In his book ‘Religion and Human Nature’, Ward makes an interesting emergentist argument in presenting what one may call a non-reductive identity theory of the soul, or, as he refers to it, a ‘soft identity theory’.32 Normally, it is reductionists who identify the mind with the brain, yet here we have a theologian (who is also a philosopher) identifying the mind/soul33 with the brain and nevertheless maintaining a non-reductive position. How so? By taking a high view of matter:
Matter always contained the potentiality for sensitive inner response and creative action, and the evolution of the human soul is the gradual realization of that potentiality.34
In order to better appreciate Ward’s position, it is important to first recall the efforts that have attempted to show that Jewish and Christian interpretations of creation contain no dichotomous notion of human beings, and that the Bible puts forth a holistic perspective of man. For example, according to Joel Green, it is an ontological monism that is representative of the New Testament’s …show more content…
This kind of theory is somewhat representative of the kind of contemporary theological anthropology that one would expect to emerge after the recent ‘tightening’ of the brain-mind link. Clayton reminds us, however, that like every other phenomenon in the universe, emergentist supervenience does not require a theological interpretation.44 Rather, it can only serve to philosophically and scientifically show the coherence of theological assumptions. My position is that it is vital – in this dialogue between theology and psychology on the nature of the human person – to always remember the distinction between theological and scientific languages, and the limitations that this places on theology’s ability to make a ‘valid’ contribution to the