Trauma In Law Enforcement

This paper first describes the types of critical incidents and other stresses experienced by law enforcement personnel. Many of these challenges affect all personnel who work in public safety and the helping professions, including police officers, firefighters, paramedics, dispatchers, trauma doctors, emergency room nurses, and psychotherapists (Miller, 1995, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, in press); however, the focus here will be on the stressors most relevant to police officers, criminal investigators, and other law enforcement personnel. Secondly, this article will describe the critical interventions and psychotherapeutic strategies that have been found most practical and useful for helping cops in distress. One of the worst effects of stress
on police officers is of course suicide. We are becoming all too familiar with police suicide especially with the attention the media has given New York City. Twice as many police officers die by their own hand as do in the line of duty!
A study of 2376 Buffalo NY police officers found that compared to the white male population police officers had higher mortality rates for cancer, suicide, and heart disease. The suggested reason: Higher stress levels. Every study done points to the higher levels of stress police officers face, but what form does that stress take? With suicide there seem to be four factors:
1. Divorce. 2. Alcohol - not alcoholism. That was one of the early theories. But in actuality it was the use of alcohol right before the act to "get up the nerve". 3. Depression. 4. A failure to get help. (Most officers who commit suicide have no history of having sought counseling).
As a police officer progresses in his/her career is the eroding of the attitudes. As noted above, police work presents a high risk of developing attitudinal problems. As a police officer's career progresses, they become more cynical. No one questions this anymore. The only questions in the research are how cynical and how soon. Some studies suggest that cynicism can be seen developing in the academy and just gets worse from there
The problem with cynicism is that destroys all attitudes. All attitudes become negative and thus the cynic will eventually crash. Cops, more than people in any other profession, are in continual danger of becoming cynics. In continual danger of crashing!
It is, I think, an officer’s job and duty (especially to his family) not to crash. Too much is at stake. Staying psychologically fit means committing to take care of yourself. It takes work. The greater the stress, the greater the need to apply maximum thrust into this resistance! For the average officer possibly the hardest job of staying healthy is to admit that he/she has a problem. The second hardest feat is the willingness to get help. I have often marveled at how police officers, whose careers are centered on helping others, have so much trouble accepting help. On the other hand, I have also marveled at the difficult jobs the officers I have worked with have undertaken and succeeded at. Both on and off the job.
A single-task job is gradually getting faded out. Be it outdoor or indoor tasks or a mix of both, present-day employees have to be prepared to take up multiple tasks this is even more increasing for Police officers. Police officers undergo elevated levels of stress. Several coping mechanisms can help reduce and effectively combat stress police officers endure. Not many have an accurate understanding of what police officers go through while working in high stress and dangerous environments. Police officers are taken for granted and people rarely think of the personal, mental, and physical sacrifices that police make in order to protect our community. Police officers were nameless and faceless people separated from the rest of society. They are the enforcers of the laws our society deems as appropriate behavior -- even if it contradicts what an individual officer believes.
If it's hard for some to see that police endure great amounts of stress, think about the fact that police have to deal with the potential to get hurt or killed, being held liable, having alternating shifts, having less free time, and never escaping the police mentality; all are reasons that police officers face insurmountable stress and pressure over their career. Problems also come to police offices from alternative directions that cause even higher levels of stress: family, public, department, internally, and environmentally. Stress, as a whole, must be seen in the entire context to which it exists: physically, mentally, socially, politically, culturally, comparatively, and environmentally. Primarily, the best way to help to combat the increased stress level visited upon police offices is where officers have a better social support system, and can find available resources to help them realize the sources of stress and techniques to lessen the pressure. Other people, who lack such a system, may negatively suffer through isolation and estrangement from others, thus increasing a chance for depression, abuse, and possibly suicide.
There are two types of categories of stress: acute and chronic. Firstly, acute stress can occur as a result of short-term problems or occasional events, like witnessing a crime in progress, having someone close to you die, or dealing with a specific issue that can cause temporary, but adaptable stress.
Stress reactions vary by characteristics of the personality, social support structure, life experiences, years of service, level of education, use of coping strategies, the intensity of the stressful event, and any unique features of the organization. Nevertheless, five major strategies officers can use will enable them to take an active role in reducing their stress.
1. At home, maintaining a proper diet, exercising regularly, getting adequate sleep, having a stable and communicative relationship with family members and friends outside of the police force, and prioritizing items of importance can help sustain a healthy home environment. At work, having time to exercise, meeting members of the community, taking adequate breaks, and having the opportunity to discuss freely personal issues with counselors, superiors, or other officers can maintain a high level of support.
2. Remember that open communication, without fear of judgment, is essential because police stress is not going to go away. If anything, strong social support systems are important in combating personal and work-related stresses.
3. When having a stressful episode, remember to change your present state of mind by engaging in and activity that usually relaxes or outs you in a more pleasant mental state; Change internal communications from the negative to the positive - instead of rehashing what is wrong, reaffirm the things that went well or are going well in your life; find the good in a situation.

4. Departmental leaders can help limiting the amount of stress police officers encounter by being supportive both to the officers and their families; sponsoring events such as BBQ's, games, and picnics.
5. Having counseling services that provide confidentiality to the officer for helping them cope with stresses outside the control of the police organizational structure.
Be on the lookout for the signs and symptoms of stress. Fatigue, muscle, tremors, vomiting, grinding of teeth, nausea, profuse sweating, chest pain, rapid heart rate, twitches, difficulty breathing, dizziness, diarrhea, black outs, headaches, anxiety, severe panic, guilt, uncertainty, fear, depression, denial, anger, irritability, withdrawal, insomnia, anti-social behavior, exhaustion, emotional outbursts, and even substance abuse.
Although stress is partially reduced by the professional knowledge officers use to deal with their work, they cope by using a number of less formal anxiety reducing, and often unconscious, strategies. The majority of these occur in the station house, a place where they find a laid-back atmosphere and company. Whatever our situation is, if you are stressed, you don't have to combat your feelings alone. Talk to someone about what you are feeling; get it off of your chest. Of course, there is no quick cure all for stress; there is always work to be done. However, with proper coping mechanisms, support, and counseling services, you can beat stress.

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All four factors are symptoms that can stem from an officer's stress levels. Police suicide is more directly related to relationship problems than to job stress! Of the last 14 suicides among the police officers in New York City, 86% had to do with divorce or relationship breakup.
Police officers going through a divorce are 5 times more likely to commit suicide that and officer in a stable marriage! Relationship problems, however, are highly related to job stress. The circle is complete!
If we consider that officers have an important relationship with their department, we can examine the effect of that relationship gone bad. Officers who get in serious trouble on the job, suspended or facing termination, are 7 times more likely to commit suicide. (Apparently cops like their jobs better than their wives).
So we see that stress has a profound effect on police officers lives, especially their home lives. Studies have called police work a "high risk lifestyle". Not high risk in terms of the physical dangers of the job, but a high risk in terms of developing attitudinal problems, behavioral problems, and intimacy and relationship problems. So you learn something about the effects of police work. You learn if you ask the average cop "Hey, what's been the scariest experience during your police career?" They will answer "My first marriage!"
The national divorce rate is 50%. All research shows police suffer a substantially higher divorce rate with estimates ranging from 60 to 75%. One of the casualties of police work is often the marriage. A police marriage, after all, is like a hurricane. A lot of sucking and blowing in the begging but in the end you lose your house. One poor (literally) officer I knew who had a few marriages gone bad told me, "If I ever decide to marry again, I'm just gonna find a woman I don't like very much and buy her a house".
There has been a lot of research on the negative effects of stress on people in general. I am sure you know that police work is one of the top rated professions for job stress next to air traffic controllers and dentists. A good way to start this presentation, I think, is to give a good working definition of police stress I have seen the following definition around enough to realize that many who are reading this are already familiar with this excellent definition. What I like about the following definition is that it is not just scientific, but gives an idea of what stress is, relates very well to the police job, and can even give us an idea of what cops may need to do to help them with stress. Okay, here it is:
That feeling and desire along with the ensuing bodily effects, experienced by a person who has a strong and true longing to choke the living shit out of someone who desperately deserves it, but you can't.
Now, while this may sound funny there is a real element of truth to it. An element of truth that says an awful lot about police work. And that is the part of the definition "......BUT YOU CAN'T". Police work, by its very nature, calls for an incredible amount of restraint. Continual restraint. Draining restraint. It is stressful. The demands on police officers to show ever greater restraint have been increasing over the years, and not so coincidentally has the effects of stress on police work. With the recent attention that police suicide has received in the media there have been a number of reviews on police suicide. I came across an interesting statistic. Between 1934 and 1960 police suicide rates were half that of the general population. Between 1980 to the present, suicide rates in some departments almost approach double! What is the difference? Street justice is all but gone. Everyone has video cameras. The media gets off on putting down cops. Politicians continue to pander to the public with new laws and restrictions for police officers that further tie their hands, If we take a quick overview of police work and look at the research of what the biggest stressors are, we find:
Killing someone in the line of duty.
Having you partner killed in the line of duty.
Lack of support by the department/bosses.
Shiftwork and disruption of family time/family rituals.
The daily grind of dealing with the stupidity of the public, or the "asshole factor".
Interestingly, physical danger is ranked low on the list of stressors by police officers!

