Trench Warfare During The Interwar Period

During the interwar period the allies developed several lines of thinking as to how airpower would be used in future warfare. The military and political leaders of the day were looking for a way to avoid the horrors of trench warfare from World War I. This timeframe offers an interesting look at how technology, in the form of airpower, had a great potential to affect future wars, but a lack of understanding of its accuracy and how to implement the technology lead to false assumptions, which resulted in miss application and delayed recognition of airpower’s shortcomings. The British ideas of Marshal Trenchard and the American ideas of the Air Corp Tactical School emerged as the dominate theories for applying airpower. In the European theater
Trenchard’s theories emerged from his experience in WWI as well as from the post WWI bombing survey. The British bombing survey reported WWI bombing resulted in little material damage, but it made considerable morale damage. Building on these findings, Trenchard emphasized airpower was an offensive weapon that would put the enemy on the defensive, and that “the moral effect is far more important than the material.” In the following years, this transformed into the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) main airpower theory. Similarly, the Americans shared the idea of the airplane being an offensive weapon, but differed in target selection as they choosing the industrial web as the primary target. The Air Corp’s Tactical School believed bombing the industrial web would “undermine efficiently the integrity of an enemy’s war economy by attacking the specific targets crucial to the functioning of that economy.” As theories, morale bombing and targeting the industrial web appeared logical, but achieving effects proved to be
The European bombing offensive ran for five years, but it did little to change Germany’s relentless pursuit of power. In fact, during 1943 the German industrial production increased. The failure of the bombing offensive was due to high bomber casualties inflicted by the robust German air defenses and the lack of accuracy of the bombs. According to Overy, only twenty percent of bombs fell within five miles of their planned targets and only one fifth of all crews survived to the 25 mission point. At times the allies experienced bomber losses as high as 26 percent in one day, which equated to as many as 60 aircraft and 600 men. With these facts, it is surprising the bombing campaign continued. However, the allies faced an aggressive enemy, and until 1943 there was no European front to fight on, and therefore the bombing campaign was the only method available to hasten an enemy set on controlling all of Europe. All in all, the effects of the bombing offensive were limited, but the heavy bombing by the allied forces from 1940 to 1944 impacted Germany’s ability to wage war. The Germans found resources were difficult to transport due to the damaged transportation routes, and the German industry was dispersed to reduce its vulnerability to air raids. It was not until 1944, when the Americans prioritizing air superiority, received adequate fighter