What Was The Reason For The Bombing Of Dresden
Strategic bombing was not an uncommon action from those on either side of World War II. Many cities in Europe were virtually destroyed by war efforts. Each bombing was accompanied by its own set of reasons. For the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima, Japan the reason was, according to President Truman to “completely destroy Japan’s power to make war” (“Primary Resources”). The bombing of Hamburg was motivated, at least in part, by desire to destroy the city’s important shipyard (“Hamburg”). However, the 1945 targeting of Dresden is particularly difficult to explain. Considered one of Germany’s most beautiful cities, there were many who believed Dresden was safe from Anglo-American Raids. According to an eyewitness of the raids, there were rumors going around that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had an aunt that lived there and that the
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Allies intended to use Dresden as their capitol, so Dresden would be spared (Bergander). Therefore, when it was attacked on the night of February 13, it came as shock for most of the residents and refugees in the city at the time. With around 25,000 to 35,000 people, mostly civilians, dead, there is a need to understand exactly why the city should be bombed (Biddle 424). The conclusion to be reached is that although the 1945 Dresden bombing was somewhat beneficial to the Allied forces, it was a flawed attacked that was mainly rooted in retaliation for Allied casualties. An important aspect of understanding the flaws in the Dresden bombing is understanding the mechanics of the raid. It was part of several raids on Eastern Germany designed to aid the Russian army westward (Biddle 414). The Allied forces made considerable progress in the development of incendiary bombs. Americans specifically brought forth a new and powerful type of bomb: the M-69. This bomb used newly invented napalm, a type of gasoline with the consistency of gelatin. It made a flaming jell that would stick to and burn almost anything (Bess 970). The British Air Force bombed the city at night with help from the American Air Force during the day. In the early months of 1945, the American Air Force drastically increased the amount of bombs dropped, going from around 100,000 tons in the whole year of 1944 to around 45,000 just in the month of January 1945 (Baldwin). The new Allied method of bombing, as well as the massive increase in bombs, proved to be extremely effective in taking killing millions and destroying property. The bombing of Dresden was no different. Thousands died, though the estimated number is something that has been a subject of debate. One author published that the death toll was 250,000, misled by falsified reports from German propaganda (Biddle 423). Kurt Vonnegut, in his fiction novel based loosely on his experience as a prisoner of war in Dresden at the time of the raid, claimed the death toll was 135,000 (Brinkley). However, most of today’s scholars have largely rejected those claims as unrealistic. The most agreed upon number of casualties is between 25,000 and 35,000 (Biddle 424). One of the biggest flaws of the Dresden raid was how excessive the bombing was. The raids took a significant number of civilian lives and destroyed much of the city. One claim many who support the bombings make is that bombing Dresden was important to destroy Germany’s industrial and communication centers (May 88). However an important point to realize is that the city’s industries were not the only thing targeted. Housing areas in Dresden, especially those in working class areas, were targeted in the bombing. The logic behind this was that working class citizens are more likely to be part of the workforce supplying weapons are other war supplies to German forces (Hills). Because of this bombing strategy, the working class population of Germany suffered greatly. The high density of these areas could take out large numbers of people and made firestorms more likely. Although Harris did wish to take out working class citizens in an effort to slow German production, this was a major flaw of the bombing. In his book examining moral issues of World War II, professor and author Michael Bess states that there are essentially four types of people affected by aerial bombing: those directly affiliated by the military, those that work to directly support war effort, those that work for industry to support both civilian life and war efforts, and finally persons with almost nothing to do with the war effort. Western thought on ethical war generally states that the latter, comprised of women, children, the handicapped, etc., should be protected whenever possible (Bess 102-103). However, intentionally seeking out this population reveals one major flaw of Harris’ plan. Although one flaw of the bombing was the planned bombing of civilians, another seemingly contradicting issue lies within the fact that the bombers were not instructed to aim at anything at all. In an interview not released until 1981, commander Harris stated that under the Bombing Command he was directed not to “specifically aim at anything, unless ordered to do so, except the German cities as a whole” Although in some ways the bombers did focus attention on “densely population regions” to enhance effectiveness of firebombing, it was not planned out to increase destruction of war industry (Hills). Instead, the firebombs were dropped all over the city, a mistake that took thousands more lives than it needed to. Another commonly repeated defense for the bombing of Dresden is that the German army did the same to the Allies, Britain specifically.