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Police stress is not always unique nor obvious. Almost any single stressor in police work can be found in another occupation. What is unique is all the different stressors in one job. Many people see the dangers of acute stressors such as post shooting trauma and have programs dealing with them. These stressors are easy to see because of the intense emotional strain a person suffers. But what about the not so obvious, chronic stressors; are they important?

The lessons from the war crimes committed at MyLai in the Vietnam War help answer the question. In 1972 Dr. M. Scott Peck chaired a committee of three psychiatrists appointed by the Army Surgeon General to study the MyLai incident and recommend research to understand its causes. Why did these Americans kill five to six hundred unarmed civilians? Dr. Peck believes that chronic stress was an important factor leading two hundred Americans to commit this atrocity.

Chronic stress has at least two effects on people. First, prolonged stress causes people to regress. Their psychological growth reverses, and they become more immature. They rapidly become more childish and primitive. A common example is a sick person who is miserable and in pain for several days. Any wife will agree that her husband becomes self-centered, whiny and irritable; he expects constant attention and care. He behaves like a young, selfish child. People naturally regress during chronic discomfort.

Second, chronic stress numbs people's sensitivity. They can't stand to continually see human misery. They must stop feeling or they won't survive. The mind has this defense mechanism so people can continue working in horrible situations. If they kept their normal sensitivity, they would fall apart. As they become insensitive to their own suffering, they become insensitive to the suffering of others. When treated with indignity they lose not only a sense of their own dignity but also the dignity of others. The pain of others stops bothering them, and they are no longer bothered when they hurt others.

The men in the Charlie Company had suffered chronic stress for months prior to going into MyLai. Their actions were primitive and self-centered; the veneer of civilization was gone. They killed unarmed civilians with insensitivity and no regret. The two effects of stress were obvious in their deeds. Chronic stress doesn't account for all that happened at MyLai, but it was an important contributor. The parallel to police work is obvious and very important for police officials.

Police officers encounter stressors in call after call which saps their strength.
Debilitation from this daily stress accumulates making officers more vulnerable to traumatic incidents and normal pressures of life. The weakening process is often too slow to see; neither a person nor his friends are aware of the damage being done.

Programs for acute stress are important but are limited in their value for two reasons. First, they are a reaction to trauma that has occurred; an officer is already suffering. Important support can be given to the officer, but almost nothing can be done to prevent an incident that causes trauma. How does a police official stop an officer's partner from being killed next to him? Second, few officers are involved in traumatic incidents in a year compared with the whole department which meets stress in call after call.

If chronic stressors are identified, then police officials can take proactive steps. They can do something before an officer becomes another suicide statistic. Departments should stop making artificial distinctions between job-related and personal problems. The two are interwoven and contribute to each other. The end result is a group of people under the greatest stress in any job in
America.
Traffic Stops
Police officers stop cars during a week for various reasons. They may hear excuses to gain their sympathies or indignities to demean them. A certain percentage of the people in the stops try to kill or injure the officers, yet officers are expected to be friendly at best or neutral at worst. A common view of police work is that we are all members of the community working for the safety and prosperity of everyone. Even in A traffic stop, a police officer is expected to work with the driver for the good of the community. After all isn't the driver a good person who has merely made a small, temporary mistake?

If an officer approaches a car with a friendly attitude, his guard is down. He can't keep his defenses up and view a person as his friend at the same time. People are on guard against those they view as enemies, not friends. If an officer continually approaches cars with a friendly attitude, the chief will eventually get a call that one of his officers is lying in a pool of blood on the street.

If an officer approaches a driver thinking this might be the one who attacks him, he will come across as rude, gruff and uncaring. It's hard to be on guard for your life and appear friendly at the same time. When an officer approaches cars with a guarded attitude, the chief will get a call that he has a cynical, brutal cop who has no business serving the community.

The officer is in a dilemma. Considering someone a friend or an enemy produces opposite mental states. A person can't hold both attitudes at the same time. He is caught in a double bind, a no win situation. For an officer the situation is chronic stress with a cumulative effect of breaking down his defenses and making him a prey to other pressures and to diseases such as ulcers. The stress of double bind situations is well documented in psychological research.
Professional vs. Military Conflict
A police department is both a professional and military organization, and these two aspects oppose each other. The classic professions of history are doctor, lawyer and minister. They require a basic education, a bachelor's degree, and a three year professional school of about 90 hours. The professional is then licensed and endorsed by an agency. He is considered to be an expert in his field and is expected to use his expertise for the good of his clients. He has much discretion in how he serves the people who call upon him. The military is opposite. The people are well trained, but the chain of command tells them how to do almost everything. Orders, rules and regulations cover every facet of life in the military. Everything is done by the book with very little discretion left for people doing their jobs.
Police officers aren't professionals in the classic sense, but they are similar. An officer must have a minimum amount of education before he goes through an academy and field training. He is commissioned and in some places licensed. His duty is to use his training and authority for the good of the community. When someone calls the police, he expects the officer to make decisions to handle the situation. The officer decides what he can and should do, but he runs head-on into orders, rules and regulations. Police departments have learned from experience the value of having procedures and policies. Yet the events of life are too complex to handle by preset rules. People must evaluate situations and make decisions.

The problem comes for the officer when he is at the scene of a call. After learning the facts, he will decide what course of action is required to meet the needs of the people. Often that course does not follow procedures. If he follows procedures exactly, he knows he won't fully help the people and is frustrated. The people will think he is shirking his responsibility and will be frustrated. If the officer follows his own judgement, he is taking a risk. If everything goes well, he is safe, but if things go badly, he is subject to discipline because he didn't follow procedures. The community and department expect officers to use judgement, but when they do, there is a danger they will be disciplined - another double bind.
Isolation
When people are isolated, they become disoriented and confused. Their behavior changes drastically. They can become apathetic to the point of illness or death. Social isolation in police officers fosters the attitude that "it's us against them". They begin to view the public like the soldiers at MyLai viewed those civilians; they're the enemy. As officers become socially isolated they suffer effects similar to physical isolation. The effects of social isolation are most prominent in the first six years of an officer's career.
Officers tend to associate only with other officers. When they go out with another couple, it is often another police couple. Officers want their spouses to go to police parties with them, but when their spouses want them to go to their office party, the answer is no. Officers make excuses that they don't want to hear the old ticket story again or they just don't fit in.
Police officers learn street wisdom. They develop confidence in themselves to handle situations in practical ways. Officers begin to look down on others because they don't have savvy in the real world. Police mostly see the seamy side of life that other people don't see, and since other people don't understand this side of life, officers feel superior. Ironically officers are the ones who are losing real world wisdom; the world isn't comprised only of criminals and fools. They judge the world from a limited perspective and see everything with a jaundiced eye.
Police work lacks balance. A doctor loses a patient today but brings a baby into the world tomorrow. Most jobs have a healthy balance; the good things are mixed with the bad. Not so in police work. In call after call officers only see criminals or people making fools of themselves. The police aren't called to a reunion party when everyone is doing right. They are called when someone gets drunk and decides he can whip anyone around. The officer making the arrest sees the man then, not when he is working hard for his family. It's not amazing that some officers think that ninety-eight percent of the people in the world are no good, and the two percent who are good are the police.
The examples given are stresses that police don't normally recognize. Anyone in police work can think of common frustrations such as seeing criminals getting out of jail on bond in a short time or being released completely. The point is there are chronic stresses in police work, and departments need to do something about them, not just the obvious traumatic incidents. Every time we dial 911, we expect that our emergency will be taken seriously and handled Competently. The police will race to our burgled office, the firefighters will speedily douse our burning home, the ambulance crew will stabilize our injured loved one and whisk him or her to the nearest hospital. We take these expectations for granted because of the skill and dedication of the workers who serve the needs of law enforcement, emergency services, and public safety. These "tough guys" (Miller, 1995) - the term includes both men and women are routinely exposed to special kinds of traumatic events and daily pressures that require a certain adaptively defensive toughness of attitude, temperament, and training. Without this resolve, they couldn't do their jobs effectively. Sometimes, however, the stress is just too much, and the very toughness that facilitates smooth functioning in their daily duties now becomes an impediment to these helpers seeking help for themselves.

