The Vietnam War Analysis
According to Clausewitz, “war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale… immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance” (Clausewitz, P75). As a result, one of the most important ways to win a war is to know the kind of conflict you’re fighting. It must also include a good understanding of the enemy at hand. For all the compelling reasons, that awareness will allow the development of effective strategy encompassing all elements of national power.
This argument was exemplified during the Vietnam War (1965 to 1973). In part, United States and the South Vietnam regime’s failure can be attributed to the lack of understanding of the nature of the war and its enemy. Following the Battle of la Drang Valley in November 1965, the enemy switched to guerrilla warfare and the US failed to adapt accordingly. Instead of recognizing the true nature of the war, the US continued to approach this conflict in the most conventional manner, neglecting to integrate all instruments of national power into the overall strategy – to include adapting the military element, as well as the effective use of the intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement. Furthermore, the use of the instruments of national power disproportionately favored other …show more content…
inconsistent military dimensions; failing to integrate elements that provide security and protection to the people.
Another example is the French-Algerian war (1954-1962). While General Challe had a brief success in 1960 with the clear-and-hold operations, France forgot that in war the enemy also has a vote. Vichy misunderstood of the nature of the conflict/enemy and purely applied the military instruments of its national power while neglecting all other means. As a result, France lost the war.
During the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese leaders did not understand the circumstances surrounding their surprise attack on US and the climate of revenge it created.
While Japan used similar attack in the past against Russia and managed to maintain a limited war, the Pearl Harbor attack resulted in an unlimited war for which Japan did not anticipate and was very ill-prepared. In fact, the nature of the war may not be the same as a result of an attack on Russian fleet versus an attack on US territory and fleet. Because Japan did not understand the nature of the Pacific War and its enemy, she failed to prepare and therefore to integrate all instruments of its national power, be it diplomatic or intelligence,
etc.
In sum, it is clear that “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it” (Handel, P311). If the nature of the war and its enemy is not understood, then there will be no knowledge on how to conduct the conflict. And the inability to fully integrate all instruments of national power into an effective overall strategy will be the direct result.
This argument was exemplified during the Vietnam War (1965 to 1973). In part, United States and the South Vietnam regime’s failure can be attributed to the lack of understanding of the nature of the war and its enemy. Following the Battle of la Drang Valley in November 1965, the enemy switched to guerrilla warfare and the US failed to adapt accordingly. Instead of recognizing the true nature of the war, the US continued to approach this conflict in the most conventional manner, neglecting to integrate all instruments of national power into the overall strategy – to include adapting the military element, as well as the effective use of the intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement. Furthermore, the use of the instruments of national power disproportionately favored other …show more content…
inconsistent military dimensions; failing to integrate elements that provide security and protection to the people.
Another example is the French-Algerian war (1954-1962). While General Challe had a brief success in 1960 with the clear-and-hold operations, France forgot that in war the enemy also has a vote. Vichy misunderstood of the nature of the conflict/enemy and purely applied the military instruments of its national power while neglecting all other means. As a result, France lost the war.
During the Pacific War in 1941, Japanese leaders did not understand the circumstances surrounding their surprise attack on US and the climate of revenge it created.
While Japan used similar attack in the past against Russia and managed to maintain a limited war, the Pearl Harbor attack resulted in an unlimited war for which Japan did not anticipate and was very ill-prepared. In fact, the nature of the war may not be the same as a result of an attack on Russian fleet versus an attack on US territory and fleet. Because Japan did not understand the nature of the Pacific War and its enemy, she failed to prepare and therefore to integrate all instruments of its national power, be it diplomatic or intelligence,
etc.
In sum, it is clear that “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it” (Handel, P311). If the nature of the war and its enemy is not understood, then there will be no knowledge on how to conduct the conflict. And the inability to fully integrate all instruments of national power into an effective overall strategy will be the direct result.