The Ministerial Advisership
Ministerial advisers have become an integral component in the relationship between Australian ministers and Senior Public Servants (Maley, 2011). Initially introducted by the Whitlam government in 1972 due to perceived imbalances in ministerial power (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96), the function and presence of ministerial advisers has significantly expanding, and is now widely recognized as an important feature of the executive process (OECD, 2011). The adviser’s role is highly varied, dependent on factors such as political or social context, the leadership style of their ministers, and the attitude of the departments they are affiliated with (Maley, 2011, 1470). In its simplest form, the adviser role may be defined as an independent, partisan source of advice for ministers on departmental outputs regarding political affairs (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007, 454). Advisers also serve an important function to the Australian Public Service (APS)
…show more content…
specifically Senior Public Servants (SPSs) (Maley, 2000). While advisers have not always been supported by the Public Service (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010), the changing nature of political processes and structure in the federal sphere has led to advisers becoming a heavily valued part of executive relations (Maley, 2011; Halligan, 2013). As such, this essay argues that the role of the ministerial adviser is primarily to support ministers and public servants independently, which in turn facilitates efficient, compliant negotiations between the two factions to achieve policy making. The development of the adviser role was in response to tensions between ministers and the APS, thus advisors serve a vital function in maintaining equilibrium between the two factions (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010). It is important to recognise that while this essay will be solely focused on the development and role of advisers in the executive, other reforms were put in place, such as New Public Management, that played a major role in restructuring the Australian political framework, but will not be discussed in this essay. Instead, this essay is centralized on the development of advisers in Australian politics in the 1970s and 80s and the way in which this has influenced ministers and SPSs and their relations in contemporary Australian politics.
Political advisers were first introduced to the federal political system in 1972, with the election of Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96). Whitlam employed political advisers as a response to the ‘remarkable lack of ministerial control over departments and over policy’ (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101), which had contributed to growing concern that the public service was too independent not sufficiently responsible to the ministry (Podger, 2004). These factors, teamed with shortages of staff and increasing political complexities (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96) gave significant cause for the introduction of external partisan advisers. The advisers were aimed at reducing ministers’ reliance on SPSs by providing partisan ‘outsiders’ who could contribute to the policy-making process and replace the administrative and liaison roles of public servants, a goal that created significant tensions between advisers and departments (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96). Unfortunately, this was not achieved; advisers employed during the Whitlam era held little influence over policy issues, given their inexperience and small numbers (Maley, 2002, 104), this allowed departments to largely resist them, a factor which undermined their purpose of regaining ministerial control (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). Moreover, research commissioned by the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) found that, while advisers’ roles were widely varied, their position itself was anomalous (Smith, 1976, as cited in Maley, 2002, 104). This implied that the accommodation of the adviser in the executive would be complicated and potentially limited, a notion strongly supported by the public service. When Fraser gained leadership in 1975, he largely supported the advice from the APS and significantly cut back advisers across departments (Maley, 2002, 104), with the exception of the Prime Ministerial office.
Fraser’s use of advisers in the prime ministerial office played a major role in the policy dominance he held during his tenure as Prime Minister (Walter, 1986, via Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010). However, other departments were fraught with concern regarding the increasing ministerial power held by the APS (Halligan, 2013, 115), a phenomenon largely due to overwhelming workload of ministers, which the advisers were initially installed to reduce (Maley, 2002, 104).
When Labor regained office in 1983, they reinstated the advisor role, making them a key component of bureaucratic processes, a construct that still exists today (Halligan, 2013).
Prime Minister Hawke perceived there to be a substantial imbalance in the distribution of power and influence in the executive, towards permanent rather than elected political officials (Halligan, 2013, 115), and viewed advisers as the key tool to overcome this imbalance and regain control over the bureaucracy (Maley, 2002, 104). To achieve this, The Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 was put in place, which enabled ministers to employ a person external to the public service as a consultant or adviser, with the approval of the Prime Minister. This Act provided empowerment of ministers through the induction of advisers while preserving the neutrality of the Public Service through clearly defined managerial roles (Halligan, 2013). This allowed tighter political control over objectives and results through greater managerial autonomy (Mulgan, 2010,
290).