This article first describes the types of critical incidents and other stresses experienced by law enforcement personnel. Many of these challenges affect all personnel who work in public safety and the helping professions, including police officers, firefighters, paramedics, dispatchers, trauma doctors, emergency room nurses, and psychotherapists (Miller, 1995, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, in press); however, the focus here will be on the stressors most relevant to police officers, criminal investigators, and other law enforcement personnel. Secondly, this article will describe the critical interventions and psychotherapeutic strategies that have been found most practical and useful for helping cops in distress.
The target audience for this article is a dual one. This article is for law enforcement supervisors and administrators who want to understand how to provide the best possible psychological services to the men and women under their command. It is also for mental health clinicians who may be considering law enforcement consultation and therefore want some insight into the unique challenges and rewards of working with these personnel. Stress and Coping in Law Enforcement
Police officers can be an insular group, and are often more reluctant to talk to outsiders or to show "weakness" in front of their own peers than are other emergency service and public safety workers. Officers typically work alone or with a single partner, as opposed to firefighters or paramedics, who are trained to have more of a team mentality (Blau, 1994; Cummings, 1996;
Kirschman, 1997; Reese, 1987; Solomon, 1995). This presents some special challenges for clinicians attempting to identify and help those officers in distress.

The Patrol Cop
Even those civilians who have no great love for cops have to admit that theirs is a difficult, dangerous, and often thankless job. Police officers regularly deal with the most violent, impulsive, and predatory members of society, put their lives on the line, and confront cruelties and horrors that the rest of us view from the sanitized distance of our newspapers and TV screens. In addition to the daily grind, officers are frequently the target of criticism and complaints by citizens, the media, the judicial system, adversarial attorneys, social service personnel, and their own administrators and law enforcement agencies (Blau, 1994).

Police officers generally carry out their sworn duties and responsibilities with dedication and valor, but some stresses are too much to take, and every officer has his or her breaking point. For some, it may come in the form of a particular traumatic experience, such as a gruesome accident or homicide, a vicious crime against a child, a close personal brush with death, the death or serious injury of a partner, the shooting of a perpetrator or innocent civilian, or an especially grisly or large-scale crime; in some cases, the traumatic critical incident can precipitate the development of a full-scale posttraumatic stress disorder, or PTSD (Miller, 1994, 1998c).
Symptoms may include numbed responsiveness, impaired memory alternating with intrusive, disturbing images of the incident, irritability, hypervigilance, impaired concentration, sleep disturbance, anxiety, depression, phobic avoidance, social withdrawal, and substance abuse.

For other officers, there may be no singular trauma, but the mental breakdown caps the cumulative weight of a number of more mundane stresses over the course of the officer's career.
Most police officers deal with both the routine and exceptional stresses by using a variety of situationally adaptive coping and defense mechanisms, such as repression, displacement, isolation of feelings, humor often seemingly callous or crass humor and generally toughing it out.
Officers develop a closed society, an insular "cop culture," centering around what many refer to as The Job. For a few, The Job becomes their life, and crowds out other activities and relationships (Blau, 1994).
In the United States, two-thirds of officers involved in shootings suffer moderate or severe problems and about 70 percent leave the force within seven years of the incident. Police are admitted to hospitals at significantly higher rates than the general population and rank third among occupations in premature death rates (Sewell et al, 1988). Interestingly, however, despite the popular notion of rampantly disturbed police marriages, there is no evidence for a disproportionately high divorce rate among officers (Borum & Philpot, 1993).

Perhaps the most tragic form of police casualty is suicide (Cummings, 1996; Hays, 1994;
McCafferty et al, 1992; Seligman et al, 1994). Twice as many officers, about 300 annually, die by their own hand as are killed in the line of duty. In New York City, the suicide rate for police officers is more than double the rate for the general population. In fact, these totals may actually be even higher, since such deaths are sometimes underreported by fellow cops to avoid stigmatizing the deceased officers and to allow families to collect benefits. Most suicide victims are young patrol officers with no record of misconduct, and most shoot themselves off-duty.
Often, problems involving alcohol or romantic crises are the catalyst, and easy access to a lethal weapon provides the ready means. Cops under stress are caught in the dilemma of risking confiscation of their guns or other career setbacks if they report distress or request help.

Special Assignments and Units
Aside from the daily stresses and hassles of patrol cops, special pressures are experienced by higher-ranking officers, such as homicide detectives, who are involved in the investigation of particularly brutal crimes, such as multiple murders or serial killings (Sewell, 1993). The protective social role of the police officer becomes even more pronounced, at the same time as their responsibilities as public servants who safeguard individual rights become compounded with the pressure to solve the case.
Moreover, the sheer magnitude and shock effect of many murder scenes, and the violence, mutilation, and sadistic brutality associated with many serial killings, especially if they involve children, often overwhelm the defense mechanisms and coping abilities of even the most seasoned officers. Revulsion may be tinged with rage, all the more so when fellow officers have been killed or injured. Finally, the cumulative effect of fatigue results in case errors, impaired work quality, and deterioration of home and workplace relationships. Fatigue also further wears down defenses, rendering the officer even more vulnerable to stress and impaired decision-making.

Dispatchers and Support Personnel
In addition to line-of-duty officers, s vital role in law enforcement is played by the workers who operate "behind the scenes," namely the dispatchers, complaint clerks, clerical staff, crime scene technicians, and other support personnel (Holt, 1989; Sewell & Crew, 1984). Although rarely exposed to direct danger (except where on-scene sand behind-scene personnel alternate shifts), several high-stress features characterize the job descriptions of these workers. These include: (1) dealing with multiple, sometimes simultaneous, calls; (2) having to make time-pressured life-and- death decisions, (3) having little information about, and low control over, the emergency situation; (4) intense, confusing, and frequently hostile contact with frantic or outraged citizens; and (5) exclusion from the status and camaraderie typically shared by on-scene personnel who
"get the credit."
After particularly difficult calls, dispatchers may show many of the classic posttraumatic reactions and symptoms, but they are often overlooked by police supervisors and consulting mental health clinicians alike. As with other tough jobs, these individuals deserve the proper treatment and support. Intervention Services and Strategies

To avoid overly "shrinky" connotations, mental health intervention services with law enforcement personnel are often conceptualized in such terms as "stress management" or "critical incident debriefing" (Anderson et al, 1995; Belles & Norvell, 1990; Mitchell & Bray, 1990;
Mitchell & Everly, 1996). In general, one-time, incident-specific interventions will be most appropriate for handling the effects of overwhelming trauma on otherwise normal, well- functioning personnel. Where posttraumatic sequella persist, or where the psychological problems relate to a longer-term pattern of maladaptive functioning, more extensive individual psychotherapeutic approaches are called for. To have the greatest impact, intervention services should be part of an integrated program within the department, and have full administrative commitment and support (Blau, 1994; Sewell, 1986).
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD)
Although components of this approach comprise an important element of all therapeutic work with traumatized patients, critical incident stress debriefing, or CISD, has been organizationally formalized for law enforcement and emergency services by Jeff Mitchell and his colleagues
(Mitchell, 1983, 1988, 1991; Mitchell & Bray, 1990; Mitchell & Everly, 1996), and the "Mitchell model" of CISD is now implemented in public safety departments throughout the United States,
Britain, and other parts of the world (Davis, 1998/99; Dyregrov, 1989). CISD is a structured intervention designed to promote the emotional processing of traumatic events through the ventilation and normalization of reactions, as well as preparation for possible future experiences.
CISD is an essential technique associated with efficient and effective Critical Incident Stress
Management (CISM).

