Vietnam War Dbq

The United States strategy in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 went through various changes and revisions as leadership tried to find a feasible plan of action. US Army General William Westmoreland and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were two of the major forces in US leadership that would shape the war effort. They devised a military strategy of attrition through tactics of search and destroy, covert operations, and other factors in hopes of wearing out the enemy. While their strategy found some success on the battlefields, the ineffectiveness of search and destroy missions, the over emphasis on body counts, and the disconnect between everyday soldiers and their superiors about defining success would doom the US war effort.
Argument
In the
wake of the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964 and increasing Viet Cong attacks on US and ARVN positions, American leadership knew that increased involvement in Vietnam was inevitable. As a plan for initial involvement was created, so too was the long term strategy. This strategy considered the production and destruction capabilities of the US compared to the North Vietnam, and concluded that the best way to win the war was to outlast the enemy in a war of attrition. This war of attrition would rely on accurate estimations of enemy abilities, as well effective and constant search and destroy missions. These search and destroy missions would send out the infantry as a reconnaissance force to draw out and elusive and well hidden enemy. After the enemy was located, often while ambushing patrolling infantry, then the destructive power of US artillery and air bombardment would rain down and destroy the enemy. This strategy found early success, but would soon run into problems as the enemy adjusted. An early example of search and destroy success came in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 as the US was able to use their strategy to achieve victory in a large scale, conventional battle. The enemy, however, would not put themselves in such a position again. The rest of the search and destroy operation involved soldiers moving from place to place with “no real combat goals or territory objectives.” Some soldiers did not see a base camp for months as they were transported throughout the county side to find the enemy, drive them out, take the land, and then move on. The search and destroy missions, with their constant moving and fighting without any real combat goals or measure of progress ,were one major failure of US military policy in Vietnam. As part of their military strategy, the US leadership decided that success in missions and unit effectiveness would be determined by body counts and kill ratios.
This desire for body count was part of Westmoreland’s plan to reach a cross-over point in which enemy forces were being killed faster they could be replenished. He believed that the US could out produce and out supply North Vietnam, and he was ready to attrit and rack up casualties until they fell. This focus on body counts as a measure of progress and success was an additional failure of US military policy. Unit commanders and captains were given kill quotas for their units, and if they did not meet the quotas they were replaced. This immense pressure to produce would lead to indiscriminate killings and atrocities, sometimes even “encourage soldiers to continue the violence.” The My Lai massacre was just one example of platoons wiping out entire villages of people and writing them up as Viet Cong killed in action to drive up the body count. This practice was widespread in the villages of Vietnam and grew even larger as the US begin to set up their own counter guerrilla teams and task forces which would be responsible for most of the massacres in the villages. The obsession with body counts and kill ratios as a measure of success lead to a shoot first, ask questions later mentality from many soldiers, most of whom were taught that everybody they meet is a potential “VC sympathizer” and could be a
threat. Since body counts were the primary measure of success, many soldiers began to wonder if they were truly winning the war by just killing more people.
The soldiers were simply told to wander around the country looking for the enemy, and when the find him, try to take him out. Once the soldiers won the battle or skirmish and gained the territory, they could not feel any source of pride as they were quickly transported by helicopter out of the newly gained territory to go search for the enemy again. This life for the every day soldier made it seem like no tangible progress was being made, and the promise of success from the generals appeared more and more empty. Enemy casualties were being over estimated, and despite the still massive enemy casualties, 75% of all fighting was engaged by the Viet Cong as this “war of pin pricks” was beginning to takes it toll. The unclear mission and lack of leadership communication would lead to a severe drop in soldier morale and was another significant failure of the US military
strategy.

Conclusion Despite the military victories and vast destruction brought by US armed forces, the failures of the military strategy in Vietnam cannot be ignored. Westmoreland and McNamara’s strategy of attrition and plans for escalation proved more harmful than useful. From the dangerous and ineffective search and destroy missions, to the horrors promoted by a desire for bodies, to the lack of an overall goal, the US military strategy would not be able to win the war, even if it won all of the battles.