The Pros And Cons Of Pre-Emptive Intervention

The attacks of September 11 2001 prompted the first major shift in U.S. foreign policy since the Cold War era. Whereas President Clinton had prioritised domestic issues over international affairs during the 1990s, the perceived threat of terrorism post-9/11 led to a highly activist Bush administration intent on supressing the influence of both the “Axis of Evil” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) and dangerous non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda. The strategy of pre-emptive intervention championed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was central to American foreign policy during this era, as is exemplified by the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
There were several advantages to the United States pursuing this strategy during the early years of the War on Terror. Firstly, and most importantly, it was believed that pre-emptive intervention allowed the U.S. to prevent future attacks on American soil before they could be accomplished. There was certainly a belief among some (particularly those belonging to the neoconservative movement) that the Clinton administration’s hands off approach to both radical Islam and Saddam Hussein’s regime severely weakened the security of the U.S. by showing foreign enemies that the country was not fully committed to fighting against them. After
al-Qaeda had revealed their true capabilities through 9/11, maintaining a policy of non-interference was clearly no longer permissible.
While the Bush’s War documentary depicts Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld as ultra-hawkish figures that were desperate for intervention in Iraq in order to finish a feud with Saddam Hussein that had begun during George H.W. Bush’s term in office, there were legitimate reasons for the U.S. to be concerned with the Ba’athist dictator. Indeed, in the late nineteen-nineties, Saddam instructed his supporters to try and assassinate George H.W. Bush. This anti-American sentiment was later reaffirmed in the aftermath of September 11, when the Iraqi government released an official statement suggesting that “the American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity”.
It’s also worth remembering that Saddam Hussein had a long history of non-compliance with the United Nations by violating dozens of Security Council resolutions and expelling UNSCOM weapons inspectors from Iraq. Although proof of weapons of mass destruction in the country never materialised, Saddam’s shadiness during his time as leader was hardly conducive to the belief that his government had nothing to hide.
Finally, it’s impossible to disagree that Saddam Hussein was not a tyrant. There is clear evidence that he repeatedly persecuted his own citizens, made attempts to expand his power in neighbouring countries and brutally crushed any political opposition that sought to challenge his regime. An argument can be made that as the only superpower in the world, and as a nation with free and fair elections and a good human rights record, it should naturally fall to the United States to rectify this situation and liberate the Iraqi people. After all, the video footage showing the toppling of Saddam’s statue and the popular celebrations that took place after this event attest that the U.S. was not defeating a leader with widespread popular support.
Nevertheless, there are significant drawbacks to this approach that clearly harmed both the domestic and international reputation of the Bush administration. Evidence implicating Iraq in the September 11 attacks that resulted in the War on Terror is exceptionally weak, and as such, the decision to invade the country in a “war of choice” that spanned eight years and caused the deaths of thousands of U.S soldiers and Iraqi civilians remains rightfully controversial.
Additionally, in going ahead with the 2003 invasion despite of UN resistance, the Bush administration essentially demonstrated their disregard for the same international organisation that they had previously chastised Saddam for not working with. Critics of the administration who believed that this made the legality of intervention questionable later had their views reinforced by the shocking revelations concerning the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 2003 and at Guantanamo Bay, a facility that Donald Rumsfeld foolishly referred to as being “not inhumane” given its “beautiful, sunny” location.
I personally cannot envision the ending of the War on Terror in the foreseeable future.
Terrorism is a broad ideology that is so intertwined in the Middle East with complex and historic religious conflicts and political associations that any attempt made by a Western power to ham-fistedly destroy it with military force will ultimately fail and stir up further resentment in the region. The ending of the Cold War was made possible through the recognition of mutual interests of state actors, yet the Salafism of al-Qaeda and ISIS, together with the rightful unwillingness of the U.S. and its allies to negotiate with unlawful terrorist organisations make a similar solution unworkable in the present
day.