According to the Mitchell model, following a critical incident, there are a number of criteria on which peer support and command staff might decide to provide a debriefing to personnel. These include: (1) many individuals within a group appear to be distressed after a call; (2) the signs of stress appear to be quite severe; (3) personnel demonstrate significant behavioral changes; (4) personnel make significant errors on calls occurring after the critical incident; (5) personnel request help; (6) the event is unusual or extraordinary.

The structure of a CISD usually consists of the presence of one or more mental health professionals and one or more peer debriefers, i.e. fellow police officers or emergency service workers who have been trained in the CISD process and who may have been through critical incidents and debriefings themselves. A typical debriefing takes place within 24-72 hours after the critical incident, and consists of a single group meeting that lasts approximately 2-3 hours, although shorter or longer meetings are determined by circumstances.
The formal CISD process consists of seven standard phases:
Introduction: The introduction phase of a debriefing is when the team leader introduces the
CISD process and approach, encourages participation by the group, and sets the ground rules by which the debriefing will operate. Generally, these guidelines involve issues of confidentiality, attendance for the full duration of the group, however with nonforced participation in discussions
(no "hot seat"), and the establishment of a supportive, noncritical atmosphere.

Fact Phase: During this phase, the group is asked to describe briefly their job or role during the incident and, from their own perspective, some facts regarding what happened. The basic question is: "What did you do?"

Thought Phase: The CISD leader asks the group members to discuss their first thoughts during the critical incident: "What went through your mind?"

Reaction Phase: This phase is designed to move the group participants from the predominantly cognitive level of intellectual processing into the emotional level of processing: "What was the worst part of the incident for you?"

Symptom Phase: This begins the movement back from the predominantly emotional processing level toward the cognitive processing level. Participants are asked to describe their physical, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral signs and symptoms of distress which appeared (1) at the scene or within 24 hours of the incident, (2) a few days after the incident, and (3) are still being experienced at the time of the debriefing: "What have you been experiencing since the incident?"

Education Phase: Information is exchanged about the nature of the stress response and the expected physiological and psychological reactions to critical incidents. This serves to normalize the stress and coping response, and provides a basis for questions and answers: "What can we learn from this experience?"

Re-entry Phase: This is a wrap-up, in which any additional questions or statements are addressed, referral for individual follow-ups are made, and general group solidarity and bonding are reinforced: "How can we help one another the next time something like this occurs?" "Was there anything that we left out?"

For a successful debriefing, timing and clinical appropriateness are important. The consensus from the literature and my own clinical experience support scheduling the debriefing toward the earlier end of the recommended 24-72 hour window (Bordow & Porritt, 1979; Solomon &
Benbenishty, 1988). To keep the focus on the event itself and to reduce the potential for singling- out of individuals, some authorities recommend that there be a policy of mandatory referral of all involved personnel to a debriefing or other appropriate mental health intervention (Horn, 1991;
McMains, 1991; Mitchell, 1991; Reese, 1991; Solomon, 1988, 1990, 1995). However, in other cases, mandatory or enforced CISD may lead to passive participation and resentment among the conscripted personnel (Bisson & Deahl, 1994; Flannery et al, 1991), and the CISD process may quickly become a boring routine if used indiscriminately after every incident, thereby diluting its effectiveness in those situations where it really could have helped. Departmental supervisor and mental health consultants must use their common sense and knowledge of their own personnel to make these kinds of judgement calls.

Special Applications of CISD for Law Enforcement

To encourage participation and reduce fear of stigmatization, the administrative policy should strongly and affirmatively state that debriefings and other postincident mental health and peer- support interventions are confidential. The only exceptions to confidentiality are a clear and present danger to self or others, or disclosure of a serious crime by the officer. Where only one officer is involved, as in a shooting, or as a follow-up or supplement to a formal group debriefing, individual debriefings may be conducted by a mental health clinician or trained peer (Solomon,
1995).

In an officer-involved shooting, when there is an ongoing or impending investigation, Solomon
(1988, 1995) recommends that the group debriefing be postponed until the initial investigation has been completed and formal statements have been taken by investigators. Otherwise, debriefing participants may be regarded as witnesses who are subject to subpoena for questioning about what was said. For particularly sensitive or controversial situations or complicated internal affairs investigations, it may be advisable to postpone the group debriefing until the investigation has been officially resolved. Individual interventions can be provided for the primarily involved officer(s) in the meantime, and/or a group debriefing may proceed with other, nonprimarily involved personnel who may have been affected by the incident, especially where the response team was multidisciplinary and multidepartmental (police, firefighters, paramedics, etc.).

Finally, as a follow-up measure, Solomon (1995) recommends holding a critical incident peer support seminar, in which the involved officers come together for two or three days in a retreat- like setting, several months postincident, to revisit and reflect upon their experience. The seminar is facilitated by mental health professionals and peer support officers.

Sewell (1993, 1994) has adapted a CISD-like stress management model to the particular needs of detectives who investigate multiple murders and other violent crimes. The major objectives of this process are: (1) ventilation of intense emotions; (2) exploration of symbolic meanings; (3) group support under catastrophic conditions; (4) initiation of the grief process within a supportive environment; (5) dismantling of the "fallacy of uniqueness;" (6) reassurance that intense emotions under catastrophic conditions are normal; (7) preparation for the continuation of the grief and stress process over the ensuing weeks and months; (8) preparing for the possible development of physical, cognitive, and emotional symptoms in the aftermath of a serious crisis; (9) education regarding normal and abnormal stress response syndromes; and (10) encouragement of continued group support and/or professional help.

Perhaps the most comprehensive adaptation of the CISD process comes from the work of Bohl
(1995) who explicitly compares and contrasts the phases in her own program with the phases of the Mitchell model.

In Bohl's program, the debriefing takes place as soon after the critical incident as possible. A debriefing may involve a single officer within the first 24 hours, later followed by a second, with a group debriefing taking place within one week to encourage group cohesion and bonding. This addresses the occupationally lower team orientation of most police officers who may not express feelings easily, even or especially in a group of their fellow cops.

The Bohl model makes no real distinction between the cognitive and emotional phases of a debriefing. If an officer begins to express emotion during the fact or cognitive phase, there is little point in telling him or her to stifle it until later. To be fair, the Mitchell model certainly does allow for flexibility and common sense in structuring debriefings, and both formats recognize the importance of responding empathically to the specific needs expressed by the participants, rather than following a rigid set of rules.

In the emotion phase itself, what is important in the Bohl model is not the mere act of venting, but rather the opportunity to validate feelings. Bohl does not ask what the "worst thing" was, since she finds the typical response to be that "everything about it was the worst thing." However, it often comes as a revelation to these law enforcement "tough" guys that their peers have had similar feelings.

Still, some emotions may be difficult to validate. For example, guilt or remorse over actions or inactions may actually be appropriate, as when an officer's momentary hesitation or impulsive action resulted in someone getting hurt or killed. In the Bohl model, the question then becomes:
"Okay, you feel guilty what are you going to do with that guilt?" That is, "What can be learned from the experience to prevent something like this from happening again?"

The Bohl model inserts an additional phase, termed the "unfinished business" phase, which has no formal counterpart in the Mitchell model. Participants are asked, "What in the present situation reminds you of past experiences? Do you want to talk about those other situations?" This phase grew out of Bohl's observation that the incident that prompted the current debriefing often acts as a catalyst for recalling past events. The questions give participants a chance to talk about incidents that may arouse strong, unresolved feelings. Bohl finds that such multilevel debriefings result in a greater sense of relief and closure than might occur by sticking solely to the present incident. In many cases, it has also been my own experience that feelings and reactions to past critical incidents will sometimes spontaneously come up during a debriefing about a more recent incident, and this must be dealt with and worked through as it arises, although team leaders must be careful not to lose too much of the structure and focus of the current debriefing.

