The Peloponnesian War
The Peloponnesian War
What were Athens’ and Sparta’s political objectives at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War? To what extent did Athens and Sparta pursue strategies compatible with their political objectives?
The Peloponnesian War was fought in three phases between the Athenians and Spartans. In order to determine the political objectives of Athens and Sparta a review of the time periods is required. The Peloponnesian War between the Athenian Empire, formerly the Delian League, and Sparta, the Peloponnesian League, began in 460 BC and ended in 445 BC. The war concluded in a draw. It flared up again from 431 BC until 421 BC with an Athenian victory. The climatic phase was from 413 BC until 404 BC, which concluded in a victory for Sparta. The a key point that has to be addressed is comparing the dominant Spartan continental land power against the dominant Athenian sea power.
Whether or not the war is judged avoidable, it would certainly appear to have been the case that there was little active antagonism between Athens and Sparta from the heroic days of 480-479 BC until the late 460s BC. The traditional view of the principal cause of the Peloponnesian War is Thucidydes’ claim that it was Sparta’s fear of the growth of Athens power. The war was triggered due to the events that took place in 462 BC. When the Spartans requested assistance from the Athenians to help them put down a revolt. The Athenians responded by sending approximately 4,000 heavy infantry. But before the Athenians arrived, a Spartan general named Cimon dismissed the force. The Athenians were furious and renounced their treaty.
Now let’s go back to look at the political objectives of each city and determine whether Athens or Sparta pursued strategies to support their political objectives. Athens secured new alliances with Argos, Magara and the state of Thessaly. In developing these relationships, Athens was able to land-lock Sparta, have a superb hoplite army in
What were Athens’ and Sparta’s political objectives at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War? To what extent did Athens and Sparta pursue strategies compatible with their political objectives?
The Peloponnesian War was fought in three phases between the Athenians and Spartans. In order to determine the political objectives of Athens and Sparta a review of the time periods is required. The Peloponnesian War between the Athenian Empire, formerly the Delian League, and Sparta, the Peloponnesian League, began in 460 BC and ended in 445 BC. The war concluded in a draw. It flared up again from 431 BC until 421 BC with an Athenian victory. The climatic phase was from 413 BC until 404 BC, which concluded in a victory for Sparta. The a key point that has to be addressed is comparing the dominant Spartan continental land power against the dominant Athenian sea power.
Whether or not the war is judged avoidable, it would certainly appear to have been the case that there was little active antagonism between Athens and Sparta from the heroic days of 480-479 BC until the late 460s BC. The traditional view of the principal cause of the Peloponnesian War is Thucidydes’ claim that it was Sparta’s fear of the growth of Athens power. The war was triggered due to the events that took place in 462 BC. When the Spartans requested assistance from the Athenians to help them put down a revolt. The Athenians responded by sending approximately 4,000 heavy infantry. But before the Athenians arrived, a Spartan general named Cimon dismissed the force. The Athenians were furious and renounced their treaty.
Now let’s go back to look at the political objectives of each city and determine whether Athens or Sparta pursued strategies to support their political objectives. Athens secured new alliances with Argos, Magara and the state of Thessaly. In developing these relationships, Athens was able to land-lock Sparta, have a superb hoplite army in
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