Truman And Korea Political Culture Summary

Paul G. Pierpaoli’s, Truman and Korea the Political Culture of the Early Cold War, written in 1999, focuses on the American decision to mediate in the Korean War and the political, military, and social impact it left behind. Pierpaoli provides an understanding into America’s first undeclared conflict and the building of the national security state. The main emphasis is to analyze how the nation mobilized for the war and how that affected the economic scene and political culture of the United States. He mentions how Korea was a turning point and how it essentially changed the political and economic scene in the United States encouraging the growth of the military-industrial complex. The historical significance is how the United States
From that point forward, even after the Korean War had ended in July 1953, the United States’ military and national security spending remained at levels unthinkable prior to Korea. Indeed, the decisions made in 1950 stood practically unchallenged for nearly two generations. The historical significance is that it left a legacy of resentment and the imperfection of the United States domestic and foreign policies. Over the long haul of the Cold War, the Korean rearmament effort and the precedents it set came at a very high price, a price that went far beyond actual military expenditures. The economic, social, and political costs resulting from the decisions made during Korea are perhaps immeasurable, for there was no real “peace dividend” at the end of the Korean War. Pierpaoli references, Robert H. Wiebe observation that the Korean conflict resulted in the permanent institutionalization of an ongoing trend in twentieth-century American history which was the detachment of the government from the people. The Korean experience also solidified and institutionalized the Cold War mentality. Truman and his successors held the “vital center” of American politics by focusing much of the nation’s attention and