gow 80). Negotiations and contact between the two countries were on a personal and global scale.
During a United Nations meeting, Adlai Stevenson questioned the Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin using photographs from U-2 carriers about the knowledge and the distasteful action of the Soviet Union. This open criticism and humiliation of the Soviet in front of the United Nations created a global crisis that U Thant, the acting Secretary General at that time commented in his October 24, 1962 address saying, “What is at stake is not just the interests of the parties directly involved, nor just the interests of all members, but the very fate of mankind…” Indeed it was not only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba that were involved. The safety of the whole world involved. The South American countries gave full support of the United States, The Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European countries, and two African countries, Guinea and Senegal, also gave the U.S.A proper supporting and legal basis of the quarantine. In order for the Soviet aircrafts to conduct a war strike, the planes would have to land in western Africa to refuel, revealing the importance of the African countries in an seemingly unrelated conflict. Without the whole support of NATO and other organizations, the position of the United States would have been undermined (Kennedy
93). The Cuban Missile Crisis did not signify an end to the arms race as the Soviet continued to build their military and the United States continues to hold nuclear weapons. However, the situation symbolized American diplomacy and the graveness of a nuclear third world war. The involvement of governmental associations, the many other countries, and non profit organizations demonstrated global cooperation in times of serious threat. The careful actions of the Ex Comm and the collective actions of the President Kennedy reflected show the intensity of the crisis as a whole along the Soviet rivalry. This crisis fully demonstrates the result of a clash of two superior powers and what provocations such as this can call.