“the Human Rights Act Has Revolutionised the Way in Which Judges Interpret Statutes.”
University of London
Common Law Reasoning and Institutions
Topic Title:
“The Human Rights Act has revolutionised the way in which judges interpret statutes.”
Student Number:
111242632
Candidate Number:
110855
The statute is a piece of legislature that is set out by Parliament to legislate the laws of United Kingdom to be used by the courts in legal proceedings. Though written by the Parliament, the duty to interpret and apply the statutes fall on the courts, more specifically the judges to enact the statute and interpret it to suit the proceedings. Thus in other words, the duty to interpret statutes fall within the responsibilities of the judge. To help with the interpretation of statutes, the Parliament has passed the Interpretation Act 1978, but it is of not much use as it only provides standard definitions of common provisions and not notes for interpretation. Thus, the judges have took up the responsibility to create rules of interpretation, which are not really rules but are different approach to interpret statutes which are created by Parliament. For example, the literal rule is used to interpret a statute to its literal meaning which is stated. Then we have the golden rule, which is used to interpret the statute, if meaning is construed through the literal meaning, to alter the meaning to not be absurd, as the will of Parliament. The third rule is the mischief rule, as laid down in Heydon 's Case [1584] EWHC Exch J36 stated that for the true interpretation of a statute, four things are to be considered, where the first is what was the common law before enactment of the Act, the second is what the mischief and defect for which the common law did not adequately deal, the third being the remedy Parliament resolved and appointed to cure the defect caused and the fourth is the true reason of the remedy. Thus by considering this four points, the judge will then interpret a statute in such a way to suppress the mischief and advance the
Common Law Reasoning and Institutions
Topic Title:
“The Human Rights Act has revolutionised the way in which judges interpret statutes.”
Student Number:
111242632
Candidate Number:
110855
The statute is a piece of legislature that is set out by Parliament to legislate the laws of United Kingdom to be used by the courts in legal proceedings. Though written by the Parliament, the duty to interpret and apply the statutes fall on the courts, more specifically the judges to enact the statute and interpret it to suit the proceedings. Thus in other words, the duty to interpret statutes fall within the responsibilities of the judge. To help with the interpretation of statutes, the Parliament has passed the Interpretation Act 1978, but it is of not much use as it only provides standard definitions of common provisions and not notes for interpretation. Thus, the judges have took up the responsibility to create rules of interpretation, which are not really rules but are different approach to interpret statutes which are created by Parliament. For example, the literal rule is used to interpret a statute to its literal meaning which is stated. Then we have the golden rule, which is used to interpret the statute, if meaning is construed through the literal meaning, to alter the meaning to not be absurd, as the will of Parliament. The third rule is the mischief rule, as laid down in Heydon 's Case [1584] EWHC Exch J36 stated that for the true interpretation of a statute, four things are to be considered, where the first is what was the common law before enactment of the Act, the second is what the mischief and defect for which the common law did not adequately deal, the third being the remedy Parliament resolved and appointed to cure the defect caused and the fourth is the true reason of the remedy. Thus by considering this four points, the judge will then interpret a statute in such a way to suppress the mischief and advance the
Bibliography: Books Keith E, ‘Speech by Keith Ewing, Professor of Public Law, King 's College, London, Labour Party Conference, Bournemouth, Monday 27th September 1999’ (1st edn LPCC, Media Office 1999) Articles Kavanagh A, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Intentions in Adjudication under the HRA 1998’(2006) 26 O.J.L.S