The Use Of Counterinsurgency Tactics In The Algerian War

The Algerian War for Independence, ultimately ending in victory for the FLN in 1962, is an important conflict that demonstrates the use of insurgency and anti-insurgency tactics in the 21 century. The French, desperate to hold on to their colonial holdings in Algeria, fought to crush the uprising, arguably losing the military battle as well as alienating the support of the Algerian people. Senior French leaders did not to implement counterinsurgency tactics learned from their conflicts in the Indochina War and conducted gruesome counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the French would eventually be pressured to grant independence, despite a sizable military advantage. The FLN correctly assessed a brutal French reaction to their terrorist tactics, bringing their conflict to the international fore fort to pressure the newly elected French President, Charles De Gaulle to offer independence.
Throughout the eight-year war, the FLN effectively utilized guerilla warfare, conducted urban warfare to control the capital city, and successfully used terrorist tactics to coerce a French overreaction that brought condemnation from the international community.
Their tactics initially relied on asymmetric guerilla tactics in the hinterlands of Algeria in an attempt to establish control. The FLN was initially successful but ultimately failed to disrupt French military operations in the countryside, came under pressure from an increased number of French troops deployed to Algeria and suffered from a lack of armament. The FLN turned their war policy and operational design from guerrilla warfare in the countryside to terrorist tactics in urban centers. Although the use of terrorist tactics resulted in a significant death count and destabilized the country, the FLN’s use of terrorism was a key component to their victory and independence from