The ‘Hole’ Argument Against Substantivalism

The ‘Hole’ Argument Against Substantivalism The ‘hole’ argument against substantivalism is a great argument created by Albert Einstein out of desperation when his general theory of relativity ran into obstacles. The ‘hole’ argument says that if the general theory of relativity is true and substantivalism is true, then for any model of the general theory of relativity representing a physically possible universe, there is a hole diffeomorphism of that model which represents a physically possible universe that is observationally equivalent to the first universe and is exactly like the first universe up to a certain region, the hole, but different from the first universe with respect to how the metric and matter-energy fields are spread within the hole. This physical difference transcends the determining power of the theory since the two models are observationally identical and because the theory cannot distinguish between the developments of the fields into the hole. Therefore substantivalism is not true. In other words, if determinism fails it should fail by physics not because of commitment to substantivalist theory that we could get rid of without affecting the empirical nature of the theory. My view is that the ‘hole’ argument is in invalid argument, that has no bases for its argument and no proof to back up its claim. But as John Locke said, “the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.” With that, although the ‘hole’ argument is lacking any evidence to back up its claim it may be valid. I still view the argument is ineffective because it has no backing and is unable to sway my opinion in its favor.
The ‘hole’ argument is based solely on the assumption that there can be an alternate universe where everything is exactly the same in every way and the only difference is a certain region of space time where the metrics and matter-energy fields of the universe, which applied to all other regions of the universe suddenly does not apply to that single