Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)
The University of Chicago
The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago
The University of Chicago Law School
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Author(s): Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, Armen A. Alchian
Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Oct., 1978), pp. 297-326
Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/725234 .
Accessed: 25/09/2011 22:23
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
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Chicago, The University of Chicago Law School are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Law and Economics.
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VERTICAL INTEGRATION, APPROPRIABLE
RENTS, AND THE COMPETITIVE
CONTRACTING PROCESS*
BENJAMIN KLEIN
University of California, Los Angeles
ROBERT G. CRAWFORD
Brigham Young University and ARMEN A. ALCHIAN
University of California, Los Angeles
thanfortyyearshave passedsinceCoase'sfundamental
M ORE insightthat transaction, coordination, and contracting costs must be considered explicitly in explaining the extent of vertical integration.1 Starting from the truism that profit-maximizing firms will undertake those activities that they find cheaper to administer internally than to purchase in the
The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago
The University of Chicago Law School
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Author(s): Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, Armen A. Alchian
Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Oct., 1978), pp. 297-326
Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/725234 .
Accessed: 25/09/2011 22:23
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press, The University of Chicago, The Booth School of Business of the University of
Chicago, The University of Chicago Law School are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Law and Economics.
http://www.jstor.org
VERTICAL INTEGRATION, APPROPRIABLE
RENTS, AND THE COMPETITIVE
CONTRACTING PROCESS*
BENJAMIN KLEIN
University of California, Los Angeles
ROBERT G. CRAWFORD
Brigham Young University and ARMEN A. ALCHIAN
University of California, Los Angeles
thanfortyyearshave passedsinceCoase'sfundamental
M ORE insightthat transaction, coordination, and contracting costs must be considered explicitly in explaining the extent of vertical integration.1 Starting from the truism that profit-maximizing firms will undertake those activities that they find cheaper to administer internally than to purchase in the