The measures put in place by the Hawke government in the 1980s have legitimized the advisers’ role in federal parliament (Mulgan, 2010), and are viewed by political executives as playing a crucial role in addressing the issues in directing modern government (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). Ministerial advisers were initially introduced to help combat increased growth and complexity in the executive (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 98), an issue that has only increased over time, in conjunction with additional pressures that have appeared with the rise of media scrutiny (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 99). The unique insight that a ministerial adviser has, as a partisan ‘outsider’ to the public service means that they are not only valued in the executive sphere, but are able to undertake a broad range of roles to ease the aforementioned pressures, with an emphasis on three significant types of support. First, they aid the minister in performing their role, enabling political leadership. Second, they help the minister in policy design and formation, facilitating positive relationships with political officals. Third, they aid the ministry in the coordination of cabinet (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 100).
Advisers provide support for ministers in carrying out their role in both a political and a personal fashion. The initial introduction of ministerial advisers in the 1970s was aimed at providing a means of increasing the capacity of ministers while preventing them from being overwhelmed by the changing political and social environment (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). The overwhelming workload of ministers was perceived to be a threat to ministerial responsibility thus measures such as advisers were put in place, allowing ministers to delegate work to others in order to focus on more important functions, such as policy-making and policy framework design (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). Given that delegating this to SPSs would impinge upon the need for neutrality in the public service, partisan ‘outsiders’ advisers were employed to protect both the ministerial responsibility of the executive and the impartiality of the public service. In this manner, advisers served to preserve the professional relationship between ministers and SPSs. Advisers would provide personal support to ministers by filtering the demands that are placed on a minister at any given time and selecting what would be the minister’s focus (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 102), a role that would not be appropriate for a public servant given its partisan nature Furthermore, advisers also provided important political support for the minister, both within the office and in the public. Advisers may be required to negotiate decisions or policies with other members of the executive in place of the minister, a matter that requires substantial political knowledge and understanding, both of party policies and political affairs (OECD, 2011). The political support provided by advisers afforded ministers greater time to engage in tasks of greater significance, such as directing policy. Moreover, the partisan qualities of advisers allowed them to advise ministers on policy-making, a quality not afforded by SPSs given their impartiality (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 102).
The role that advisers played in policy-making occurred in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the policy process (Colebatch, 1998, as cited in Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). The ‘vertical’ dimension refers to the processes occurring between authorised officials as departments and ministers work together in policy-making, in addition to hierarchical decision-making within the executive (Colebatch, 1998, as cited in Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). The ‘horizontal’ dimension involves political activity that transcends organization boundaries (Colebatch, 1998, in cited in Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 1019). The vertical dimension is evident in advisers’ relationships with SPSs and their ministers, as well as their involvement in negotiations between SPSs and ministers (Maley, 2011, 1469). A significant example of this is the relationship between Prime Minister Keating and his adviser Don Russell, who decided ‘jointly what to say, what not to say, what the tone and volume would be’ (Watson, 2002, as cited in Maley, 2011, 1477). This partisan role would not be possible for an SPS given their impartial status. Advisers could also be involved in horizontal relationships with interest groups, as examined in a study by Maley (2000). Maley (2000) found that advisers played an important role in promoting the agenda of the minister while engaged in negotiations with other political groups, such as SPSs, cabinet and other political parties (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 103).
Ministerial advisers provide significant support for ministers in a plethora of ways. This flexibility and breadth of knowledge means that partisan advisers are not only valuable to ministers but are also an asset to the public service (Wilson, 2003, 373), given their roles in networking and negotiation between executive officials and interest groups.
