that they are perfect. On the contrary drones are quite the opposite, and this has left the United States’ use of drones in a very controversial position. With the loss of innocent lives and the potential radicalization of local Muslim populations, many are opposed to the use of drone strikes against terrorists. Despite the harsh effect of drones on civilians, they are the United States’ best choice against terrorists due to their effectiveness against terrorist organizations, their proficiency over other methods, and their preservation of American lives. Surely people do not wish to see terrorists run rampant, and unless the United States wants to risk American lives with a ground war or manned airstrikes, drones are the most viable option against terrorist organizations.
UAVs are a recent addition to the military. The drone program has only been around since the late 90s when they were used to track al Qaeda’s movements. George Bush and his administration only authorized weaponized drone strikes after the horrendous aftermath of 9/11 to wipe out al Qaeda leaders (Bergen and Tiedemann 12-18). The Bush administration did not enforce a large amount of drone strikes for several reasons. The technology itself was a fairly new and they did not have any previous accounts of success to go on. Also, the CIA had not yet established an abundance of information networks in the Middle East. This made it hard for the government to find terrorists to target. The administration feared to use drone strikes for geopolitical reasons as well (Anderson 14). With Obama’s administration, however, the number of drone strikes has greatly increased (Byman 32-43), and will most likely continue to increase in the future.
Drones possess a unique set of attributes. They can be used for surveillance as well as attack, and they have proved proficient in both areas. Drones to do not fly at high speeds but have incredible endurance and can maintain flight for many hours. A downfall to UAVs is that they are easily shot down by minimal anti-air defense systems (Anderson 14). This means that they can only be deployed to areas with primitive weaponry. For example, sending a drone to Iran would most likely end in failure, making drones obsolete in places with even remotely decent anti-air defense. It is safe to say that drones have been able to produce for the military. As of 2013 drones had killed an estimated 3300 Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives (Byman 32-43). From the years 2004 to 2013 drone strikes had cut down 75% of the al Qaeda members. If that is not enough, drones actually lowered the violence in areas they targeted from 2007 to 2011 (Cronin 44-54). Drone strikes as of 2013 had also killed over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and Taliban (Byman 32-43). They have destroyed entire bases and compounds, and can be used to not only target individuals, but entire groups as well (Aaronovitch). Drones have done their intended job, and that is killing terrorists. The numbers do not lie. Drones not only cut down the number of the enemy, but they hinder terrorists in different ways as well. Drones make terrorists constantly change locations and habits as if they are on the run, which allows little time for strategy talks (Cronin 44-54). Drones greatly diminish communication between leaders and underlings. Because of drones, leaders cannot congregate in large numbers with their fighters as a drone would register this movement as terrorists activity (Byman 32-43). This may cause leaders to go into hiding. That being said, even if the United States cannot target leaders, taking out lower level individuals with special skills such as passport forging and bomb making is still a great triumph for the military. Proof has been found that terrorists are being handicapped by drones. Daniel Byman mentioned in his article that “a tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to ‘maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts’ and ‘avoid gathering in open areas’" as a result of drone presence in the Middle East (32-43). It should be obvious that drones are not only dwindling numbers, but are more importantly preventing communication and planning because of the fear they put into the hearts of terrorist organizations. Drone warfare is not implemented by the United States because the government finds it amusing; it is implemented because it is the best option available.
Opponents of drones like to argue that drones are too destructive. While a drone warhead does pack quite a punch, the common military fighter jet the F-16 and Tomahawk cruise missiles have far greater warheads that are less precise and have a bigger payload than drone warheads. With greater payloads these missiles cause more collateral damage and thus more civilian casualties (Byman 32-43). It should also be mentioned that the 1 out of 3 civilian deaths estimated by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism created by drones is less than that of what it be for other methods (Byman 32-43). Drones can pick up civilians with real time surveillance as well (Byman 32-43), and this makes them an even greater asset than a fighter pilot that could not tell a civilian from a light post at 50,000 feet. Opponents of drones will also make the argument that drones violate a nation’s sovereignty, but would a ground or air campaign not do the same? Drones fit into a sweet spot with the government’s needs as of today, and this is why they are the best alternative for the
military.