When Are Sanctions Likely to Work?
When are sanctions most likely to work?
1. Introduction
Economic sanctions, defined as “economic measures directed to political objectives” (Barber,
1979, p. 367), are given a prominent place among the range of coercive diplomacy (George,
Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, 1991, p. 5). They are praised as a good alternative to war because it seeks to persuade an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping (George, Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, 1991, p. 5). There is, however, general consensus that economic sanctions rarely work. Nevertheless they are continued to be employed. This essay attempts to shed light on why sanctions are continued to be applied even though there is general consensus that they rarely work. Before doing so, this essay first explores how economic sanctions are defined in the literature and what it means for sanctions to be effective. The case of Iraq was chosen to help us analyse the effectiveness of sanctions. This essay argues that sanctions are continued to be applied, because they are successful in combination with other means of statecraft and when they are used to achieve minor goals in a broader political strategy.
2. Understanding Economic Sanctions
2.1 Definition of Economic Sanctions
Coercive diplomacy which aims at “persuading an opponent to stop and/ or undo an action he is already embarked upon” (George, 1991, p. 5) has often only relied to “military instruments as the only effective means for achieving ambitious foreign policy goals, as for example taking or defending territory, altering a state’s military behaviour and changing a state’s regime or internal political structure” (Pape, 1997, p. 91). Since the First World War, however, economic sanctions represent an important and more humane alternative to war. The term
„sender“ is used to designate the country or international organisation that is the principal
1. Introduction
Economic sanctions, defined as “economic measures directed to political objectives” (Barber,
1979, p. 367), are given a prominent place among the range of coercive diplomacy (George,
Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, 1991, p. 5). They are praised as a good alternative to war because it seeks to persuade an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping (George, Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, 1991, p. 5). There is, however, general consensus that economic sanctions rarely work. Nevertheless they are continued to be employed. This essay attempts to shed light on why sanctions are continued to be applied even though there is general consensus that they rarely work. Before doing so, this essay first explores how economic sanctions are defined in the literature and what it means for sanctions to be effective. The case of Iraq was chosen to help us analyse the effectiveness of sanctions. This essay argues that sanctions are continued to be applied, because they are successful in combination with other means of statecraft and when they are used to achieve minor goals in a broader political strategy.
2. Understanding Economic Sanctions
2.1 Definition of Economic Sanctions
Coercive diplomacy which aims at “persuading an opponent to stop and/ or undo an action he is already embarked upon” (George, 1991, p. 5) has often only relied to “military instruments as the only effective means for achieving ambitious foreign policy goals, as for example taking or defending territory, altering a state’s military behaviour and changing a state’s regime or internal political structure” (Pape, 1997, p. 91). Since the First World War, however, economic sanctions represent an important and more humane alternative to war. The term
„sender“ is used to designate the country or international organisation that is the principal
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