Senior Public Servants (SPSs) play a significant role in policy-making, however their interactions with the executive is strictly regulated to maintain neutrality, a key component of the public service (Mulgan, 2010). Given that the core unit of executive government is primarily a private, partisan sphere, separate from public servants, ministerial advisers provide a platform for public servants to gain knowledge and understanding of ministerial views and policies, aiding the functioning of policy processes and development (Maley, 2011, 1470). The primary way in which ministerial advisers assist SPSs is through networking, which in turn preserves the neutrality of the public service.
Networking refers to advisers work with other advisers and public servants, functioning to expand the minister’s communications with colleagues (Maley, 2011, 1486). It can involve forming and maintaining relationships, and the use of those relationships in the conveyance, lobby and negotiation of policy decisions (Maley, 2011, 1471). For this reason, it may be argued that the work that is achieved through networking is better described as ‘the strategic use of informal personal contacts’ (Maley, 2011, 1471). Networking utilises the informal aspects of the cabinet system, focusing on the personal connections between individuals, acting as ‘facilitative links’ in the cabinet system, used strategically by advisers in negotiation and coordination (Maley, 2011, 1472). Moreover, networking provides links between ministers and SPSs, which are important components of the policy-making process. A study conducted by Maley (2011), showed the value that SPSs held in networking, as one public servant stated,
Advisers play a really important role within Parliament House. The linkages between minister’s offices are important for the ministry, to keep them across what’s going on. It’s really important for departments … because we can’t go to another minister’s office and find out what they’re thinking … It’s just keeping the communication open so the whole of government is moving in one direction. It’s a coordination role.
(Maley, 2011, 1473).
The view held by public servants in this study indicates that advisers act as a coordination point for decision-making, and accelerating processes in a manner that would not be possible in a strictly formal setting (Maley, 2011, 1473).
The intermediate role that advisers play in communication also preserves the neutrality in the public service by maintaining SPSs understanding of ministerial affairs while maintaining the distance from necessary to be objective. Wilson (2003), a former public servant, supports this notion, stating his recognition for the role of advisers in party-political aspects of governmental business, which would not be appropriate for public servants (Wilson, 2003, 373). The presence of advisers preserves the neutrality that underpins the Australian Public Service in their filtering of party-political affairs, while still provide a forum for SPSs to share their ideas, given that advisers typically have substantial knowledge of their minister’s stance (Maley, 2011). The continuous, informal communication also allows advisers to monitor policy process; given that SPSs must ensure policy is administered in a way that is publicly defendable (Mulgan, 2010, 294), there is inherent tension in the system in balancing policy-making, due to the powerplay between ministers and SPSs (Di Francesco, 2001, 104). Advisers act as a mediation point for both factions, coordinating government action with SPSs through constant consultation with their ministers (Maley, 2011, 1486). Advisers clearly play a highly important role in their connections with public servants and ministers, and coordinating negotiations between the two. This unique role of communication provides advisers with substantial power in their dealings with policy-making. While the results are largely positive, there are also risks that are associated with the adviser’s role in the executive, given the ambiguous nature of their duties (Maley, 2011).
Advisers provide a useful means of negotiation for both ministers and public servants (Maley, 2011) and are an integral component of policy processes and decision-making. However, the ambiguous nature of their role means that accountability can be difficult to determine (Edwards & Williams, 2002). While ministerial advisers are in constant consultation with their ministers (Maley, 2011, 1486), there is potential for advisers to diverge from the expected actions and act independently from the minister (Edwards & Williams, 2002). This brings accountability into question, given adviser’s actions are perceived to be under the direction of their minister (Edwards & Williams, 2002). This issue can be a concern to public servants, which in turn may lead to politicization, as SPSs seek to gain the attention of the minister (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2006, 3). Overall however, it appears that public servants are largely satisfied with the mediation role of advisers (Maley, 2011). The changed nature of minister-SPS interaction has become a normalized component of minister-SPS relations and is now perceived to be crucial to ensure efficiency and negotiation of policy processes (Maley, 2011).
