The Triumph Of Conservatism Summary

Travis L Seay
July 26, 2005
Review of The Triumph of Conservatism:
A Reinterpretation of American History,
1900-1916, by Gabriel Kolko.

In The Triumph of Conservatism, Gabriel Kolko argued that the Progressive Era was in fact a conservative period. It emerged, he wrote, from the efforts of a business community which concerned itself with attaining economic “stability, predictability, and security”—i.e. a system of rationalization which would guarantee sustained profits and which would minimize radical threats to the establishment (p. 3). Contrary to the interpretations of Kolko’s predecessors, “Progressivism was not the triumph of small businesses over the trusts,” but the achievement of a high level of economic rationalization
by the federal government on behalf of big business (p. 284). Kolko found a rationale for his study in the absence of thorough investigations of the relationship between the state and the economy. Writers in Marxist theory offered few serious confrontations of the issue. Weber addressed the development of the modern political economy, but he ignored the reasons for increased bureaucratization. And although Veblen acknowledged a domineering business culture in American politics, he gave an “oversimplified” account of the source of this culture (294-300). Aside from a rationalized economy, big businesses desired a way to thwart the momentum of the labor movement, socialists, and political radicals. This objective met with success. The lack of serious alternatives to the modern capitalist industrial order resulted in part from the efforts of “powerful economic groups” to minimize political and economic development based on democratic foundations. Thus, Kolko dismissed the idea of bureaucracy as an inevitable result of modern political capitalism; it did rely, however, on a strong concentration of resources aimed at the national level and toward a hegemonic version of the political system. In the absence of equally powerful, concerted efforts from the Left, the scheme went ahead without great resistance. The “[n]ational program was able to short-circuit state progressivism, to hold nascent radicalism in check by feeding the illusions of its leaders—leaders who could not tell the difference between federal regulation of business and federal regulation for business” (p. 285). The author cited the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 as an example of such ambiguous reform. The European market—not public demands for change—held the greatest sway in initiating this particular law. Under the threat of foreign bans on U.S. meat, large meat packers pushed the reform forward. By taking on the image of benevolent administrators bending to the demands of social reformers, the government-business alliance worked out a way to both appease the public and satisfy its interests. Concerning trusts and mergers, Kolko contended that “contrary to the consensus of historians, it was not the existence of monopoly that caused the federal government to intervene in the economy but the lack of it” (p.
5). He negated the idea of government as a “neutral…shield” between corporate giants and the public. Rather, the results of the Progressive movement coincided with the desires of big business. Late nineteenth century businessmen desired the obsolescence of competition, which they viewed as “ruinous.” Mergers were supposed to increase output, lessen competition, and thus promote industrial efficiency. However, the merger movement tapered off after 1901 with the entry of many small and medium-sized competitors to the market; with it dwindled “promises of stability, profits, and industrial cooperation” (p. 24). Mergers, it appeared, may have actually encouraged competition. Through a series of case studies on industrial iron and steel, oil, automobiles, agricultural machinery, telephones, copper, and meat packing, Kolko demonstrated a loss of dominance and of hopes for stability among large companies at the turn of the century. Laissez faire had “created instability and insecurity in the economy” (p. 57). Political devices became necessary to the promotion of
stability. Enter the federal government. Kolko investigated legislative and judicial actions at the federal level and found that business sponsorship lay behind plenty of legal writing. He also found much motivation for business-centered politics in the conservative trinity of Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. Traditionally, the argument went, historians overstated the differences among these chief executives, and they overlooked “their much more important similarities” (p. 281). Roosevelt received campaign help from big businesses, and he became increasingly conservative after winning the White House on his own 1904 ticket. He appointed some of his Wall Street chums to positions in his administration and exhibited many of the anxieties of business titans who feared the expansion of democracy and “mob rule” and who advocated federal protection from the inconsistent, destabilizing legislation coming out of state and local governments. Federal mandates, argued Kolko, tended to be more big business friendly than those of the states, which regulated railroads, passed social welfare legislation, and brought suits against large corporations. Additionally, conservatives criticized the underlying political system which allowed for frequent elections and thereby facilitated the passage of such legal actions. In the eyes of business leaders, these factors combined to threaten the construction of a stable political economy. According to one civil service administrator of the period, the job of civil service reform was to “mitigate this evil of democracy” (p. 163). Thus the best hope that big business had for building stability lay at the federal level. Roosevelt took on the challenge of fulfilling that hope. Returning to politics in 1912 as the Progressive Party candidate, Roosevelt took a pro-business, largely anti-labor, and upper middle class position. Thus TR and his political apparatus appeared radical but upheld conservative measures. Wilson, like TR, acted paternalistically and spouted moralistic rhetoric which ultimately upheld business hegemony.
An intellectually conservative man, Wilson masked his true colors with ambiguous statements—he was “for big business” and “against the trust.” But behind this reassuring public persona, Wilson supported the business conception of business regulation. Wilson’s intellectual conservatism, argued Kolko, fostered an atmosphere which allowed big businesses to receive generous federal
assistance. Taft, although he was helped into office by big business (and by TR), represented inconsistency and contradiction in Kolko’s conservative chief executive mold. In the end, Taft oversaw more anti-trust regulation than did Roosevelt. His literal-mindedness and political ineptitude “upset the corporate climate” and threatened the détente system which existed between business and government (pp. 165, 172). In a 1964 review of Triumph, Edward Kirkland questioned the value of Kolko’s argument concerning conservatism in the White House during the Progressive Era: “he would have been more persuasive if he had not found it necessary to attack the previous failures of ‘historians’ to interpret this period correctly.” Kirkland asserted that for “many years” prior to this book numerous historians argued that Roosevelt and Wilson acted conservatively and had very friendly relations with business. Kolko’s employment of such “strut and swagger” made the book quite unconvincing. Robert Wiebe reacted similarly. The author’s arguments that rich progressives tried to preserve the capitalist system, that many national economic reforms originated with businessmen, and that Roosevelt and Wilson expressed conservative interests fell well outside the bounds of originality. Wiebe drew parallels between Kolko’s thinking and that of John Chamberlain, Matthew Josephson, Arthur Link, George Mowry, and John Garraty. Wiebe also faulted Kolko for failing to identify the small elite in which he claimed practically all economic and political power rested. He never explained how power became so concentrated and so well-controlled. This theory, wrote Wiebe, constituted the fundamental premise for the author’s argument. Uncritical acceptance of the premise allowed Kolko’s research to fall neatly behind it. On the other hand, recognition of the author’s vagueness would reveal that he “handle[d] the business community like an accordion, expanding it in areas of agreement and contracting it in areas of disagreement.” I must concede that my affinity for conspiracy theories predisposed me to a sympathetic reading of this book. Still, though I found Triumph an intriguing story, Wiebe’s critique of Kolko’s premise served as a strong reminder to identify and test the premise of an argument as deeply as possible. This reminder revealed the thin line which often exists between political stances and disciplined scholarship.