The theory and practice of corporate

Journal of Financial Economics 60 (2001) 187}243

The theory and practice of corporate "nance: evidence from the "eldଝ
John R. Graham , Campbell R. Harvey  *
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02912, USA
Received 2 August 1999; received in revised form 10 December 1999

Abstract
We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure.
Large "rms rely heavily on present value techniques and the capital asset pricing model, while small "rms are relatively likely to use the payback criterion. A surprising number of
"rms use "rm risk rather than project risk in evaluating new investments. Firms are concerned about "nancial #exibility and credit ratings when issuing debt, and earnings
ଝ

We thank Franklin Allen for his detailed comments on the survey instrument and the overall project. We appreciate the input of Chris Allen, J.B. Heaton, Craig Lewis, Cli! Smith, Jeremy Stein,
Robert Taggart, and Sheridan Titman on the survey questions and design. We received expert survey advice from Lisa Abendroth, John Lynch, and Greg Stewart. We thank Carol Bass, Frank
Ryan, and Fuqua MBA students for help in gathering the data, and Kathy Benton, Steve Fink, Anne
Higgs, Ken Rona, and Ge Zhang for computer assistance. The paper has bene"ted from comments made by an anonymous referee, the editor (Bill Schwert), as well as Michael Bradley, Alon Brav,
Susan Chaplinsky, Magnus Dahlquist, Gene Fama, Paul Gompers, Ravi Jagannathan, Tim Opler,
Todd Pulvino, Nathalie Rossiensky, Rick Ruback, David Smith, Rene Stulz, and seminar particiH pants at the Harvard Business School/Journal of Financial Economics Conference on the interplay between theoretical, empirical, and "eld research in "nance, the 2000 Utah Winter Finance
Conference, the University of Wisconsin and the 2001 American Finance Association Meetings.
Finally, we thank the executives who took

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