This point seems only to allude to the fact that the bombing of Dresden was motivated largely by retaliation. The Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command was taken over by Sir Arthur Harris in early 1942 (RAF website). This is when the majority of Britain’s air raids targeting German cities began. The German Air Force’s bombing campaign, known as The Blitz ended in May 1941 (Daily Mail). Although there is no denying the extremity of The Blitz, the Bomber Command’s actions so closely following The Blitz certainly raises questions. There are some who believe British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the bombing of Dresden as retaliation for the bombing of Coventry alone. Some think that Churchill allowed Coventry to burn so as to avoid giving away intelligence (Winston Churchill Website). Although these claims are mostly ignored, the fact that the RAF’s Bombing Command so closely followed the events of the Blitz, including the bombing of the English city Coventry, cannot be
overlooked. There is some evidence of the uncertainty of the Dresden bombing in the “blame game” that went on between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and commander of the raid, Sir Arthur Harris. Churchill began to have doubts about the mission immediately after. In his letter to Harris after the Dresden bombing, he said “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing terror, should be reviewed.... I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives..., rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction..(Churchill)” Harris was not happy with this. In his autobiography he wrote “I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself” (National Archives). Churchill later revoked his statement to Harris upon Harris’ criticism (Churchill). From this exchange it becomes apparent those in power do not want to be affiliated with the decision to attack Dresden. This finger pointing is further proof that the Dresden Bombing was overkill. Churchill felt immediate unease about the bombing, as proved by his statement. Even Arthur “Bomber” Harris, who was often viewed as a hardliner and was unapologetic for the violent actions carried out in World War II (Hills), distanced himself from the attack. Another issue of the bombing of Dresden is the fact that Dresden was not very important to the war effort. Cities like Berlin and Hamburg, which were also cities targeted in Germany by the Bomber Command, were easier to justify. They were essential to many aspects of the war effort, containing large amounts of industry and communications. Such was not the case in Dresden, at least not to the extent of those in other targeted cities. Dresden contained a camera factory that was using technology for German weapons (cite). This industry was important for the war effort and the destruction of said factory is easily justified. However, said factory is one of the few war related industries Dresden had. For the most part, Dresden was solely a cultural center. The industry and communications was so small it can almost be overlooked. There was not important government there either. The attack certainly affected morale but it is hard to say it achieved what it was intended to achieve. Destroying the camera factory and advancing the Red Army were seemingly the two goals of the raid (Biddle). It becomes obvious that the destruction of the entire city was not necessary to achieve those goals. The Bombing of Dresden remains controversial today for a variety of reasons. Though there is a good amount of false information about the bombing out there, the causes of concern are not to be ignored. It is important to realize the flaws of the attack, as well as understand how the motives were rooted in retaliation. There are certainly those who believe the bombing was helpful to the war effort, and though this might be true, it remains important to understand the flaws of the raid. One positive of the Dresden Bombing was that it caused all policies of “blanket bombing,” the kind of all-inclusive bombing used at Dresden, to be reviewed and ultimately ceased by the Allies. The subsequent Geneva Convention of 1949 stated that civilian hospitals could never be targeted. After that, a 1968 convention proclaimed no nation should ever “target” civilian populations (“Firestorms”). The lessons learned from Dresden are important to all countries in future wars. Though it is always difficult to argue if war is “good” or “bad,” those on each side of any armed conflict must understand the implications of war and therefore plan each attack as carefully as possible to avoid taking unnecessary lives.
Allies intended to use Dresden as their capitol, so Dresden would be spared (Bergander). Therefore, when it was attacked on the night of February 13, it came as shock for most of the residents and refugees in the city at the time. With around 25,000 to 35,000 people, mostly civilians, dead, there is a need to understand exactly why the city should be bombed (Biddle 424). The conclusion to be reached is that although the 1945 Dresden bombing was somewhat beneficial to the Allied forces, it was a flawed attacked that was mainly rooted in retaliation for Allied casualties. An important aspect of understanding the flaws in the Dresden bombing is understanding the mechanics of the raid. It was part of several raids on Eastern Germany designed to aid the Russian army westward (Biddle 414). The Allied forces made considerable progress in the development of incendiary bombs. Americans specifically brought forth a new and powerful type of bomb: the M-69. This bomb used newly invented napalm, a type of gasoline with the consistency of gelatin. It made a flaming jell that would stick to and burn almost anything (Bess 970). The British Air Force bombed the city at night with help from the American Air Force during the day. In the early months of 1945, the American Air Force drastically increased the amount of bombs dropped, going from around 100,000 tons in the whole year of 1944 to around 45,000 just in the month of January 1945 (Baldwin). The new Allied method of bombing, as well as the massive increase in bombs, proved to be extremely effective in taking killing millions and destroying property. The bombing of Dresden was no different. Thousands died, though the estimated number is something that has been a subject of debate. One author published that the death toll was 250,000, misled by falsified reports from German propaganda (Biddle 423). Kurt Vonnegut, in his fiction novel based loosely on his experience as a prisoner of war in Dresden at the time of the raid, claimed the death toll was 135,000 (Brinkley). However, most of today’s scholars have largely rejected those claims as unrealistic. The most agreed upon number of casualties is between 25,000 and 35,000 (Biddle 424). One of the biggest flaws of the Dresden raid was how excessive the bombing was. The raids took a significant number of civilian lives and destroyed much of the city. One