What Is Somalian Piracy?

Tamara Rodgers
Professor Jackson
English 1010-542
26 April 2014
Somalian Piracy: A Problem and a Solution

Piracy is one of the oldest forms of crime. Since there have been ships on the sea there have been maritime pirates. The vast majority of piracy within the last few years has occurred near Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. These are not the pirates of Hollywood with peg legs who say shiver me timbers. In fact, Somalian pirates are extremely aggressive and organized. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 2013 Annual Report states, “Somali pirates are dangerous and are prepared to fire their automatic weapons and RPG [rocket propelled grenades] at vessels in order to stop them” (IMB 22). The IMB further advises that Somali
There are a number of factors contributing to the rise of Somalian piracy, but the most important is the lack of a central government. Somalia has not had a central government since the rule of Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Captain of the Spanish Merchant Navy, Santiago Baniela states, “[…] the state lost control of its own coastal waters, and the sporadic first phase of Somali piracy began” (Baniela 195). Without law enforcement, Somalia’s coastal territories were left unprotected. For example, this allowed foreign countries to fish Somalian waters unregulated “[…] jeopardizing the livelihood of local fisherman and leading to violent disputes” (qtd. Baniela 195). As the local fishing grounds were depleted this caused economic hardships for Somalians. Local fisherman then saw an opportunity to recuperate lost money by demanding “taxes” from illegal fishing vessels. These men saw themselves as protectors of their sea waters and justified such activity as an alternative means of
However, naval or police action funded by other countries is not a long term solution. A professor of international law at the University of Connecticut, Dr. Paul Hallwood states, “[…] in recent years […] more captured maritime pirates were released by the warships that captured them than were prosecuted” (124). For instance, in 2011 the Esbern Snare, a Danish warship, captured sixteen heavily armed Somali pirates aboard a stolen vessel. The pirates had two Yemeni nationals held hostage. The task force set the suspected pirates free stating there was not enough evidence to prosecute them (Hallwood 117). It would appear this was an excuse not to incur the cost of prosecuting the pirates as they had not offended against Denmark and did not affect their national