Three Theories Of Diachronic Personal Identity

Diachronic personal identity in philosophy refers to what makes a person the same person over time. Solving this question of diachronic personal identity is valuable because it gives conditions for what makes up a person’s identity across time. There are different theories to explain what makes a person at an earlier time the same person at a later time. Three of these theories are the soul theory, the body theory and the psychological continuity or memory theory. Each theory offers a unique perspective on the issue of diachronic personal identity. The three theories of diachronic personal identity explained in John Perry’s “Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality” are the soul theory, the body theory and the psychological continuity theory. The soul theory says that a
While there are objections to all three theories the objections to the body and soul theories seem to be harder to argue against. An objection to the body theory is explained with the imagery of imagining yourself waking up as a cockroach. It is relatively easy to imagine yourself waking up in a different body, even if it is a highly implausible scenario. Therefore, it is false that a different body implies a different person, because you can imagine yourself being the same person in a different body, which makes the body theory is less convincing. The soul theory also leads to some questions as the soul is not where feelings or emotions, which are critical to experiences as a person, are produced. The soul is a nonmaterial part of a person which is separate from the body, but is not what makes the person the same person across the span of time. Therefore, the soul theory also seems to not be a convincing answer to the problem of diachronic personal