The education phase in the Bohl model resembles its Mitchell model counterpart, in that participants are schooled about normal and pathological stress reactions, how to deal with coworkers and family members, and what to anticipate in the days and weeks ahead. Unlike the
Mitchell model, the Bohl model does not ask whether anything positive, hopeful, or growth- promoting has arisen from the incident. Officers who have had to deal with senseless brutality might be forgiven for failing to perceive anything positive about the incident, and expecting them to extract some kind of "growth experience" from such an event may seem like a sick joke.

A final non-Mitchell phase of the debriefing in the Bohl model is the "round robin" in which each officer is invited to say whatever he or she wants. The statement can be addressed to anyone, but others cannot respond directly; this is supposed to give participants a feeling of safety. My own concern is that this may provide an opportunity for last-minute gratuitous sniping, which can quickly erode the supportive atmosphere that has been carefully crafted during the debriefing.
Additionally, in practice, there doesn't seem to be anything particularly unique about this round robin phase to distinguish it from the standard re-entry phase of the Mitchell model. Finally, adding more and more "phases" to the debriefing process may serve to decrease the forthrightness and spontaneity of its implementation. Again, clinical judgement and common sense should guide the process.

Law Enforcement Psychotherapy

As noted above, police officers have a reputation for shunning mental health services, often perceiving its practitioners as "softies" and "bleeding hearts" who help criminals go free with over complicated psychobabble excuses. Other cops may fear being "shrunk," having a notion of the psychotherapy process as akin to brainwashing, a humiliating and emasculating experience in which they lie on a couch and sob about their dysfunctional childhoods. More commonly, the idea of needing "mental help" implies weakness, cowardice, and lack of ability to do the job. In the environment of many departments, some officers realistically fear censure, stigmatization, ridicule, thwarted career advancement, and alienation from colleagues if they are perceived as the type who "folds under pressure." Still others in the department who may have something to hide may fear a colleague "spilling his guts" to the shrink and thereby blowing the malfeasor's cover
(Miller, 1995, 1998c).

Administrative Issues

There is some debate about whether psychological services, especially therapy-type services, should be provided by a psychologist within the department, even a clinician who is also an active or retired sworn officer, or whether such matters are best handled by outside therapists who are less involved in departmental politics and gossip (Blau, 1994; Silva, 1991).

On the one hand, the departmental clinician is likely to have more knowledge of, and experience with, the direct pressures faced by the personnel he or she serves; this is especially true if the psychologist is also an officer or has had formal law enforcement training or ride-along experience. On the other hand, in addition to providing psychotherapy services, the departmental psychologist is likely to also be involved in performing work status and fitness-for-duty evaluations, as well as other assessments or legal roles which may conflict with that of an objective helper. An outside clinician may have less direct experience with departmental policy and pressures, but may enjoy more therapeutic freedom of movement.

My own experience has been that officers who sincerely come for help are usually less interested in the therapist's extensive technical knowledge of The Job, and more concerned that he or she demonstrate a basic trust and a willingness to understand the officer's situation the cops will be more than happy to provide the grim details. These officers expect mental health professionals to
"give 100 percent" in the psychotherapy process, just as the officers do in their own jobs; they really don't want us to be another cop, they want us to be a skilled therapist that's why they're talking to us in the first place.

Many cops are actually glad to find a secure haven away from the "fishbowl" atmosphere of the department and relieved that the therapeutic sessions provide a respite from shop talk. This is especially true where the referral problem has less to do with direct job-related issues and more with outside pressures, such as family or alcohol problems, that may impinge on job performance.
In any case, the therapist, the patient, and the department should be clear at the outset about the issues relating to confidentiality and chain of command, and any changes in ground rules should be clarified as needed.

Trust and the Therapeutic Relationship

Difficulty with trust appears to be an occupational hazard for workers in law enforcement and public safety who typically maintain a strong sense of self-sufficiency and insistence on solving their own problems. Therapists may therefore frequently find themselves "tested," especially at the beginning of the treatment process. As the therapeutic alliance begins to solidify, the officer will begin to feel more at ease with the therapist and may actually find comfort and sense of stability from the psychotherapy sessions. Silva (1991) has outlined the following requirements for establishing therapeutic mutual trust:

Accurate Empathy: The therapist conveys his or her understanding of the officer's background and experience (but beware of premature false familiarity and phony "bonding").

Genuineness: The therapist is as spontaneous, tactful, flexible, and nondefensive as possible.

Availability: The therapist is accessible and available (within reason) when needed, and avoids making promises and commitments he or she can't realistically keep.

Respect: This is both gracious and firm, and acknowledges the officer's sense of autonomy, control, and responsibility within the therapeutic relationship. Respect is manifested by the therapist's general attitude, as well as by certain specific actions, such as signifying regard for rank or job role by initially using formal departmental titles, such as "officer," "detective,"
"lieutenant," until trust and mutual respect allow an easing of formality. Here it is important for clinicians to avoid the dual traps of overfamiliarity, patronizing, and talking down to the officer on the one hand, and trying to "play cop" or force bogus camaraderie by assuming the role of a colleague or commander.

Concreteness: Therapy should, at least initially be goal-oriented and have a problem-solving focus. Police officers are into action and results, and to the extent that it is clinically realistic, the therapeutic approach should emphasize active, problem-solving approaches before tackling more sensitive and complex psychological issues.

Therapeutic Strategies and Techniques

Since most law enforcement and emergency services personnel come under psychotherapeutic care in the context of some form of posttraumatic stress reaction, both clinical experience and literature (Blau, 1994; Cummings, 1996; Fullerton et al, 1992; Kirschman, 1997) reflect this emphasis. In general, the effectiveness of any intervention technique will be determined by the timeliness, tone, style, and intent of the intervention. Effective interventions share in common the elements of briefness, focus on specific symptomatology or conflict issues, and direct operational efforts to resolve the conflict or to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

In working with police officers, Blau (1994) recommends that the first meeting between the therapist and the officer establish a safe and comfortable working atmosphere by the therapist's articulating : (1) a positive endorsement of the officer's decision to seek help; (2) a clear description of the therapist's responsibilities and limitations with respect to confidentiality and privilege; and (3) an invitation to state the officer's concerns.

A straightforward, goal-directed, problem-solving therapeutic intervention approach includes the following elements: (1) creating a sanctuary; (2) focusing on critical areas of concern; (3) specifying desired outcomes; (4) reviewing assets; (5) developing a general plan; (6) identifying practical initial implementations; {7) reviewing self-efficacy; and (8) setting appointments for review, reassurance, and further implementation (Blau, 1994).

Blau (1994) delineates a number of effective individual intervention strategies for police officers, including the following:

Attentive Listening: This includes good eye contact, appropriate body language, and genuine interest, without inappropriate comment or interruption. Clinicians will recognize this intervention as "active listening."

Being There With Empathy: This therapeutic attitude conveys availability, concern, and awareness of the turbulent emotions being experienced by the traumatized officer. It is also helpful to let the officer know what he or she is likely to experience in the days and weeks ahead.

Reassurance: In acute stress situations, this should take the form of realistically reassuring the officer that routine matters will be taken care of, deferred responsibilities will be handled by others, and that the officer has administrative and command support.

Supportive Counseling: This includes effective listening, restatement of content, clarification of feelings, and reassurance, as well as community referral and networking with liaison agencies, when necessary.

Interpretive Counseling: This type of intervention should be used when the officer's emotional reaction is significantly greater than the circumstances that the critical incident seem to warrant.
In appropriate cases, this therapeutic strategy can stimulate the officer to explore underlying emotional stresses that intensify a naturally stressful traumatic event. In a few cases, this may lead to ongoing psychotherapy.

