The Simulation Theory And Description Of Mental States

As humans, we can apply mental concepts and conscious states to others to explain and predict their behavior. This process is known as mind reading. Although there are several theories that explain how mind reading works, the one that I find most plausible is the simulation theory. The simulation theory states that we generate certain mental states in ourselves and are then able to predict and explain the mental states of others. In simpler terms, with the simulation theory, we want to say what brought a person to behave in a certain way, so we ask ourselves, “What would I do in this situation?”. The simulation theory is an attractive theory for several reasons. First, in addition to inferring others’ mental states from our mental states,
we can use simulation to infer others’ actions from our mental states. This means that we can use simulation to predict the outcome of someone else’s actions based on our imagination of what the outcome would be for us. Additionally, the simulation theory provides uniform account for all mental state ascriptions, as it can explain the attribution of non-propositional states, like tickles or pains. Simulation also explains how verbal communicators correctly make assumptions about how a subject will process the spoken words that he or she is hearing.
Next, the simulation theory fixes the problems of the theory theory.
The simulation theory offers a simpler explanation for ascription of mental states. We already have the cognitive means for producing action and behavior from input and desire, and we can use this system to produce beliefs about others’ mental states. A complicated tacit theory of human psychology, as proposed by the theory theory, is not necessary for explaining how folk psychology works. For the theory theory to explain ascription of mental states, we must assume that there is a general connection between what the subject does and what the subject believes. From the simulation approach, we can simply put ourselves in the subject’s shoes to determine the subject’s mental states and decisions. With the simulation theory, we can understand a subject’s behavior even if we have not had encounters with this person. The simulation theory also fixes the problems posed by the rational norms approach. Through the simulation theory, we can attribute beliefs to a subject even if there is an inconsistency in those
beliefs. Even though the theory theory and the simulation theory are very different, they both adhere to the principles of folk psychology. The radical view of eliminativism, however, says that the psychological attitudes involved in folk psychology, namely belief and desire, do not exist. I disagree with this rejection of beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires are constantly apparent in the world around us. If beliefs did not exist, I would not have an opinion on which of the mind reading theories is most feasible. If desires did not exist, I would not be able to write this paper. Generalizations relating mental states to behavior are necessary for mind reading. These generalizations are successful because they recognize that states, like belief and desire, cause certain behaviors. We can use these generalizations to successfully mind read, which means that folk psychology must be true, and therefore, belief and desire must exist. Proponents of eliminativism present an argument from theoretical inadequacy and an argument from the history of science. To explain the first argument, eliminativists believe that folk psychology is an inadequate theory of mind because it does not adhere to a range of requirements for a scientific theory. Folk psychology, however, is much more adequate than for what this objection gives it credit. It is a radical assumption to decide that a theory is false simply because it is incomplete. Also, folk psychology has proven to be effective, in both its predictive nature and in its successes as a root of numerous psychological disciplines, like cognitive psychology.
Moreover, the simulation approach, offers a different challenge to the theoretical inadequacy objection: It challenges the idea that folk psychology must be a theory. If we believe that the simulation theory is true, which I do, then we can say that folk psychology is not theory-driven. Therefore, the eliminativist argument is flawed because it assumes that folk psychology is a theory.
To explain the objection from the history of science, eliminativists believe that folk psychology will surely be completely wiped out and replaced by a proper science of mind because this has occurred historically with folk-science theories.
Again, we see the eliminativist making a radical assumption with little evidence to explain why folk psychology must be included in these generalizations. We have no reason to believe that folk psychology should follow the path of other folk-scientific theories. Neuroscientific advancements are still young, and it is perfectly conceivable that we will someday discover the connections between the causal mechanisms of psychology and the folk-psychological concepts of belief and desire.
Overall, the eliminativist objections of theoretical inadequacy and historical science are not sufficient for disproving the psychological attitudes of folk psychology. Folk psychology is an adequate explanation for the human ability to mind read, and the simulation theory, through its diverse applications and lack of complications, provides the most credible explanation as to what enables us to accurately mind
read.