Tupamaros Essay
The Tupamaros of Uruguay
Uruguay in the 1960¹s was distinct among other South American counties for its affluence and sociopolitical stability. Economic prosperity had fostered the growth of a large middle class and a stable welfare-state government that allowed a wider degree of democratic and civil freedoms larger than any other South American government. Because Uruguayan society was so peaceful, the Army and Police were very small. In 1968 there were only about 12,000 men in the armed forces and fewer than 22,000 police to keep order in a population of about 3 million. A slump in the demand for wool and meat, Uruguay¹s two principal exports, after the Korean War brought mass unemployment, inflation, and a steep drop in the …show more content…
standard of living. the social tensions this produced, along with the corruption of the overblown state bureaucracy (one in five working Uruguayans was employed by the federal government in some fashion), gave the impulse for an effective urban guerrilla movement to emerge. This revolutionary group¹s official name was Movimento de Liberacion National but was popularly known as the Tupamaros (from Tupac Amaru, last member of the Inca royal family, murdered by the Spanish in 1571). It was founded in 1963 by Raul Sendic, a law student studying in Montevideo. Because Uruguay was so urbanized (over 80% of Uruguayans lived in large towns or cities) they concentrated almost all their activity in and around the capital, Montevideo, where more than half the entire population of the country lived. As with most other South American guerrilla groups, they started as a political organization that deliberately chose the tactics of armed struggle¹ and drew its membership from young, radical, middle-class people -- mostly students and white-collar workers. Like most urban terrorist groups, they were organized in a cellular structure of 4-5 men called a firing group,¹ with the group leader as the only link to other cells. This was done for security reasons, as was their practice of never telling any individual more than he or she needed to know for any particular operation. From 1963 to early 1968 the Tupamaros concentrated on gathering resources -- mostly by robbing banks, guns shops, and private businesses. Their goal was to make the government look powerless to defend its friends and unnecessarily heavy-handed in its reactions. The main tactics they used to achieve this were political kidnapping, armed propaganda,¹ and intimidating the security forces. The Tupamaros used political kidnapping as an alternative to assassinations and as a way to show the government¹s impotence. It was a severe psychological shock and embarrassment to those in the government to have their friends and diplomatic figures snatched off the street and held in so-called people¹s prisons¹ in Montevideo itself. Meanwhile, the people did not react as they would have against assassinations because the kidnappings (often of unpopular and corrupt people anyway) did not inconvenience them, but the inept police reaction (usually a massive cordon-and-search operation) did. The worsening state of the economy provoked a wave of student rioting and labour unrest, and a state of national emergency was declared in June 1968 (which was to last until late 1972). It was during this crisis that the Tupamaros staged their first political kidnapping -- Ulises Pereyra, the president of the State Telephone Company, an unpopular figure whose abduction was acclaimed by the public. When the police began to search the campus of the National University in Montevideo, they started a student riot that ended in the death of a student. Ulises Pereyra was released unharmed five days later. More kidnappings followed. In September 1969 they kidnapped a leading banker and held him for ten weeks, in support of a strike by employees at his bank. In July 1970 Dan Mitrione, an American policeman on loan to the Uruguayan security forces, and Aloisio Gonide, the Brazilian consul in Uruguay, were kidnapped and held for ransom. When the government refused to parley with the Tupamaros, they killed Mitrione, a move that was to cost them considerable public support. In the first half of 1971 the British ambassador to Uruguay, the Uruguayan attorney-general, and a former minister of agriculture were kidnapped, and Ulises Pereyra was abducted a second time. The second tactic the Tupamaros used was armed propaganda. Some of these actions resembled nothing so much as forceful advertising. When the government shut down left-wing papers and forbade the regular news media to refer to the Tupamaros by name, the Tupamaros ran their own mobile radio transmitter in Montevideo, temporarily seized radio stations to broadcast propaganda, and maintained an underground press. Groups of armed terrorists would also occupy meeting halls, cafeterias, and cinemas (real guerrilla theatre!) and make speeches to a literally captive audience. Actions like bank robberies and raids on police stations, besides their logistical benefit, also had a propaganda goal. The Tupamaros conducted several very professional operations in this area. A third tactic was intimidation of the security forces. Because the police were doing almost all of the fighting against the guerrillas, the Tupamaros began to select individual policemen for assassination in late 1969. Although only a few policemen were killed this way, the moral of the force was shaken. In June 1970 there was a general police strike for higher pay and the right to work in civilian clothes in order to make them less conspicuous. The government¹s response to these three tactics was uneven and predictably clumsy.
