What Is Aquinas First Argument As Any Proof For God's Existence
Aquinas affirms the name ‘God’ means that He is infinitely good (pg. 125). The first argument offered concludes there must be a first mover, “and this everyone understands to be God” (pg. 126). His first argument does not prove the unmoved mover is good or bad. Aquinas, like most, understand God to be the original mover and infinitely good. Can we take Aquinas’ first argument as any proof of God’s existence? I believe not. Aquinas must argue such a creator is all good. Aquinas’ fourth argument puts all beings on the good/bad scale. There must be a being(s) that is the hottest, truest, noblest, or best. Aquinas writes, “The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus” (pg. 127). Aquinas concluded God is the original mover, and creator
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He might reject my analysis of a gene of motion resting in the same group as nobility, goodness, and heat. The larger group of predicates apply as more-or-less to a thing. A noble thing compares to other noble things. Similarly, an object which is heated is either hotter or colder than others. Moreover, good things are either the equivalent or more-or-less good than others. Motion on the other hand might be suiting correctly in the first proof as either in or out of motion. Whether something is or isn’t in motion does not come in more-or-less, but rather either in motion or stationary. Conversely, the speed of objects does come on a scale. The origin of speed, not motion, might be a certain kind of genus where the maximum is the …show more content…
The fourth argument shows the origin of genus as the maximum of that genus. This last passage further suggest the motion argument carries to some other genus from argument four. Goodness in particular is done voluntarily. Goodness may not always be voluntary, but this position aligns well with free will. Free will allows human action to be voluntary in order to be greater in the hierarchy of God’s creation. Anything voluntary traces back to some higher cause (pg. 128). Goods from free will trace back to some higher cause. God is the higher cause. So, God is the cause of these goods. There seems to be justificatory force from putting motion into the genius of argument four. Wise Aquinas likely picked up on some issue with this line of argumentation or thought it was unnecessary at
He might reject my analysis of a gene of motion resting in the same group as nobility, goodness, and heat. The larger group of predicates apply as more-or-less to a thing. A noble thing compares to other noble things. Similarly, an object which is heated is either hotter or colder than others. Moreover, good things are either the equivalent or more-or-less good than others. Motion on the other hand might be suiting correctly in the first proof as either in or out of motion. Whether something is or isn’t in motion does not come in more-or-less, but rather either in motion or stationary. Conversely, the speed of objects does come on a scale. The origin of speed, not motion, might be a certain kind of genus where the maximum is the …show more content…
The fourth argument shows the origin of genus as the maximum of that genus. This last passage further suggest the motion argument carries to some other genus from argument four. Goodness in particular is done voluntarily. Goodness may not always be voluntary, but this position aligns well with free will. Free will allows human action to be voluntary in order to be greater in the hierarchy of God’s creation. Anything voluntary traces back to some higher cause (pg. 128). Goods from free will trace back to some higher cause. God is the higher cause. So, God is the cause of these goods. There seems to be justificatory force from putting motion into the genius of argument four. Wise Aquinas likely picked up on some issue with this line of argumentation or thought it was unnecessary at