The Greenbik Case
Withholding Supply
There could be a stronger case for withholding supply under s 98 if unsuccessful under s 46 . Greenbike is treating Cycloplatform unfavourably with respect to timing of delivery of replacement parts and this is a violation of s 98(1)(c) .
Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing which breaches CCA if advantage is taken by a competitor with substantial market power for the anti-competitive purpose to provide services below cost price to drive other competitors from market. The facts do suggest signs of predatory pricing as regardless of how much discounting Cycloplatform gives it is still unable to obtain tenders with city councils. There is the possibility that the three major competitors provide lower quality services and …show more content…
The conclusion drawn from Arnotts Ltd v TPC was it could not be established the appropriate market was wider than just biscuit and subsequently was found to have breach s 50 . Similarly, Cycloplatform cannot claim by acquiring the two competitors it was had a market outside of bike sharing therefore the merger would not be successful. Horizontal mergers have the effects of concentration of market power, facilitating collusive conduct and leading to output restriction. The ACCC would also take into account factors listed in s 50(3) in determining whether the acquisition would likely have the effect of substantially lessening competition. The main problem with horizontal mergers is it not only lessens competition but harms consumers. The remaining firms following the merger have the ability to act in a coordinate manner on certain competitive dimension via coordinated interaction. As the ACCC is most concerned about consumer impacts implications such higher prices, lower quality and a reduction in choice would warrant most horizontal mergers …show more content…
Authorisation is granted in cases where public benefits overshadows any anti-competitive harm.
Remedies
Common remedies for breach of contravention includes but is not limited to pecuniary penalties , damages and divesture . In some circumstances, non-punitive orders may be imposed.
Conclusion:
Overall, it is more likely Jane would have greater success by exercising rights Cycloplatform holds under the CCA as there are numerous problems associated with the merger. Cycloplatform may have a case for predatory pricing if more detailed had been provided. It is advisable for Jane to look further into discriminatory pricing and withholding supply as they appear to be the better options to
There could be a stronger case for withholding supply under s 98 if unsuccessful under s 46 . Greenbike is treating Cycloplatform unfavourably with respect to timing of delivery of replacement parts and this is a violation of s 98(1)(c) .
Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing which breaches CCA if advantage is taken by a competitor with substantial market power for the anti-competitive purpose to provide services below cost price to drive other competitors from market. The facts do suggest signs of predatory pricing as regardless of how much discounting Cycloplatform gives it is still unable to obtain tenders with city councils. There is the possibility that the three major competitors provide lower quality services and …show more content…
The conclusion drawn from Arnotts Ltd v TPC was it could not be established the appropriate market was wider than just biscuit and subsequently was found to have breach s 50 . Similarly, Cycloplatform cannot claim by acquiring the two competitors it was had a market outside of bike sharing therefore the merger would not be successful. Horizontal mergers have the effects of concentration of market power, facilitating collusive conduct and leading to output restriction. The ACCC would also take into account factors listed in s 50(3) in determining whether the acquisition would likely have the effect of substantially lessening competition. The main problem with horizontal mergers is it not only lessens competition but harms consumers. The remaining firms following the merger have the ability to act in a coordinate manner on certain competitive dimension via coordinated interaction. As the ACCC is most concerned about consumer impacts implications such higher prices, lower quality and a reduction in choice would warrant most horizontal mergers …show more content…
Authorisation is granted in cases where public benefits overshadows any anti-competitive harm.
Remedies
Common remedies for breach of contravention includes but is not limited to pecuniary penalties , damages and divesture . In some circumstances, non-punitive orders may be imposed.
Conclusion:
Overall, it is more likely Jane would have greater success by exercising rights Cycloplatform holds under the CCA as there are numerous problems associated with the merger. Cycloplatform may have a case for predatory pricing if more detailed had been provided. It is advisable for Jane to look further into discriminatory pricing and withholding supply as they appear to be the better options to