Not to be neglected is the use of humor, which has its place in many forms of psychotherapy, but may be especially useful in working with law enforcement and emergency services personnel. In general, if the therapist and patient can share a laugh, this may lead to the sharing of more intimate feelings. Humor serves to bring a sense of balance, perspective, and clarity to a world that seems to have been warped and polluted by malevolence and horror. Humor even sarcastic, gross, or callous humor, if handled appropriately and used constructively may allow the venting of anger, frustration, resentment, or sadness, and thereby lead to productive, reintegrative therapeutic work (Fullerton et al, 1992; Miller, 1994; Silva, 1991).

Departmental Support

Even in the absence of formal psychotherapeutic intervention, following a department-wide critical incident, such as a line-of-duty death or a particularly stressful rescue or arrest, the mental health professional can advise and guide law enforcement departments in encouraging and implementing several organizational response measures, based on the available literature on individual and group coping strategies for public safety personnel (Alexander, 1993; Alexander &
Walker, 1994; Alexander & Wells, 1991; DeAngelis, 1995; Fullerton et al, 1992; Palmer, 1983).
Many of these measures are applicable proactively as part of training before a critical incident occurs. Some specific measures include the following:

(1) Encourage mutual support among peers and supervisors. The former typically happens anyway; the latter may need some explicit reinforcement. Police officers frequently work as partners and understand that shared decision-making and mutual reassurance can enhance effective job performance.

(2) Utilize humor as a coping mechanism to facilitate emotional insulation and group bonding.
The first forestalls excessive identification with victims, the second encourages mutual group support via a shared language. Of course, the mental health clinician needs to monitor the line between adaptive humor and unproductive gratuitous nastiness that only serves to entrench cynicism and despair.

(3) Make use of appropriate rituals to give meaning and dignity to an otherwise existentially disorienting experience. This includes not only religious rites related to mourning, but such respectful protocols as a military-style honor guard to attend bodies before disposition, and the formal acknowledgment of actions above and beyond the call of duty. Important here is the role of "grief leadership," in which the commanding officer demonstrates by example that it's okay to express grief and mourn the death of fallen comrades or civilians and that the dignified expression of one's feelings about the incident will be supported, not denigrated.

Conclusion

Psychotherapy with law enforcement and emergency services personnel entails its share of frustration as well as satisfaction. A certain flexibility is called for in adapting traditional psychotherapeutic models and techniques for use with this group and clinical work frequently requires both firm professional grounding and "seat-of-the-pants" maneuverability. Incomplete closures and partial successes are to be expected, but in a few instances, the impact of successful intervention can have profound effects on morale and job effectiveness that may be felt department-wide. Working with these "tough guys" takes skill, dedication, and sometimes a strong stomach, but for mental health clinicians who are not afraid to tough it out themselves, this can be a fascinating and rewarding area of clinical practice.

In the reading "The Globalization of Eating Disorders" by Susan Bordo, Bordo describes how the western media has increased the number of eating disorders across the world. Bordo states that three years after television broadcasting became available in Fiji, 11% of girls were reported with symptoms of eating disorders. Though the media claims they do not have an effect on a young girl's self-image, evidence has proved otherwise. Pictures in magazines teach young girls how to dress, how to act, and what the accepted appearance maybe. It is not the parents nor teaches that teach these ideas to children. It is the media. Bordo states that though eating disorders may predominate in women, they are increasingly becoming more popular in the male gender. Men are abusing steroids, and comparing their muscles to those in famous magazines, such as Sports Illustrated. Some are even going as far as getting cosmetic surgery. As a reader, it is so important to make people aware of this increase in eating disorders, because unlike cancer, there is a cure.
Being a young girl growing up in a society similar to the one described, I often times understand what Bordo is saying ,when she states that women are affected by the mass media. Though we may not often realize how great of an effect it has, it is causing young woman to feel insecure about who they are. We should not look up to individuals in magazines, for they are not reality. Reality is what we see when we look around everyday. They are the people with flaws, because no person will ever be perfectly shaped. I have learned that "what you see is what you get.
From Bordo's article" You will never be anybody else. Bordo has made me realize that this disease is becoming such a greater problem. To think that people are willing to starve themselves in order to be beautiful does even sound appealing. I always told myself that you only live once, so live life to the fullest. If you want to eat a piece of cheesecake, then eat a piece of cheesecake, who cares how many calories you are digesting.
The structure of Bordo's essay is very appealing, by starting off with such an image, the reader is able to connect to the situation, but then by throwing a twist she once again reiterates the idea of the disease becoming globalized. In the body of the essay, Bordo provides several statistics to back up her thesis, whether it is Fiji, African American weddings, or existence of eating disorders in Asia. And finally Bordo concludes by stating reasoning as to what steps can be taken in order to address this problem of an increase in eating disorders across the world.

Our ranks are few because of the difficulty of our training and the commitment needed to face the difficulties of our missions.
Our nation places its trust and confidence in those who earn our title, as every decision a Marine makes has the potential to prevent a conflict—or to escalate it. At all times focused, alert and in control, Marines are strategic warriors with training, judgment and character our entire nation can depend on
Conditions can change quickly on the modern battlefield, and Marines must adapt to meet those conditions with decisive but appropriate action. No two operations are identical, and no Marine prepares for only one type of mission. A situation can deteriorate, a crowd can grow restless and a humanitarian operation can turn into a combat engagement—in an instant. Marines may be called on to provide relief in a combat zone, a show of force in a disaster area or reconnaissance during a rescue operation. Regardless of the mission, Marines are prepared to face down the threats of our time.
As America's premiere expeditionary force in readiness, it isn't enough to know how to fight every threat—Marines must know how to interact with different cultures as well. Before deploying abroad, Marines familiarize themselves with the language, customs and traditions, geography, religion, politics and socioeconomic factors of the regions in which they may operate. These considerations are also taken into account at the command level during the planning of operations to prevent avoidable tensions with local populaces.
Marines are prepared for anything because they train for a broad spectrum of situations. We develop Marines into leaders by constantly exposing them to training situations that require sound decisions with limited time, resources or information. Marines train to use their judgment, decisiveness and knowledge to respond quickly and appropriately because the worst decision a Marine can make in the midst of an operation is no decision at all.
Marines are entrusted by our nation to both defend its interests and represent its values. For this reason it is imperative that Marines who serve and fight abroad be of extraordinarily good character. Marines are ambassadors of our nation and Corps and must possess the honor and integrity to do what is right, regardless of the circumstances.
No Marine is more qualified to make tactical decisions than the small-unit leader on the battlefield. The Marine Corps concept of "Commander's Intent" ensures every Marine has a clear understanding of their commander's desired objective and the latitude to take the best course of action to accomplish it. In the midst of a complex operation, circumstances can change rapidly. When they do, Marines at the tip of the spear have the freedom to respond accordingly.
Marines may not be able to predict the next challenge ahead, but they can be ready for it. A Marine may practice putting his gas mask on in complete darkness. A squad of Marines might study a foreign language together. A Platoon Sergeant could use friendly competition to challenge his Marines to be the fastest at changing a magazine, or disassembling and reassembling a machine gun. To be a strategic warrior is to ensure not only personal readiness but the combat readiness of the entire unit

Transition Team When I was in the Marines I was part of a transition team (Regimental Combat Team 5) when we arrived in HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan to replace our predecessors from RCT-1 had already planted the seeds of transition with Afghan National Security Forces. Through this partnership, the people of Marjah, Nawa, Garmsir and Khan Neshin districts were able to begin rebuilding a land once controlled by a Taliban insurgency. Initially, we were in the lead in conducting counterinsurgency operations, partnered with the Afghan forces. Additionally, we were developing their governance, in order to create an environment that allows the Afghan government to become increasingly capable. The initial mission of the RCT 5 followed the trend of previous coalition units, with Marines leading operations and simultaneously training the Afghan National Army and police forces. Civilians from International Security Assistance Force nations partnered with Afghan officials in the district governments, working in concert with the military mission in the Central Helmand River Valley.
About midway through [the deployment], the mission changed. “The Afghans took the lead and we were in support of their operations.” With Afghan forces taking the lead, Marines operating under RCT-5 shifted their focus to an advisor mission. This shift included Marines mentoring and assisting Afghan forces in counterinsurgency operations, and allowing Afghan government officials to take the lead in providing for the people of their districts.
Our security situation was good, and there was momentum established when we arrived in southern Helmand. The two key challenges were changing the narrative from a coalition to Afghan led mission, and to take care of the remaining areas of resistance that were impeding progress.
After maintaining the security throughout the fall, we shifted our focus to mentoring and advising ANA soldiers, specifically those with 1st Brigade, 215th Corps. Subordinate battalions in the RCT-5 battle space also focused on developing the capabilities of the ANA, as well as the Afghan Local Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police and Afghan Border Police forces.
Our mission was to provide persistent advice, mentoring, coaching and teaching to the 1st Bde., 215th Corps, across all the war fighting functions.
Upon arriving in southern Helmand the BAT found that their ANA counterparts were capable of conducting independent operations at the company level. Despite their basic tactical proficiency the brigade remained reliant on support from coalition forces in several key areas. They were heavily dependent on coalition forces for logistics, intelligence and just about all of the other enabling functions that support the tactics. We wanted to focus on improving their ability to operate independently in those functions.

