What Is The Ostpolitik

Describe Brandt’s “Ostpolitik”. Assess the achievements of this policy for the people in East and West Germany as well as in Poland.

“Ostpolitik” was a daring policy led by Willy Brandt during the 1960s. It was a bid to improve relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union. It was progressive, successful and ultimately, it was done for the German nation and its citizens. Brandt knew that if changes were going to happen, if the divide between the two separate nations could be lessened; it would have to be done by the German people themselves. Many West Germans disputed over the “Ostpolitik” yet the lasting success of it benefitted many more people. Brandt declared ‘The Germans must be at peace with themselves so that the world can be at peace with Germany.’[1]
It has been said that “Ostpolitik” began when Adenauer visited Moscow in 1955 to sign a treaty that established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
Efforts were made too by Kurt Georg Kiesinger, chancellor of the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union and Social Democratic parties from 1966 to 1969, who also had the long-term aim of German reunification. However, their efforts made little ground and their attempts to ease relations with Eastern countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were prevented by the Soviet Union.

The wheels of the “Ostpolitik” came into motion once more in July 1963 when Willy Brandt, a former Mayor of Berlin and future first socialist Chancellor of the FRG, and Egon Bahr (his “Ostpolitik” advisor), proposed new German and Eastern policies at a conference in Tutzing. They began with recognising that the catastrophe of World War II began with the National Socialists rise to power in 1933, and how Germany should accept their past and so began a period of
détente.

The FRG had reconciled with Western Europe in the 1950s and had since then been successfully cooperating fully within Western Europe and with the USA. With this in hand, the FRG turned towards their Eastern neighbours, hoping to ease relations. Yet the party who had power until 1966, the Christian Democrats, not used to cooperating with the communist East, and particularly with the GDR, would not accept the GDR government and behaved as though they were in charge of the whole of Germany. They followed the Hallstein Doctrine to isolate the GDR which meant they would break relations with any country that recognised the GDR as a separate state.

When Brandt came to power, he realised for better relations they would have ‘to work from the existing realities’[2]. They were aware that a reunited Germany was highly unlikely for a long while. The Berlin wall had been erected on August 13th 1961; the Iron Curtain dividing the East and West was now in place. This led to the emergence of “Ostpolitik” again; a controversial policy that had little to no support from the right wing. Several members of the coalition defected and Brandt only narrowly survived a vote of no confidence introduced by the opposition in 1972, just three years after becoming Chancellor. The CDU/CSU found it difficult to accept, let alone agree with the Eastern policies introduced by Brandt’s government.
Many West Germans were unhappy with the lack of effort put in by the Western powers to prevent the building of the Wall and rapprochement with the East was high on people’s list of priorities. One of the most striking features of “Ostpolitik” was their desire to prevent yet more division between East and West Germany. An invisible cultural and economic wall was on the verge of spreading the divide just as the Berlin Wall already did. There was now even less of a Zusammengehoerigkeitsgefuehl (sense of belonging together). A modus vivendi was needed to prevent the gap between East and West Germany increasing.
The 1960s were a time of change throughout Europe, with radical students more and more enthused by socialist ideologies, questioning the West German society and demanding social and political reform. Brandt’s policies were in alignment with the ‘skeptical generation’ of Germany and upon winning Chancellorship in 1969, he vowed ‘Wir wollen mehr Demokratie wagen’[3] (lit.: ‘Let's dare more democracy’). Brandt became Chancellor of the FRG with the support of the Free Democratic Party in 1969. He immediately led his government into peace talks with Eastern Europe and East Germany to form nonaggression treaties with the USSR and Poland. An important aspect of “Ostpolitik” was the need to recognise the GDR as a sovereign state along with the loss of land to the East, giving formal recognition to the Oder-Neisse frontier (1970–72). This was in no way giving up on the idea of reunification. Brandt’s main objective ultimately was German unification but knew it was not possible with such a rift there at that time. Menschen Erleichterungen (easing of human problems) was now of higher priority. Both states were doubtful of Brandt’s initiatives, the West worried that the communists would give nothing in return to Bonn whilst the East feared that if they were to accept Brandt’s policies that they would then have too much contact with the West and thus, lose their hold on their people.
Brandt initiated a ‘policy of small steps’ which financially rewarded East Germany for each ‘humanitarian concession’ they made; political prisoners were released, He sought to relax and gain agreement and concession from East Germany regarding limitations on family visits, trade barriers and postal and communication restrictions.

August 12th 1970 was a highly significant day for the USSR and the FRG as they signed the Treaty of Moscow, recognising the pre-eminence of Russia in Eastern Europe and led to accepting present borders, ‘the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics share the realization that peace can only be maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs the present frontiers.’[4] The Treaty goes on to agree that; ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consider it an important objective of their policies to maintain international peace and achieve détente.’ Brandt was aware that the key to Eastern Europe was through Moscow.

