Tinker V. Des Moines Independent Community School Case Study
The Supreme Court struck the delicate balance between maintaining an ordered school environment and inculcating First Amendment values within students in four cases, which together defined the boundaries of student-expression rights. The first of these cases, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District has been called the “magna carta of student’s expression rights.” The events in Tinker occurred in 1965 during the controversy of the Vietnam War. In Des Moines, Iowa, a group of adults and students objected to the Vietnam conflict by wearing black armbands. Principals in the area heard of these intentions and, “[feeling] that ‘the schools [were] no place for demonstrations,’” prohibited students from wearing black armbands to school. John and Mary Beth Tinker wore black armbands to school and were suspended when they refused to remove them. The Court held the prohibition and punishment an unconstitutional deprivation of the student’s expression rights because school officials could not of reasonably forecasted substantial disruption of school
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activities as a result of the demonstration and no substantial disruption actually occurred.
According to the Tinker majority, schools cannot be managed like “enclaves of totalitarianism,” where students are “closed-circuit recipients” of the states’ official message and school officials can suppress any speech they disagree with. Schools do not possess absolute control over students. Students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” In fact, protection of free expression is particularly important in American schools, which should be emblematic of the “marketplace of ideas,” where truth is derived from a “multitude of tongues” rather than “authoritative selection.” Hence, schools cannot prohibit expression out of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” or a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.” However, a student’s First Amendment rights must be construed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” For a school to constitutionally prohibit student expression, it must show that the expression “would materially and substantially interfere with the needs of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or that the expression reasonably justifie[s] a forecast of substantial disruption. The Court found the disruption lacking because there were no threats of violence and only a few remarks made towards the demonstrators. The Court found no reason for school officials to anticipate substantial disruption. Instead, the school’s decision arose from a desire to avoid the controversy that may have been caused by the students wearing the armbands. The Supreme Court next addressed student-expression rights in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. As part of a program in self-government, Matthew Fraser delivered a speech in front of the school, nominating a fellow student for office. The audience was composed of about six hundred students, many of who were fourteen years old. Matthew deliberately couched his speech in sexual innuendo. He urged the school to elect Jeff because Jeff was “firm in his pants,” would “go to the very end-even the climax” for his fellow students, and would never “come between” the students and the best their high school could be. The school suspended Matthew for three days. The Supreme Court held the school’s punishment constitutional. The Court reaffirmed that student expression is constitutionally protected and schools must teach students American values such as tolerance of unpopular views. However, “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” A school can constitutionally punish a student for lewd and vulgar speech that is inconsistent with its educational message.
The Court offered two predominant policies that justify less protection for vulgar or lewd student speech in public schools.
First, society has an interest in protecting kids (especially those in the audience) from lewd , vulgar , and sexually explicit speech. Also, schools have a duty to teach student speakers the “habits and manners of civility” essential to democratic governance. Schools must teach students to responsibly consider the sensibilities of others, even when exercising their right to express unpopular viewpoints. Schools may reasonably conclude the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior cannot adequately be taught to students in an environment where the right to communicate in lewd, vulgar, and sexually explicit terms are absolute. Therefore, schools can constitutionally punish students for vulgar and lewd speech inconsistent with their educational
mandate.
Two years later, the Court further limited student-expression rights in Hazelwood School District v. Kulmeier . The Journalism II class at Hazelwood East High School published a school sponsored newspaper several times a year. The principal reviewed each edition before publication. The publication at issue contained a story about three teen pregnancies at the school and another about the effect of divorce on several students. The principal felt the stories were inappropriate and refused to publish them.
The Court held the principal’s actions constitutional. According to the Court, Tinker defines the extent that schools must tolerate student speech; however, Kuhlmeier addresses the extent schools must affirmatively promote student speech. Schools have a heightened interest in controlling school-sponsored expression, such as theatrical productions and school publications, to ensure that participating students learn what the activities are designed to impart. Educators have greater control over student expression so that the “views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school” and that audience members are not exposed to inappropriate content for his or her age. Schools do not run afoul of the Constitution by “exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.”
activities as a result of the demonstration and no substantial disruption actually occurred.
According to the Tinker majority, schools cannot be managed like “enclaves of totalitarianism,” where students are “closed-circuit recipients” of the states’ official message and school officials can suppress any speech they disagree with. Schools do not possess absolute control over students. Students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” In fact, protection of free expression is particularly important in American schools, which should be emblematic of the “marketplace of ideas,” where truth is derived from a “multitude of tongues” rather than “authoritative selection.” Hence, schools cannot prohibit expression out of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” or a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.” However, a student’s First Amendment rights must be construed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” For a school to constitutionally prohibit student expression, it must show that the expression “would materially and substantially interfere with the needs of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or that the expression reasonably justifie[s] a forecast of substantial disruption. The Court found the disruption lacking because there were no threats of violence and only a few remarks made towards the demonstrators. The Court found no reason for school officials to anticipate substantial disruption. Instead, the school’s decision arose from a desire to avoid the controversy that may have been caused by the students wearing the armbands. The Supreme Court next addressed student-expression rights in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. As part of a program in self-government, Matthew Fraser delivered a speech in front of the school, nominating a fellow student for office. The audience was composed of about six hundred students, many of who were fourteen years old. Matthew deliberately couched his speech in sexual innuendo. He urged the school to elect Jeff because Jeff was “firm in his pants,” would “go to the very end-even the climax” for his fellow students, and would never “come between” the students and the best their high school could be. The school suspended Matthew for three days. The Supreme Court held the school’s punishment constitutional. The Court reaffirmed that student expression is constitutionally protected and schools must teach students American values such as tolerance of unpopular views. However, “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” A school can constitutionally punish a student for lewd and vulgar speech that is inconsistent with its educational message.
The Court offered two predominant policies that justify less protection for vulgar or lewd student speech in public schools.
First, society has an interest in protecting kids (especially those in the audience) from lewd , vulgar , and sexually explicit speech. Also, schools have a duty to teach student speakers the “habits and manners of civility” essential to democratic governance. Schools must teach students to responsibly consider the sensibilities of others, even when exercising their right to express unpopular viewpoints. Schools may reasonably conclude the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior cannot adequately be taught to students in an environment where the right to communicate in lewd, vulgar, and sexually explicit terms are absolute. Therefore, schools can constitutionally punish students for vulgar and lewd speech inconsistent with their educational
mandate.
Two years later, the Court further limited student-expression rights in Hazelwood School District v. Kulmeier . The Journalism II class at Hazelwood East High School published a school sponsored newspaper several times a year. The principal reviewed each edition before publication. The publication at issue contained a story about three teen pregnancies at the school and another about the effect of divorce on several students. The principal felt the stories were inappropriate and refused to publish them.
The Court held the principal’s actions constitutional. According to the Court, Tinker defines the extent that schools must tolerate student speech; however, Kuhlmeier addresses the extent schools must affirmatively promote student speech. Schools have a heightened interest in controlling school-sponsored expression, such as theatrical productions and school publications, to ensure that participating students learn what the activities are designed to impart. Educators have greater control over student expression so that the “views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school” and that audience members are not exposed to inappropriate content for his or her age. Schools do not run afoul of the Constitution by “exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.”