Mao evidently knew that he had little choice in the matter of battle strategy. As Maurice Meisner reports in Mao’s China and After, “…the Maoist forces learned to employ the tactics of guerilla warfare upon which their survival was dependent.” (Meisner, 31) Mao also presented the peasantry of Jiangxi with a reform to the oppressive feudal system which granted redistribution of land to tenants. Through the implementation of revolutionary agrarian policies, Mao was able to secure the beginnings of a unified opposition to the Nanjing regime. Policies that were deemed too radical by the middle peasantry were thought to be “…politically and economically counterproductive in a situation that demanded a broad base of popular support in a rural society…” (Meisner, 32) Although Mao seemed to have many of the necessary ingredients to effect change among his countrymen, the Guomindang armies were too strong to be defeated this early in the development communist response to Chinese nationalism. Mao would lead the First Front Army, out of necessity, from their now obsolete home of Jiangxi to mountainous Northwest regions of …show more content…
Although the Guomigdang harbored superior weapons and were concentrated in some of the most important strategic positions, their leadership and numbers would be forever weakened by their invading neighbors. Although the Japanese were unable to hold large territories in China due to its enormous mass, they captured major cities and ports formerly under Chiang’s rule. The Guomindang could do little to stop the advances of the Japanese Imperial Army. Chiang was aware that he needed Western military aid in order to reclaim the cities he had lost in the East. However, his retreat to the center left Chiang with a single option for military success: implementing a strategy of guerilla warfare. In reality this was not a viable option for the Guomindang. In his article Origins of the Chinese Revolution, Lucien Bianco contends “Mobilizing the rural masses would have required transforming the Chinese countryside and limiting the power of large landowners; hence Chiang’s aversion to the idea,” (Bianco, 149) displaying Chiang’s lack of attractive options. If he were to unite and mobilize the peasantry he would risk the overthrow of large landowners—a consequence that played directly into the communist strategy. In other words Chiang would have to sacrifice his dominance over the Red Army in order to pacify the invaders