Although at first the Army and Police were small and untrained in counterinsurgency techniques, a paramilitary body of 20,000 men called the Metropolitan Guards was set up in 1968. It was trained by American and Brazilian policemen, and its main duty was to oppose the Tupamaros. The security forces were handicapped by a lack of reliable informers, a coordinated network for sharing and disseminating intelligence, and their habit of conducting massive cordon-and-search operations that more often than not alienated the public¹s support. It appeared to many people that the Tupamaros, who by now had reached an active strength of almost 3,000, were running rings around the police. The economy failed to improve, and a series of corruption scandals in 1970 and 1971 further undermined public support for the government. It seemed that the Tupamaros were on the verge of creating the climate of collapse¹ that would lead to the government¹s fall. In November 1971 presidential elections were held. An alliance of left-wing parties called the Frente Amplio emerged to challenge the rule of the two traditional political parties. The Tupamaros, gave vocal support to the Frente Amplio while continuing their campaign of provocation. However, the murder of Dan
Mitrione in August 1970 and the continual civic disruption pushed more and more people away from support of the Tupamaros. The Frente Amplio suffered from the association and got less than 20% of the votes in the elections. The new Uruguayan president, Juan Maria Bordaberry, suspended civil liberties and declared a state of internal war¹ with the Tupamaros in April 1972. The Army, which until this point had been playing only a supporting role to the Police and Metropolitan Guards in the counterinsurgency, was ordered into action. They relied on mass arrests, torture, and large cordon-and-search operations. These saturation tactics captured most of the guerrillas and forced the remainder to flee the country. By November 1972 the Tupamaros had ceased to be a threat to Uruguay. The government had won, but only at the cost of destroying democracy in Uruguay and alienating large sections of the population. The Army, which in ten years had gone from consuming 1% of the national budget to over 26%, was not about to go meekly back to barracks. In their view, they had just cleared up the politician¹s mess,¹ and were not going to let it happen again. The military leadership pressured President Bordaberry to maintain the declared state of internal war. By mid-1973 all left-wing political activity had been suppressed and the national legislature indefinitely dissolved. Uruguay, once the most tolerant and democratic country in South America had become another garrison state. This was the only permanent legacy of the Tupamaros, although they had advanced further and offered a more serious challenge to established power than any other urban guerrilla movement.
Uruguay in the 1960¹s was distinct among other South American counties for its affluence and sociopolitical stability. Economic prosperity had fostered the growth of a large middle class and a stable welfare-state government that allowed a wider degree of democratic and civil freedoms larger than any other South American government. Because Uruguayan society was so peaceful, the Army and Police were very small. In 1968 there were only about 12,000 men in the armed forces and fewer than 22,000 police to keep order in a population of about 3 million. A slump in the demand for wool and meat, Uruguay¹s two principal exports, after the Korean War brought mass unemployment, inflation, and a steep drop in the …show more content…
standard of living. the social tensions this produced, along with the corruption of the overblown state bureaucracy (one in five working Uruguayans was employed by the federal government in some fashion), gave the impulse for an effective urban guerrilla movement to emerge. This revolutionary group¹s official name was Movimento de Liberacion National but was popularly known as the Tupamaros (from Tupac Amaru, last member of the Inca royal family, murdered by the Spanish in 1571). It was founded in 1963 by Raul Sendic, a law student studying in Montevideo. Because Uruguay was so urbanized (over 80% of Uruguayans lived in large towns or cities) they concentrated almost all their activity in and around the capital, Montevideo, where more than half the entire population of the country lived. As with most other South American guerrilla groups, they started as a political organization that deliberately chose the tactics of armed struggle¹ and drew its membership from young, radical, middle-class people -- mostly students and white-collar workers. Like most urban terrorist groups, they were organized in a cellular structure of 4-5 men called a firing group,¹ with the group leader as the only link to other cells. This was done for security reasons, as was their practice of never telling any individual more than he or she needed to know for any particular operation. From 1963 to early 1968 the Tupamaros concentrated on gathering resources -- mostly by robbing banks, guns shops, and private businesses. Their goal was to make the government look powerless to defend its friends and unnecessarily heavy-handed in its reactions. The main tactics they used to achieve this were political kidnapping, armed propaganda,¹ and intimidating the security forces. The Tupamaros used political kidnapping as an alternative to assassinations and as a way to show the government¹s impotence. It was a severe psychological shock and embarrassment to those in the government to have their friends and diplomatic figures snatched off the street and held in so-called people¹s prisons¹ in Montevideo