What Was The Cause Of The Challenger Disaster

Causes of Accident
Challenger's STS-51L mission was scheduled for Launch at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Fla. “After several technical and weather-related delays, Challenger launched at 11:38 a.m. EST on Jan. 28, 1986” (Chow, 2011). The ship exploded 73 seconds after liftoff (Howell, 2012). The (mechanical) cause of the accident points to pressure seals (O-rings) but more importantly points to the serious problems that NASA had with its communication channels and safety information systems (Mahler & Casamayou, 2009, p. 40)
Structural and Mechanical Factors
As aforementioned in the paragraph above pressure rings are blamed for the Challenger incident. In reality it was a chain reaction or domino effect that started with the
pressure seals. Pictures of the initial part of the launch display puffs of smoke that points to the inefficiency of the O-rings, and then they disappear which points to the seal working probably due to aluminum oxide melting and filling the gap.
About a minute into the flight smoke re-appears and catastrophe nears.
A small flame starts flickering, the flame continued to grow and got caught in the aerodynamic flow field of the accelerating shuttle, hydrogen began leaking and continued to fuel that flame. ("Challenger Disaster," n.d.)
Contributing Factors
Contributing factors for this accident can be narrowed down to weather and aerodynamic forces. The Challenger had never been launched in such low temperatures as this time. Sources point to the temperature dropping below 18° F the night before and 36° F on the morning of the launch. ("Challenger Disaster," n.d.) This colder climate created certain conditions that sources say affected the O-rings’ capability to seal correctly.
Furthermore the aerodynamic forces in accordance with the direction of the Challenger made it possible for the vehicle to be covered in a highly explosive mist combination of oxygen and hydrogen. The high speed of Mach 2 and the aerodynamic pressures while not being under control caused deterioration of mechanical structures on the orbiter and caused certain components to break out. The stresses the loads created were too extreme for the shuttle and it broke into several large
pieces.
Investigation Board Findings
In regards to the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Motors the materials used were unsatisfactory in their application in the Challenger particularly during cold weather months. The design of the field joint was also unsatisfactory as it could not contain the burning gases under expected condition during lift-off and flight phases. (Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives [Committee on Science and Technology], 1986)
The Rogers Commission concluded that NASA’s decision making process was flawed but the Committee on Science and Technology did not agree and concludes that the accident was caused by a failure in the aft field joint on the right-hand Solid Rocket Motor and agree that his was due to a faulty designed not completely understood by NASA nor Thiokol at the time of design and implementation.(Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives [Committee on Science and Technology], 1986)
Recommendations
Multiple committees recommended that NASA review its risk management activities to define a complete risk management program. The Committee on Science and Technology also recommended that there should be a study on how to provide Space Shuttle crews with a means of escape during controlled gliding flight. (Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives [Committee on Science and Technology], 1986)
Outcomes

References
Chow, D. (2011). Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster FAQ: What Went Wrong. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/10677-challenger-tragedy-overview.html
Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives. (1986). Investigation of the Challenger Incident (House Report 99-1016). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Howell, E. (2012). Challenger: Shuttle Disaster That Changed NASA. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/18084-space-shuttle-challenger.html
Mahler, J. G., & Casamayou, M. H. (2009). Organizational Learning at Nasa: The Challenger and Columbia Incidents. [Adobe Digital Edition version]. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com
Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/investigations/q0122.shtml