The role of ministerial advisers in the Australian federal government has evolved and expanded over time (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007), a phenomenon that has contributed to the prevalence of ministerial advisers in the political system today. While the introduction of advisers was heavily debated in the 1970s and 1980s, they have become an integrated component of the executive government, playing a significant role in support for ministers and public servants independently, while also facilitating negotiations between the two factors to ensure efficient policy-making.
specifically Senior Public Servants (SPSs) (Maley, 2000). While advisers have not always been supported by the Public Service (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010), the changing nature of political processes and structure in the federal sphere has led to advisers becoming a heavily valued part of executive relations (Maley, 2011; Halligan, 2013). As such, this essay argues that the role of the ministerial adviser is primarily to support ministers and public servants independently, which in turn facilitates efficient, compliant negotiations between the two factions to achieve policy making. The development of the adviser role was in response to tensions between ministers and the APS, thus advisors serve a vital function in maintaining equilibrium between the two factions (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010). It is important to recognise that while this essay will be solely focused on the development and role of advisers in the executive, other reforms were put in place, such as New Public Management, that played a major role in restructuring the Australian political framework, but will not be discussed in this essay. Instead, this essay is centralized on the development of advisers in Australian politics in the 1970s and 80s and the way in which this has influenced ministers and SPSs and their relations in contemporary Australian politics.
Political advisers were first introduced to the federal political system in 1972, with the election of Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96). Whitlam employed political advisers as a response to the ‘remarkable lack of ministerial control over departments and over policy’ (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101), which had contributed to growing concern that the public service was too independent not sufficiently responsible to the ministry (Podger, 2004). These factors, teamed with shortages of staff and increasing political complexities (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96) gave significant cause for the introduction of external partisan advisers. The advisers were aimed at reducing ministers’ reliance on SPSs by providing partisan ‘outsiders’ who could contribute to the policy-making process and replace the administrative and liaison roles of public servants, a goal that created significant tensions between advisers and departments (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 96). Unfortunately, this was not achieved; advisers employed during the Whitlam era held little influence over policy issues, given their inexperience and small numbers (Maley, 2002, 104), this allowed departments to largely resist them, a factor which undermined their purpose of regaining ministerial control (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). Moreover, research commissioned by the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA) found that, while advisers’ roles were widely varied, their position itself was anomalous (Smith, 1976, as cited in Maley, 2002, 104). This implied that the accommodation of the adviser in the executive would be complicated and potentially limited, a notion strongly supported by the public service. When Fraser gained leadership in 1975, he largely supported the advice from the APS and significantly cut back advisers across departments (Maley, 2002, 104), with the exception of the Prime Ministerial office.
Fraser’s use of advisers in the prime ministerial office played a major role in the policy dominance he held during his tenure as Prime Minister (Walter, 1986, via Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010). However, other departments were fraught with concern regarding the increasing ministerial power held by the APS (Halligan, 2013, 115), a phenomenon largely due to overwhelming workload of ministers, which the advisers were initially installed to reduce (Maley, 2002, 104).
When Labor regained office in 1983, they reinstated the advisor role, making them a key component of bureaucratic processes, a construct that still exists today (Halligan, 2013).
Prime Minister Hawke perceived there to be a substantial imbalance in the distribution of power and influence in the executive, towards permanent rather than elected political officials (Halligan, 2013, 115), and viewed advisers as the key tool to overcome this imbalance and regain control over the bureaucracy (Maley, 2002, 104). To achieve this, The Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 was put in place, which enabled ministers to employ a person external to the public service as a consultant or adviser, with the approval of the Prime Minister. This Act provided empowerment of ministers through the induction of advisers while preserving the neutrality of the Public Service through clearly defined managerial roles (Halligan, 2013). This allowed tighter political control over objectives and results through greater managerial autonomy (Mulgan, 2010,
290).