claim many who support the bombings make is that bombing Dresden was important to destroy Germany’s industrial and communication centers (May 88). However an important point to realize is that the city’s industries were not the only thing targeted. Housing areas in Dresden, especially those in working class areas, were targeted in the bombing. The logic behind this was that working class citizens are more likely to be part of the workforce supplying weapons are other war supplies to German forces (Hills). Because of this bombing strategy, the working class population of Germany suffered greatly. The high density of these areas could take out large numbers of people and made firestorms more likely. Although Harris did wish to take out working class citizens in an effort to slow German production, this was a major flaw of the bombing. In his book examining moral issues of World War II, professor and author Michael Bess states that there are essentially four types of people affected by aerial bombing: those directly affiliated by the military, those that work to directly support war effort, those that work for industry to support both civilian life and war efforts, and finally persons with almost nothing to do with the war effort. Western thought on ethical war generally states that the latter, comprised of women, children, the handicapped, etc., should be protected whenever possible (Bess 102-103). However, intentionally seeking out this population reveals one major flaw of Harris’ plan. Although one flaw of the bombing was the planned bombing of civilians, another seemingly contradicting issue lies within the fact that the bombers were not instructed to aim at anything at all. In an interview not released until 1981, commander Harris stated that under the Bombing Command he was directed not to “specifically aim at anything, unless ordered to do so, except the German cities as a whole” Although in some ways the bombers did focus attention on “densely population regions” to enhance effectiveness of firebombing, it was not planned out to increase destruction of war industry (Hills). Instead, the firebombs were dropped all over the city, a mistake that took thousands more lives than it needed to. Another commonly repeated defense for the bombing of Dresden is that the German army did the same to the Allies, Britain specifically.
This point seems only to allude to the fact that the bombing of Dresden was motivated largely by retaliation. The Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command was taken over by Sir Arthur Harris in early 1942 (RAF website). This is when the majority of Britain’s air raids targeting German cities began. The German Air Force’s bombing campaign, known as The Blitz ended in May 1941 (Daily Mail). Although there is no denying the extremity of The Blitz, the Bomber Command’s actions so closely following The Blitz certainly raises questions. There are some who believe British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ordered the bombing of Dresden as retaliation for the bombing of Coventry alone. Some think that Churchill allowed Coventry to burn so as to avoid giving away intelligence (Winston Churchill Website). Although these claims are mostly ignored, the fact that the RAF’s Bombing Command so closely followed the events of the Blitz, including the bombing of the English city Coventry, cannot be
overlooked. There is some evidence of the uncertainty of the Dresden bombing in the “blame game” that went on between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and commander of the raid, Sir Arthur Harris. Churchill began to have doubts about the mission immediately after. In his letter to Harris after the Dresden bombing, he said “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing terror, should be reviewed.... I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives..., rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction..(Churchill)” Harris was not happy with this. In his autobiography he wrote “I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself” (National Archives). Churchill later revoked his statement to Harris upon Harris’ criticism (Churchill). From this exchange it becomes apparent those in power do not want to be affiliated with the decision to attack Dresden. This finger pointing is further proof that the Dresden Bombing was overkill. Churchill felt immediate unease about the bombing, as proved by his statement. Even Arthur “Bomber” Harris, who was often viewed as a hardliner and was unapologetic for the violent actions carried out in World War II (Hills), distanced himself from the attack. Another issue of the bombing of Dresden is the fact that Dresden was not very important to the war effort. Cities like Berlin and Hamburg, which were also cities targeted in Germany by the Bomber Command, were easier to justify. They were essential to many aspects of the war effort, containing large amounts of industry and communications. Such was not the case in Dresden, at least not to the extent of those in other targeted cities. Dresden contained a camera factory that was using technology for German weapons (cite). This industry was important for the war effort and the destruction of said factory is easily justified. However, said factory is one of the few war related industries Dresden had. For the most part, Dresden was solely a cultural center. The industry and communications was so small it can almost be overlooked. There was not important government there either. The attack certainly affected morale but it is hard to say it achieved what it was intended to achieve. Destroying the camera factory and advancing the Red Army were seemingly the two goals of the raid (Biddle). It becomes obvious that the destruction of the entire city was not necessary to achieve those goals. The Bombing of Dresden remains controversial today for a variety of reasons. Though there is a good amount of false information about the bombing out there, the causes of concern are not to be ignored. It is important to realize the flaws of the attack, as well as understand how the motives were rooted in retaliation. There are certainly those who believe the bombing was helpful to the war effort, and though this might be true, it remains important to understand the flaws of the raid. One positive of the Dresden Bombing was that it caused all policies of “blanket bombing,” the kind of all-inclusive bombing used at Dresden, to be reviewed and ultimately ceased by the Allies. The subsequent Geneva Convention of 1949 stated that civilian hospitals could never be targeted. After that, a 1968 convention proclaimed no nation should ever “target” civilian populations (“Firestorms”). The lessons learned from Dresden are important to all countries in future wars. Though it is always difficult to argue if war is “good” or “bad,” those on each side of any armed conflict must understand the implications of war and therefore plan each attack as carefully as possible to avoid taking unnecessary lives.