What Are the Difficulties Encountered by Psychologists in Studying Consciousness? to What Extent Have Theory and Research in Cognitive Psychology Helped Overcome These Difficulties?
What are the difficulties encountered by psychologists in studying consciousness? To what extent have theory and research in cognitive psychology helped overcome these difficulties?
Consciousness is an umbrella term utilised to refer to a variety of mental phenomena. Cognitive psychologists have focused their efforts in understanding access consciousness, or how information carried in conscious mental states is available to different cognitive processes. This is linked to attention and working memory. However, consciousness is difficult to quantify and hence most pieces of research study consciousness by contrasting the characteristics between conscious and unconscious processes. Although with some limitations, research has provided enough information for the formulation of several models of consciousness. Besides, the combination of behavioural and neuropsychological data is slowly advancing the understanding about what consciousness is and what it is for although much is yet to know.
Consciousness is a fascinating but challenging topic in cognitive psychology. The concept of consciousness is difficult to define not only because it refers to heterogeneous phenomena but because it is difficult to measure objectively (Atkinson et al, 2000). It is an inclusive term for a number of central aspects of our existence; the state of being awake and aware of ourselves in our environment as opposed to being asleep; being aware of particular sensations or mental events or being aware of the quality of our experiences; and also, self-consciousness, our awareness and monitoring of what we are doing and thinking (Andrade, 2010). Pinker (1997) summarises these aspects in three: sentience or Block’s (1995, as cited in Andrade, 2010) phenomenal awareness; access to information or Block’s (ibid.) access consciousness; and self-knowledge. Chalmers (1996, as cited in Andrade, 2010) refer to sentience as the ‘hard problem’ whilst access consciousness is the ‘easy problem’.
Consciousness is an umbrella term utilised to refer to a variety of mental phenomena. Cognitive psychologists have focused their efforts in understanding access consciousness, or how information carried in conscious mental states is available to different cognitive processes. This is linked to attention and working memory. However, consciousness is difficult to quantify and hence most pieces of research study consciousness by contrasting the characteristics between conscious and unconscious processes. Although with some limitations, research has provided enough information for the formulation of several models of consciousness. Besides, the combination of behavioural and neuropsychological data is slowly advancing the understanding about what consciousness is and what it is for although much is yet to know.
Consciousness is a fascinating but challenging topic in cognitive psychology. The concept of consciousness is difficult to define not only because it refers to heterogeneous phenomena but because it is difficult to measure objectively (Atkinson et al, 2000). It is an inclusive term for a number of central aspects of our existence; the state of being awake and aware of ourselves in our environment as opposed to being asleep; being aware of particular sensations or mental events or being aware of the quality of our experiences; and also, self-consciousness, our awareness and monitoring of what we are doing and thinking (Andrade, 2010). Pinker (1997) summarises these aspects in three: sentience or Block’s (1995, as cited in Andrade, 2010) phenomenal awareness; access to information or Block’s (ibid.) access consciousness; and self-knowledge. Chalmers (1996, as cited in Andrade, 2010) refer to sentience as the ‘hard problem’ whilst access consciousness is the ‘easy problem’.
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