The measures put in place by the Hawke government in the 1980s have legitimized the advisers’ role in federal parliament (Mulgan, 2010), and are viewed by political executives as playing a crucial role in addressing the issues in directing modern government (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). Ministerial advisers were initially introduced to help combat increased growth and complexity in the executive (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 98), an issue that has only increased over time, in conjunction with additional pressures that have appeared with the rise of media scrutiny (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 99). The unique insight that a ministerial adviser has, as a partisan ‘outsider’ to the public service means that they are not only valued in the executive sphere, but are able to undertake a broad range of roles to ease the aforementioned pressures, with an emphasis on three significant types of support. First, they aid the minister in performing their role, enabling political leadership. Second, they help the minister in policy design and formation, facilitating positive relationships with political officals. Third, they aid the ministry in the coordination of cabinet (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 100).
Advisers provide support for ministers in carrying out their role in both a political and a personal fashion. The initial introduction of ministerial advisers in the 1970s was aimed at providing a means of increasing the capacity of ministers while preventing them from being overwhelmed by the changing political and social environment (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). The overwhelming workload of ministers was perceived to be a threat to ministerial responsibility thus measures such as advisers were put in place, allowing ministers to delegate work to others in order to focus on more important functions, such as policy-making and policy framework design (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). Given that delegating this to SPSs would impinge upon the need for neutrality in the public service, partisan ‘outsiders’ advisers were employed to protect both the ministerial responsibility of the executive and the impartiality of the public service. In this manner, advisers served to preserve the professional relationship between ministers and SPSs. Advisers would provide personal support to ministers by filtering the demands that are placed on a minister at any given time and selecting what would be the minister’s focus (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 102), a role that would not be appropriate for a public servant given its partisan nature Furthermore, advisers also provided important political support for the minister, both within the office and in the public. Advisers may be required to negotiate decisions or policies with other members of the executive in place of the minister, a matter that requires substantial political knowledge and understanding, both of party policies and political affairs (OECD, 2011). The political support provided by advisers afforded ministers greater time to engage in tasks of greater significance, such as directing policy. Moreover, the partisan qualities of advisers allowed them to advise ministers on policy-making, a quality not afforded by SPSs given their impartiality (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 102).
The role that advisers played in policy-making occurred in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the policy process (Colebatch, 1998, as cited in Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). The ‘vertical’ dimension refers to the processes occurring between authorised officials as departments and ministers work together in policy-making, in addition to hierarchical decision-making within the executive (Colebatch, 1998, as cited in Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 101). The ‘horizontal’ dimension involves political activity that transcends organization boundaries (Colebatch, 1998, in cited in Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 1019). The vertical dimension is evident in advisers’ relationships with SPSs and their ministers, as well as their involvement in negotiations between SPSs and ministers (Maley, 2011, 1469). A significant example of this is the relationship between Prime Minister Keating and his adviser Don Russell, who decided ‘jointly what to say, what not to say, what the tone and volume would be’ (Watson, 2002, as cited in Maley, 2011, 1477). This partisan role would not be possible for an SPS given their impartial status. Advisers could also be involved in horizontal relationships with interest groups, as examined in a study by Maley (2000). Maley (2000) found that advisers played an important role in promoting the agenda of the minister while engaged in negotiations with other political groups, such as SPSs, cabinet and other political parties (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, 103).
Ministerial advisers provide significant support for ministers in a plethora of ways. This flexibility and breadth of knowledge means that partisan advisers are not only valuable to ministers but are also an asset to the public service (Wilson, 2003, 373), given their roles in networking and negotiation between executive officials and interest groups.
Senior Public Servants (SPSs) play a significant role in policy-making, however their interactions with the executive is strictly regulated to maintain neutrality, a key component of the public service (Mulgan, 2010). Given that the core unit of executive government is primarily a private, partisan sphere, separate from public servants, ministerial advisers provide a platform for public servants to gain knowledge and understanding of ministerial views and policies, aiding the functioning of policy processes and development (Maley, 2011, 1470). The primary way in which ministerial advisers assist SPSs is through networking, which in turn preserves the neutrality of the public service.
