The Dichotomy Between Free Will And Determinism

Compatibilism attempts to solve the seemingly inconsistent coexistence of free will in a deterministic universe. In so doing, it rejects what is considered a “false dichotomy” between having to choose in the either the exclusive existence of determinism or free will. Therefore, compatibilism is an inclusive endeavor that seeks to bridge the gap. In the framework of the argument presented, a compatibilist will accept as true that the universe has determinate physical causes, representing a causal chain that is necessitated by preceding actions. Moreover, the existence of human “free will” need not be logically inconsistent with this proposed state of affairs. The first premise and by logical extension, the final premise both rest on faulty information.
The contingency of human actions on prior events, whether the cause link is physical, theological, or otherwise, suggests that power over choices and their alternatives is limited. The compatibilists answer with their own set of counter arguments. Classical compatibilist philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, have posited that freedom exists when one is unimpeded from action. Free will can exist in the determinist context if there are no barriers preventing one from acting according to one’s own volition. A positive and negative component of classical compatibilism is expressed most succinctly when Thomas Hobbes wrote of a person's acting with “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe [sic]” (Leviathan, p.108). The positive axiom “what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” implies human agency, and coupled with its negative component “no stop,” creates a scenario wherein human free will can be exercised in a set of determinate conditions. This can be understood by what is called “one way freedom,” an evaluation looking at the argument based upon the actual actions of a human agent, rather than the potential alternatives. Incompatibilists have used this to show that freedom is not present when more than one choice is not available. In other words, simply
If power necessity is required to change the facts of nature of the past, and one lacks this power, then the future is completely determined by the natural facts of the past that are outside of human control. Consequently, determinism would not entail free will- severely undercutting the compatibilist argument. One way of addressing this is to say that an agent could do otherwise simply if he or she willed or chose to do so. A counterfactual approach to this problem entails that if an agent had chosen to perform an action than is otherwise willed and performed, it would in effect be the result of a different set of past causes. Moreover, it provides the human agent with control over actions, providing strength to the existence of free