As a Marine advisor we tackled two primary logistical requirements, fuel and water, during the first few months of their deployment. The brigade was highly dependent on their advisors for fuel to power vehicles and generators, and bottled water for Afghan soldiers at the brigade headquarters and subordinate kandaks (ANA battalions) throughout southern Helmand. We helped them improve and maintain fuel storage facilities at the brigade headquarters and at kandak locations. We helped the brigade logistics officer establish contracts for fuel delivery… that has allowed them to store sufficient fuel for operations on a monthly basis.
The brigade has also used their contracting system to establish wells or bottled water delivery for their positions. Fuel and water sources at key brigade and kandak positions have been in use by Afghan soldiers for nine months. In addition to finding a solution for two of the brigade’s main logistical problems, the BAT developed training to improve ANA combat support capabilities. Artillerymen and combat engineers with the brigade’s 4th Kandak made the greatest strides over the last year, conducting several artillery training exercises, providing illumination for operations, and building and demilitarizing ANA positions in Marjah, Nawa and Garmsir districts.
The brigade demonstrated its improved tactical and combat support capabilities through its planning and execution of several major operations during RCT-5’s yearlong deployment. Operation Tageer Shamal (Shifting Winds) was the first brigade-level operation, planned and led by the ANA following the transfer of lead security authority in Marjah and Nawa districts to Afghan forces and the Afghan government. Afghan soldiers with 2nd Kandak, 1st Bde., 215th Corps, and Afghan police, supported by Marines with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, moved to the outskirts of Garmsir district along the western side of the Helmand River, clearing the area of insurgent activity, weapons and improvised explosive device-making materials.

This initial stage of Operation Tageer Shamal laid the groundwork for follow on operations on the outskirts each of the four districts in southern Helmand. Prior to this operation, Afghan and Marine forces were primarily focused on district population centers, or green zones. The increased presence and effectiveness of the various branches of the Afghan police allowed the ANA and Marines operating under RCT-5 to turn their attention outward.

The bulk of the responsibility to train Afghan police across southern Helmand fell on the shoulders of Marine police advisors at the regiment and battalion levels. The advisors conducted training on “blue side” tactics, or traditional western-style community policing, and military tactics with the various Afghan police forces. They [Afghan police] were very good at securing an area and they were very good at keeping the bad guys out and if the bad guys show up, they can push them out. But they weren’t too involved in community policing efforts, proper detainee handling techniques and all the stuff that goes into being an actual police force. The team worked primarily with AUP and ALP forces in Marjah, developing the police and assisting in the consolidation of Marine positions across the district.
The PMT began their deployment training small police units in military tactics to maintain the basic skills already acquired by the Afghan policemen and conduct an initial evaluation of their capabilities. As the deployment progressed, they focused more and more on blue side tactics, eventually developing a “train the trainer” program that gave non-commissioned officers in the AUP and ALP the necessary skills to train their own policemen.
We had a pretty well established training routine. We started to see which guys were excited for us to come around and train them. We focused on those guys because we knew that they were the ones that were going to follow through and train their own.

While the RCT-5 mission was built around partnered counterinsurgency operations and training the various Afghan forces, the regiment and one of its subordinate battalions recognized a window of opportunity to turn the tide on a major source of insurgent funding in southern Helmand.
Gap

Operation Psarlay Taba, a partnered counternarcotics operation conducted by 2nd Bn., 9th Marines, and the Afghan National Interdiction Unit, targeted opium production facilities and narcotics trafficking in the Bari Desert, northwest of Marjah. The security situation had developed to a point where Afghan and coalition forces could turn their attention to the outskirts of the district.

“Marjah was a district in transition,” said Lt. Col. Michael Styskal, the commanding officer of 2nd Bn., 9th Marines. “Marines and ANA moved out to the periphery… the police were set in and the district government was working.”

To attack this critical insurgent funding stream, the battalion designed an operation that included heliborne raids on suspected opium production facilities and aerial interdictions on vehicles transporting narcotics. However, guaranteed mission success called for more capabilities than a Marine battalion alone could provide.

The NIU is an elite counternarcotics police force that falls under the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. Closely resembling American SWAT teams in both tactics and organizational structure, the NIU operate in eight to 16-man teams. Their unique capabilities made them ideal partners in an operation with a heavy emphasis on heliborne raids.

“The NIU was involved in all mission selection and would help us decide which targets to take action on,” said Styskal. “They were the main effort, the assault force on all these raids.”

During the four-month period 2nd Bn., 9th Marines and the NIU conducted raid missions in support of Operation Psarlay Taba, the partnered force captured over 26,000 pounds of opium products. The bulk of the finds came in the form of dry opium, but significant amounts of wet opium, morphine and heroin were also recovered from production facilities and vehicles transporting narcotics.

The traditional summer fighting season in southern Helmand has yet to emerge. Styskal agrees that his battalion’s aggressive counternarcotics operations played a key role in bucking this trend, though he maintains that two years of partnered counterinsurgency operations by Afghan and coalition forces are responsible for sustained security in Marjah district.

“There is no threat that can defeat the ANSF in Marjah today,” said Styskal. “They just have to be confident in themselves and their ability to secure the district.”

In the span of 12 months, the regiment and its subordinate battalions were able maintain security in district green zones and spread security to outlying areas of each district in the RCT-5 area of operations. This increased security has allowed district governments to grow in concert with Afghan security forces, improving the lives of a population that suffered under Taliban rule only a few years ago.

Developing governance and quality of life

A year ago, the district governments in southern Helmand each held their own unique challenges. Nawa was recognized as having the most efficient and mature government, while the neighboring districts of Marjah, Garmsir and Khan Neshin needed significant work to provide a better quality of life for their populations.

Though the challenges for each district varied, the RCT-5 governance mission was focused on one goal: to prepare each district for transition to the control of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, while continuously improving the quality of life for the people of southern Helmand.

Three of the four districts in southern Helmand have district community councils, elected by the people to advise the district governors and GIRoA line ministers.

“Unfortunately, they [council members] didn’t have actual legislative powers,” said Maj. Victor Ruble, the RCT-5 Effects Officer. “They acted as a bridge between the old system of paying tribute to [village] elders and the new government, which is democratically based.”

Although the council members, who were more often than not village elders, had no legislative power, they act as a check and balance for the appointed district governor.

“They work with the appointed governor and ministers, who are not from the district, to find synergy in their execution of governance, rule of law and development,” explained Ruble, a native of San Clemente, Calif.

Striking the right balance between elected and appointed officials is, without a doubt, critical to the success of the district governments. Over the yearlong deployment, RCT-5 saw Afghan leaders acting with initiative and taking responsibility for the growth of their district.

One of these men is Nawa District Governor Abdul Manaf. Appointed to govern Nawa two years ago, Manaf arrived at a time when there was little to no security in the district. The district center had been destroyed by years of fighting with the insurgency and a constant barrage of violence directed toward him, local civilians and coalition forces.

Opium growth and drug use was rampant among the population and many government officials were corrupt. Manaf immediately took the reigns and has led a relentless campaign t to improve the quality of life for his people.