Networking refers to advisers work with other advisers and public servants, functioning to expand the minister’s communications with colleagues (Maley, 2011, 1486). It can involve forming and maintaining relationships, and the use of those relationships in the conveyance, lobby and negotiation of policy decisions (Maley, 2011, 1471). For this reason, it may be argued that the work that is achieved through networking is better described as ‘the strategic use of informal personal contacts’ (Maley, 2011, 1471). Networking utilises the informal aspects of the cabinet system, focusing on the personal connections between individuals, acting as ‘facilitative links’ in the cabinet system, used strategically by advisers in negotiation and coordination (Maley, 2011, 1472). Moreover, networking provides links between ministers and SPSs, which are important components of the policy-making process. A study conducted by Maley (2011), showed the value that SPSs held in networking, as one public servant stated,
Advisers play a really important role within Parliament House. The linkages between minister’s offices are important for the ministry, to keep them across what’s going on. It’s really important for departments … because we can’t go to another minister’s office and find out what they’re thinking … It’s just keeping the communication open so the whole of government is moving in one direction. It’s a coordination role.
(Maley, 2011, 1473).
The view held by public servants in this study indicates that advisers act as a coordination point for decision-making, and accelerating processes in a manner that would not be possible in a strictly formal setting (Maley, 2011, 1473).
The intermediate role that advisers play in communication also preserves the neutrality in the public service by maintaining SPSs understanding of ministerial affairs while maintaining the distance from necessary to be objective. Wilson (2003), a former public servant, supports this notion, stating his recognition for the role of advisers in party-political aspects of governmental business, which would not be appropriate for public servants (Wilson, 2003, 373). The presence of advisers preserves the neutrality that underpins the Australian Public Service in their filtering of party-political affairs, while still provide a forum for SPSs to share their ideas, given that advisers typically have substantial knowledge of their minister’s stance (Maley, 2011). The continuous, informal communication also allows advisers to monitor policy process; given that SPSs must ensure policy is administered in a way that is publicly defendable (Mulgan, 2010, 294), there is inherent tension in the system in balancing policy-making, due to the powerplay between ministers and SPSs (Di Francesco, 2001, 104). Advisers act as a mediation point for both factions, coordinating government action with SPSs through constant consultation with their ministers (Maley, 2011, 1486). Advisers clearly play a highly important role in their connections with public servants and ministers, and coordinating negotiations between the two. This unique role of communication provides advisers with substantial power in their dealings with policy-making. While the results are largely positive, there are also risks that are associated with the adviser’s role in the executive, given the ambiguous nature of their duties (Maley, 2011).
Advisers provide a useful means of negotiation for both ministers and public servants (Maley, 2011) and are an integral component of policy processes and decision-making. However, the ambiguous nature of their role means that accountability can be difficult to determine (Edwards & Williams, 2002). While ministerial advisers are in constant consultation with their ministers (Maley, 2011, 1486), there is potential for advisers to diverge from the expected actions and act independently from the minister (Edwards & Williams, 2002). This brings accountability into question, given adviser’s actions are perceived to be under the direction of their minister (Edwards & Williams, 2002). This issue can be a concern to public servants, which in turn may lead to politicization, as SPSs seek to gain the attention of the minister (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2006, 3). Overall however, it appears that public servants are largely satisfied with the mediation role of advisers (Maley, 2011). The changed nature of minister-SPS interaction has become a normalized component of minister-SPS relations and is now perceived to be crucial to ensure efficiency and negotiation of policy processes (Maley, 2011).
The role of ministerial advisers in the Australian federal government has evolved and expanded over time (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007), a phenomenon that has contributed to the prevalence of ministerial advisers in the political system today. While the introduction of advisers was heavily debated in the 1970s and 1980s, they have become an integrated component of the executive government, playing a significant role in support for ministers and public servants independently, while also facilitating negotiations between the two factors to ensure efficient policy-making.