itself. Meanwhile, the people did not react as they would have against assassinations because the kidnappings (often of unpopular and corrupt people anyway) did not inconvenience them, but the inept police reaction (usually a massive cordon-and-search operation) did. The worsening state of the economy provoked a wave of student rioting and labour unrest, and a state of national emergency was declared in June 1968 (which was to last until late 1972). It was during this crisis that the Tupamaros staged their first political kidnapping -- Ulises Pereyra, the president of the State Telephone Company, an unpopular figure whose abduction was acclaimed by the public. When the police began to search the campus of the National University in Montevideo, they started a student riot that ended in the death of a student. Ulises Pereyra was released unharmed five days later. More kidnappings followed. In September 1969 they kidnapped a leading banker and held him for ten weeks, in support of a strike by employees at his bank. In July 1970 Dan Mitrione, an American policeman on loan to the Uruguayan security forces, and Aloisio Gonide, the Brazilian consul in Uruguay, were kidnapped and held for ransom. When the government refused to parley with the Tupamaros, they killed Mitrione, a move that was to cost them considerable public support. In the first half of 1971 the British ambassador to Uruguay, the Uruguayan attorney-general, and a former minister of agriculture were kidnapped, and Ulises Pereyra was abducted a second time. The second tactic the Tupamaros used was armed propaganda. Some of these actions resembled nothing so much as forceful advertising. When the government shut down left-wing papers and forbade the regular news media to refer to the Tupamaros by name, the Tupamaros ran their own mobile radio transmitter in Montevideo, temporarily seized radio stations to broadcast propaganda, and maintained an underground press. Groups of armed terrorists would also occupy meeting halls, cafeterias, and cinemas (real guerrilla theatre!) and make speeches to a literally captive audience. Actions like bank robberies and raids on police stations, besides their logistical benefit, also had a propaganda goal. The Tupamaros conducted several very professional operations in this area. A third tactic was intimidation of the security forces. Because the police were doing almost all of the fighting against the guerrillas, the Tupamaros began to select individual policemen for assassination in late 1969. Although only a few policemen were killed this way, the moral of the force was shaken. In June 1970 there was a general police strike for higher pay and the right to work in civilian clothes in order to make them less conspicuous. The government¹s response to these three tactics was uneven and predictably clumsy.
Although at first the Army and Police were small and untrained in counterinsurgency techniques, a paramilitary body of 20,000 men called the Metropolitan Guards was set up in 1968. It was trained by American and Brazilian policemen, and its main duty was to oppose the Tupamaros. The security forces were handicapped by a lack of reliable informers, a coordinated network for sharing and disseminating intelligence, and their habit of conducting massive cordon-and-search operations that more often than not alienated the public¹s support. It appeared to many people that the Tupamaros, who by now had reached an active strength of almost 3,000, were running rings around the police. The economy failed to improve, and a series of corruption scandals in 1970 and 1971 further undermined public support for the government. It seemed that the Tupamaros were on the verge of creating the climate of collapse¹ that would lead to the government¹s fall. In November 1971 presidential elections were held. An alliance of left-wing parties called the Frente Amplio emerged to challenge the rule of the two traditional political parties. The Tupamaros, gave vocal support to the Frente Amplio while continuing their campaign of provocation. However, the murder of Dan
Mitrione in August 1970 and the continual civic disruption pushed more and more people away from support of the Tupamaros. The Frente Amplio suffered from the association and got less than 20% of the votes in the elections. The new Uruguayan president, Juan Maria Bordaberry, suspended civil liberties and declared a state of internal war¹ with the Tupamaros in April 1972. The Army, which until this point had been playing only a supporting role to the Police and Metropolitan Guards in the counterinsurgency, was ordered into action. They relied on mass arrests, torture, and large cordon-and-search operations. These saturation tactics captured most of the guerrillas and forced the remainder to flee the country. By November 1972 the Tupamaros had ceased to be a threat to Uruguay. The government had won, but only at the cost of destroying democracy in Uruguay and alienating large sections of the population. The Army, which in ten years had gone from consuming 1% of the national budget to over 26%, was not about to go meekly back to barracks. In their view, they had just cleared up the politician¹s mess,¹ and were not going to let it happen again. The military leadership pressured President Bordaberry to maintain the declared state of internal war. By mid-1973 all left-wing political activity had been suppressed and the national legislature indefinitely dissolved. Uruguay, once the most tolerant and democratic country in South America had become another garrison state. This was the only permanent legacy of the Tupamaros, although they had advanced further and offered a more serious challenge to established power than any other urban guerrilla movement.