“I want to encourage everyone here to go out and get an education so we can bring stability, both men and women,” Manaf explained. “I want to bring peace and security for the entire district of Nawa so it will be a beautiful place that people will want to come and see.”

Although he wasn’t born in Nawa, Manaf strives to build his connection with the people of his district through constant communication. He keeps the Nawa population informed on his plans for the district during weekly call-in radio shows. When he’s not broadcasting his messages over the airwaves, he can be seen conducting shuras throughout the district or interacting with people shopping in local bazaars.

“Manaf is a cult of a personality,” said Ruble. “He runs the district and works very well with the elders. Even though he’s not from the district, he has very much embraced Nawa and the elders have reciprocated.”

In Khan Neshin, newly appointed district governor Shah Mahmood recently held a governance and security shura at the district center. Mahmood discussed the continued coalition and Afghan partnership in his district, touching on key topics such as security and agricultural development.

The most significant development during the shura was the formation of an elders council. This new council will work alongside Mahmood, advising him on the needs of the Khan Neshin people until funding for an official DCC is received from the Helmand provincial government.

“The elders’ shura is the main way to bring issues of the local villages to light,” said Mahmood. “The elders come to the shura and discuss their issues with me... that’s a very big thing for the population.”

Though strong leadership from district officials like Manaf and Mahmood has enabled RCT-5 to improve the quality of life for Afghans throughout southern Helmand, challenges remain.

One such challenge facing district governments in the RCT-5 battlespace was a lack of funding from the Afghan government. Early on, a number of schools, hospitals and mosques were built by Afghan contractors using coalition funds.

After several months of coalition funded development projects, GIRoA’s District Development Program was put in effect. Officials were able to manage and distribute funding provided by the Afghan government according to the needs of their districts.

“Over the course of the year, we were able to transition all the funding [from coalition] to Afghan funding,” said Turner. “They began using Afghan [funding] systems as opposed to coalition money.”

Marine civil affairs teams worked with district officials, mentoring and advising them on the proper allocation of DDP funds. Schools, health clinics and other government funded projects began popping up throughout southern Helmand. The funding program has allowed the Afghan people to rely more on their district governments, rather than coalition forces.

“Now, in the three northern districts specifically, they have a fairly mature government which is representative in nature,” explained Turner. “They have an elected DCC which works with appointed ministers in healthcare, agriculture, water distribution, transportation and education systems.”

The Safar School, the first school built by the Garmsir district government, is a key example of these Afghan funded development projects.

The Safar area was once an insurgent hub with little to no educational opportunities for the youth of southern Garmsir. Once Afghan and coalition forces were able to secure the area, education for children in the area, and thus the potential for a brighter future, became a realistic possibility.

“The Marines and our government have presented us with this building; now it’s our job to see that it’s used as a school,” said Malim Wazir, the Safar School’s head teacher at the school’s opening. “Every boy and every girl has the right to learn. We must ensure they receive this education.”

As the Afghan people began seeing the capability of their own government, their trust in elected officials has continued to increase. This trust is evident in the increased attendance at shuras and district elections held over the last year.

The village of Hazar Joft in Garmsir played host to perhaps the most important election of the year in April 2011. Voters came from across the district, casting over 2,200 ballots to successfully fill 34 seats on Garmsir’s community council.

District elections were first conducted under the guidance of coalition forces in 2009, but only people from the northern part of Garmsir closest to the district center were able to vote. In subsequent years, the increased security provided by Afghan and coalition forces has allowed governance to expand further south, reaching out to votes in the southernmost areas of the district.

“We’ve seen a lot of progress in governance,” said Turner. “We understand that it’s really key because ultimately, the competition between [GIRoA] and the Taliban is who is going to be able to provide those services.”

Maintaining success and overcoming challenges

Although Afghan security forces have maintained steady progress while taking charge of most areas in southern Helmand, challenges certainly pave the road ahead.

“These people have endured about 30 years of turmoil and have had absolutely no predictability in their lives until we were able to get ahead of the security about 18 months ago,” Turner said. “They really cherish the security they have.”

“If something starts to go poorly, the population puts a lot of pressure on their Afghan leaders and their security forces to make it right, Turner explains. “That [shows] there’s a very authentic and genuine feel that they really want to maintain their security and they don’t want it to go back to the turmoil that existed prior to our efforts here.”

According to senior leaders with RCT-5, one of the biggest challenges that lie ahead for Afghan forces in southern Helmand is the lack of support from their higher headquarters at the provincial and national level.

“We have about 8,000 Afghan forces in this area of Helmand… they can overmatch the Taliban on any day of the week, and they frequently do,” said Turner. “At the tip of the spear, they do awesome, but with some of the maintenance and supply actions that function all the way from Kabul down to the forces in the field, they still need work.”

Coalition forces are still heavily involved in mentoring higher chains of command on establishing proper supply and maintenance operations, critical to the daily tactical and operational capabilities of Afghan forces at the lowest levels.

“We probably need to stay involved [with logistics] so they can sustain their effort over the long term,” Turner added.

With security under control and governance functions in place, the people of southern Helmand are enjoying the fruits of the labors of both coalition and Afghan forces. As they observe the success of their own security forces, the confidence in the Afghan government to sustain this stability should continue to grow in kind.

“As we draw down, I think that one of their biggest challenges is relying on the institutions that we’ve helped them build, that they’ve built upon themselves,” explained Ruble. “Once they see that the institutions in place are effective as long as they work through them, I think they’ll be absolutely fine.”

The “Fighting Fifth” held command over 10 different battalions during the regiment’s yearlong deployment in southern Helmand. Marines and sailors with RCT-5 conducted over 40 named offensive and combat support operations, consolidating nearly 180 coalition positions to 15 before transferring the battlespace to RCT-6 in July.

“The Marines that are out there maintain a great relationship with their Afghan partners, the population and elders…they’re absolutely our secret weapon,” said Turner. “Early on when we still had Marines out inside the districts, if you go on patrol, you would see a corporal or a sergeant, and he would literally be like the mayor of the town. Whether it’s a shopkeeper, an elder or kids, they would go up and say hello to him.”

“Those Marines out there were able to change the fight,” said Turner. “The conduct that those young Marines displayed completely undermined the Taliban’s narrative.”

The professionalism of Marines on the battlefield allowed coalition forces to maintain their relationships with the Afghan people, even after shifting to a mentoring role.

“We were able to take a backseat and put the Afghan forces more and more at the forefront,” said Turner. “The only way we have done it is because all of the hard work that has come before us, and all the Marines that have worked with the Afghan forces throughout the years, that have created the conditions that allow them to thrive.”

As their yearlong deployment comes to a close, another battle streamer will be added to the already prestigious lineage of the “Fighting Fifth.” When they head home to Camp Pendleton, Calif., early next month, the Marines and sailors of RCT-5 will no doubt reflect on their time in southern Helmand.

When they do take a moment to pause, they will remember where they began, how far they’ve come, and see clearly the difference they’ve made in the lives of the Afghan people.

Editor’s note: Regimental Combat Team 5 was assigned to 1st Marine Division (Forward), which heads Task Force Leatherneck. The task force served as the ground combat element of Regional Command (Southwest) and works in partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The unit was dedicated to securing the Afghan people, defeating insurgent forces and enabling ANSF assumption of security responsibilities within its area of operations in order to support the expansion of stability, development and legitimate governance during their yearlong deployment.

Quotes from Lt. Col. Michael Styskal were taken from the story “Blocks of Marjah secure, Marine battalion shifts focus to counternarcotics,” written by 1st Lt. Chris Harper. Quotes from Col. Roger B. Turner Jr. about Operation Tageer Shamal were taken from the story “Afghan, Marine forces clear remnants of insurgency in southern Helmand,” written by 1st Lt. Chris Harper. Quotes from Nawa District Governor Abdul Manaf were taken from the story ”The busiest man in Nawa,” written by Staff Sgt. Andrew Miller. Quotes from Khan Neshin District Governor Shah Mahmood were taken from the story “Khan Neshin governor reaches out to district elders,” written by Cpl. Anthony Ward Jr. Quotes from Malim Wazar were taken from the story “Garmsir district continues progress in education with Safar School construction,” written by Cpl. Reece Lodder.