Politics between the FRG and Poland were of utmost importance and hope for a good political relationship was reinforced in June 1970 with long-term trade and cooperation agreements. Adenauer’s government of 1949-63 refused to have diplomatic relations with Poland because Poland had relations with the illegal and illegitimate’ regime in East Germany. They wouldn’t accept Poland’s borders and allowed ethnic Germans the automatic ‘right of return’ to their former homes. Before Brandt there was only a series of non-negotiable points and a policy of non-recognition.[5]
Brandt set about trying to improve relations and this led to a second treaty, the Treaty of Warsaw, much like the Treaty of Moscow, which was signed on December 7th 1970. With regard to German-Polish relations, nothing could be solved without first the issue of their borders. The treaty reads as follows: The Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of Poland state in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line …running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemuende, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River …shall constitute the western State frontier of the People’s Republic of Poland.[6]

It was not quite formal recognition of the frontier. It described ‘the present boundary line’ as the ‘legal western border of Poland’, but it was a major advancement. In return, ethnic Germans in Poland were allowed to return to the FRG. These treaties were a clear signifier of now possible normal diplomatic relations between Bonn and Warsaw. On the day the Treaty was signed, Brandt made a momentous gesture by spontaneously kneeling as he put down a wreath at the memorial for the Jews murdered in 1943 by SS units in the Warsaw Ghetto. This was him accepting the blame on behalf of his country for all their wrongs.

Another important factor of “Ostpolitik” was to improve trading between Eastern and Western Europe. The communist economy needed a serious boost; Eastern Europe became aware of the contrast between their faltering economy and that of the prospering West. The Soviet Union exported far more goods to the FRG than any other country and with better relations between the two nations, this was a great improvement and a number of trade agreements were settled upon. By improving trade relations they hoped to improve political relations.

The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was settled on 3rd September 1971 by the four wartime allied powers. It brought the two parts of Berlin somewhat closer together, eased travel and communication between the East and West of the city. It was of great advantage to Western citizens. “Ostpolitik” led to westerners being allowed to visit their relatives in the East and Eastern retirees were permitted to travel westward. This relaxation in freedom for the citizens of the GDR was a major step. When Brandt requested guaranteed civilian access for West Germans to West Berlin, located 110 miles inside East Germany, to the Soviets, he was fully aware that the Soviets would be reluctant to ease their grip; ‘The chance for Europe to enter into a new period of easing tensions will either be lost here or won here. Where the cold war was coldest, it will be the most difficult.’

East Germany agreed on 7th and 21st December 1971 to a basic treaty (Grundlagen-Vertrag) easing transportation of civilian goods and issuing passes for family visits between East and West Germany and Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” was showing advancements. Diplomatic ties were upgraded, peace agreements were settled and they agreed to respect each others sovereignty. The most important aspect of the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the FRG and the GDR was that neither state could represent the other or claim to be acting for the other. The SED Politburo of East Germany said in 1970 that ‘the question of the ordering of the relations between our two states is not some second-rate issue, but rather a cardinal problem of peace in Europe.’[7]

The United Nations accepted both East and West Germany on 18th September 1973 marking a new state of mind for Europe. Furthermore, the Treaty of Prague renouncing violence and recognising the German-Czechoslovak border was signed by Brandt and Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal after much difficulty due to the nationalist stance adopted by the Czech government-in-exile. Brandt said after the ceremony ‘The acts of brute force cannot be wiped out simply by promising never to use force again, but we can build a bridge over the abyss.’[8]

Yet the differences between East and West Germany were clearly apparent. East Germans were living under Soviet rule and constantly had more and more restrictions placed on them. They knew of the prospering, economically wealthy West Germany, but could do little about their situation. It was difficult for the citizens of the GDR to travel outside of the GDR and a highly effective security force called the Stasi monitored the lives of East Germans to ensure good behaviour and avoid any dissent. It was regular citizens in Eastern Europe who were the victims of the Cold War, whether they lost their homes for death strips or used as ‘bargaining tools.’ The shift in Cold War politics due to “Ostpolitik” led to loosening the grip of the GDR on its citizens.

Brandt was also aware of his people and their wellbeing and the problems caused by the division of the German nation. He was popular amongst the German people and had widespread public support for his efforts in improving relations with the East.

He was adamant that he could improve relations throughout Europe without affecting any of West Berlin’s principles or harming the future for West German governments.
Unfortunate events led to Brandt’s resignation on May 6, 1974. Following revelations that a close aide was an East German spy, this proved a major set-back for Soviet-West German rapprochement.

Cracks began to appear in “Ostpolitik” during 1973, the Quadripartite Agreement had problems being implemented and the GDR set limits on contact between East and West German citizens, this process was known as Abgrenzung. The Soviets didn’t stop there though and in November 1973, they introduced a far higher exchange rate for West German visitors to the East, which breached the contract of the Basic Treaty.

