Tibetan Autonomy

Melvyn C. Goldstein (1995) writes that Western powers have dealt with Tibet under masks of double standards, interacting with Tibet as if it were an independent nation, however, consistently recognizing Chinese authority, rather than Tibetan autonomy. For example, Goldstein writes that in 1943, President Roosevelt, in communication with the 14th Dalai Lama, referred to the Dalai Lama by his religious title, rather than as the “leader” of Tibet, which allowed the President to successfully avoid gaining attention from China, and also allowed the U.S. to avoid recognizing Tibetan autonomy (1). Indeed, due to such types of interactions, Goldstein later reiterates that, “…Tibets’ subordination to China was repeatedly validated by the West throughout
and Tibet would be strengthened (20). However, on December 3, Tibetan officials sent the British government (as well as the U.S. Secretary of State) telegrams regarding the incompatibility of China and Tibet due to ideological differences, and the growing threat of the CCP on Tibet. From there, Tibet requested admission as a member of the United Nations General Assembly. However, with Britain regarding the Tibet issue as a problem for India, and the United States followed suit in avoiding taking any sort of stance for Tibet
In fact, according to Sam Van Shaik (2011), although most international reception of the seventeen-point agreement between China and Tibet was assumed to be under consent of the Tibetan people, the United States involved itself by deepening talks between the U.S. Embassy and Tibetan officials who remained in India (217). Van Schaik continues to write that the United States promised asylum for the Dalai Lama and military aid to Tibet, and that if the Dalai Lama were to flee and reject the seventeen-point agreement, the Tibetan resistance against Communism would be strengthened