The Theory Of The Firm As Governance Structure From Choice To Contract
American Economic Association
The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract
Author(s): Oliver E. Williamson
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 171-195
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216956
Accessed: 21-04-2015 06:39 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of
Economic Perspectives.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 131.174.75.30 on Tue, 21 Apr 2015 06:39:58 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Journal of Economic Perspectives?Volume
16, Number 3?Summer
The
Firm
of
Theory
Structure:
Oliver
the
From
E.
Choice
as to 2002?Pages
171-195
Governance
Contract
Williamson
to that organization matters and that it is susceptible propositions there were economists.
To
be sure, analysis long greeted by skepticism by in Industry and Trade
The
Marshall were conspicuous
Alfred
exceptions: in and and (1932), Joseph
Schumpeter
Capitalism, Socialism,
Democracy (1942)
Friedrich Hayek (1945) in his writings on knowledge.
Institutional
economists like (1904), John R. Commons
(1934) and Ronald Coase (1937) and theorists like
Robert
Michels
Chester Barnard (1938),
(1915 [1962]), organization Herbert Simon (1957a), James March (March and Simon, 1958) and Richard Scott deserves greater prominence.
(1992) also made the case that organization
Thorstein
The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract
Author(s): Oliver E. Williamson
Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 171-195
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216956
Accessed: 21-04-2015 06:39 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of
Economic Perspectives.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 131.174.75.30 on Tue, 21 Apr 2015 06:39:58 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Journal of Economic Perspectives?Volume
16, Number 3?Summer
The
Firm
of
Theory
Structure:
Oliver
the
From
E.
Choice
as to 2002?Pages
171-195
Governance
Contract
Williamson
to that organization matters and that it is susceptible propositions there were economists.
To
be sure, analysis long greeted by skepticism by in Industry and Trade
The
Marshall were conspicuous
Alfred
exceptions: in and and (1932), Joseph
Schumpeter
Capitalism, Socialism,
Democracy (1942)
Friedrich Hayek (1945) in his writings on knowledge.
Institutional
economists like (1904), John R. Commons
(1934) and Ronald Coase (1937) and theorists like
Robert
Michels
Chester Barnard (1938),
(1915 [1962]), organization Herbert Simon (1957a), James March (March and Simon, 1958) and Richard Scott deserves greater prominence.
(1992) also made the case that organization
Thorstein
References: Akerlof, George A. 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons ': Qualitative Uncertainty and the Mar? Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz. 1972. Arrow, Kenneth. 1999. "Forward," in Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Asanuma, Banri. 1989. "Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept of Relationship-Specific Skills." Journal of Japanese Asanuma, Banri. 1992. "Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in International Perspective: The Automobile Case," in InternationalAdjust? Aumann, Robert J. 1985. "What is Game The? ory Trying to Accomplish?" in FrontiersofEconom? Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis. 2001. "In? centives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Barnard, Chester I. 1938. TheFunctions of the Executive.Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Baron, James N. and David M. Kreps. 1999. Becker, Gary. 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: Effects on Earnings."Journal of Political Boerner, C. S. and J. Macher. 2001. "Transac? tion Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment Buchanan, James M. 1964a. "What Should Economists Do?" SouthernEconomicJournal.January, 30, pp Buchanan, James M. 1964b. "IsEconomics the Science of Choice?" in Roads toFreedom:Essaysin Buchanan, James M. 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory." Amer? Buchanan, James M. 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy." AmericanEconomicReview. Buchanan, James M. 2001. "Game Theory, Mathematics, and Economics." Journal of Eco? Coase, Ronald H. 1937. "The Nature of the Firm." Economica.November, 4, pp Coase, Ronald H. 1959. "The Federal Communications Commission." Journal of Law and Economics.October, 3, pp Coase, Ronald H. 1972. "Industrial Organiza? tion: A Proposal for Research," in Policy Issues Coase, Ronald H. 1992. "The Institutional Structure of Production." AmericanEconomicRe? Commons, John R. 1932. "The Problem of Correlating Law, Economics and Ethics." Wisconsin Law Review.8, pp Commons, John R. 1934. InstitutionalEconom? ics Crocker, Keith and Scott Masten. 1996. "Reg? ulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Cyert, Richard and James March. 1963. A Be? havioral Theoryof theFirm.Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: