Utilitarianism In John Stuart Mill

Perhaps quite eloquently, in John Stuart Mill’s text Utilitarianism he noted that “there are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong” (Mill 1:1-6). In summary, it is rather evident that there are extraordinary inconsistencies concerning the unanimity of both what is right and what is wrong. Ostensibly, it appears that ethics is not a static subject; amongst a notably lengthy duration of unsuccessful attempts to define ethics, it
Well, unsurprisingly, there doesn’t seem to be a universally applicable understanding of ethical principles. In fact, John Stuart Mill asserted that his ideology of ‘utilitarianism’ is subject to development in lieu of that lack of concurrence. In an attempt to disprove the argument that perfectionism requires far more time than is inherently available while one is pressured to make an instantaneous decision. Mill rebukes this objection by agreeing that there is simply not enough time to readily calculate the quantitative and qualitative potential of an action whereby computing the amount of happiness that an action can generate. Instead, he argues that this calculation is already prepared. Mill explicates this misunderstanding, verbatim: “the answer to the objection is that there has been ample time, namely, the duration of the human species. During all that time mankind have been learning by the experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence as well as the morality of life are dependent” (Mill 23:35–39). This notion is particularly compelling, considering it is unconcerned with likening ephemerality to reality; alternatively,
Firstly, Mill is cognizant that critics have asserted that it is demeaning to assume that the meaning of life is simply satisfying others, or satisfying oneself; inasmuch as it was (although ethics isn’t necessarily analogous with life’s purpose), humans would not be superior to other apparently less significant organisms. Mill responds by sharing that, foremost, it is degrading to merely assume that humans are incapable of experiencing pleasure more rewarding than “that of which swine are capable” (Mill 8:2). Moreover, Mill claims that “for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other,” (Mill 8:4-7) followed by the contention that “Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites and, when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification” (Mill 8:9-12). On that account, Mill distinguishes the distinctions between animalistic pleasures and human pleasures – he argues that pleasures associated with inferior organisms are unalike pleasures of human beings. By that means, it should be understood that there are different degrees of pleasure that each have respective quality corresponding to one’s satisfaction. In