Sole acknowledgement cannot be given to Brandt for reuniting Berlin and Germany but it cannot be denied that he made the framework for the long-term objectives, earning himself the Nobel Peace Prize 1971. The policies he enforced and the agreements that he formed so successfully between the FRG and the GDR; border agreements and non aggression pledges amongst other things, were continued to a certain extent throughout the reign of Helmut Schmidt and also when the CDU/CSU led by Helmut Kohl came back into power in 1982. They aimed to continue all the political, administrative, humanitarian and commercial policies with regards to the Eastern block. After all the opposition shown by the CDU/CSU, they recognised the benefits of Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” and pledged to ‘preserve and promote an Ostpolitik based on Bonn’s de facto acceptance of the European territorial and political status quo – that is, the continents post-war division, Germany’s partition into two sovereign states, and the existence of the GDR.’[9]
Yet in Poland during Schmidt’s reign relations deteriorated and it seemed as if the 1950s and early 1960s were back. Brandt’s successor, Helmut Schmidt did little in terms of German-Polish relations. There were numerous independent trade unions in Poland, which the FRG viewed as potentially threatening to Europe’s security as they wanted liberal democracy in Poland. Then Kohl took to power in 1982 and things started to change again. Poland was experiencing great economic difficulty and many German charities, in particular the Red Cross made huge efforts to help the Polish people. Relations between Germany and Poland made steps towards a better friendship due to Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” yet it was not until the Wall fell and Germany and Poland signed the treaty recognising Poland’s western border on 14th November 1990, followed by the Treaty on Friendship and Co-operation of 17 June 1991.

Brandt’s “Ostpolitik” was a major step on the road to the collapse of the Soviet block and although Brandt only just lived to see the fall of the Berlin Wall, he had achieved the great goals of his life: the end of the cold war and the restoration of a unified Germany for the people he cared so much about. ‘For centuries Germany was a bridge between East and West... We are striving to build anew the shattered bridge, better, sturdier and more reliable’.[10] . By accepting the Cold War order, the FRG found the cooperation and communication with the East that would set in place the eventual demise of the Soviet block and opened up to the East to once more realign the FRG with the eventual hope of reunification. On the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9th November 1989, Brandt spoke to Germany and said ‘What belongs together will now grow together.’[11]
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Biography

Pulzer, Peter, German Politics, 1945-1995 (Oxford: OUP, 1995)

Pittman, Avril, From Ostpolitik to reunification: West German-Soviet political relations. (Cambridge University Press)

Sarotte, M.E. Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik 1969-1972 (UNC Press)

Albert, E.H. The Brandt Doctrine of Two States in Germany. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 293-303. Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs

Brandt, Willy, People and politics: the years 1960-1975 (London: Collins, 1978)

‘The Ostpolitik of the FRG’ - The Treaty of Warsaw United States-Department of State. Documents on Germany 1944-1985. Washington: Department of State, [s.d.], pp. 1125-1127. - SCHEEL, Walter. The German-Polish Treaty., Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs - BRANDT, Willy. My life in politics. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1992, pp. 196-197; 199-200. - Auffassung der Bundesregierung zu den Ostverträgen (Januar 1972), in Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. 18.01.1972, No 6, p. 53. These documents are available in European NAvigator, www.ena.lu. Accessed 4/4/2008

‘Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik’. Author: National War Coll Washington DC Available: Accessed 4/4/2008 http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA437399

‘Did Ostpolitik Work?’ Author: Gordon A. Craig Available: Accessed 4/4/2008 http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19940101fareviewessay8558/gordon-a-craig/did-ostpolitik-work.html

Volume 9. Two Germans 1961-1989. Author: Konrad H. Jarausch and Helga A. Welsh Available: Accessed 6/4/2008 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English%20Introduction%20November%2018%202004.pdf

Willy Brandt, Man of the Year. 1970 Jan 4th Available: Accessed 4/4/2008 http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1970.html Bridging The Abyss. 1973 Dec 24th Available: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,943509,00.html German-Polish Relations in the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change Paper Presented in Panel: German-Czech Relations in the Twenty First Century: a Comparison. Author: Dr Karl Cordell Available: Accessed: 7/4/2008 http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/16/2/Cordell.pdf -----------------------
[1] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942376-6,00.html On The Road To A New Reality, 04/01/1971
[2] European unification and the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (1966–1974) http://www.ena.lu/ Robin Allers.
[3] http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/parlhist/streifzug/g1960/g1960_8.html

[4] Politics and Government in Germany, 1944-1994: Basic Documents. Page 131.

[5] W. Loth, Ost-West-Konflikt und deutsche Frage, München, dtv, 1989 (page173).

[6] United States-Department of State. Documents on Germany 1944-1985. Washington: Department of State, [s.d.], pp. 1125-1127. Available: http://www.ena.lu/
[7] http://uncpress.unc.edu/chapters/sarotte_dealing.html
[8] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,943509,00.html

[9] Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (pg 2). Clay Clemens, pub.1989. Duke University Press.

[10] http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1970.html
[11] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,976765-2,00.html Jackson, James. O. A Bold Peacemaker