Who was most responsible for the ‘Nakba’ and Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49?

The Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 was an extremely significant event in the history of Arab-Israeli conflict. At the time it was the first military conflict the new state of Israel has been involved in. Never before had its forces been truly tested in the field of conflict, and its military capabilities was still relatively unknown. However it was significant as it highlighted the true power the Israelis had, with the result of a crushing defeat for the Arabs, and the Israeli’s ability to retain the independence of their newly created state. However there is much disagreement over which side was in fact responsible for the ‘Nakba’ (catastrophe in Arabic). Although the Israeli success can be seen as major indicator of their military strength, it can also be judged that due to the weaknesses of the Arab coalition and the difficulties they faced during the war, this may have been the most significant factor in contributing to the ‘Nakba’. A piece of evidence that strongly supports the view that the Israeli’s were responsible for the Nakba and overall Arab defeat is Brooman, J, Conflict in Palestine: Jews, Arabs and the Middle-East Since 1900 (p.11-12). The evidence that supports this hypothesis is when it states that the Israeli army’s strength had been raised to ‘nearly a million’ and that due to this and their additional increase in weaponry, the Arabs ‘could not match the strength of the Jews’. This clearly highlights that the Israelis had been long preparing for conflict and at no stage had defeat been seen as a possible outcome. Evidence of the Israelis preparing their forces for conflict can be shown further by Scott-Baumann, Crisis in the Middle East: Israel and the Arab States 1945-2007 (p.23-34). Despite stating that ‘at the start of the war, the Israelis only had about 30,000 soldiers’ and ‘inferior’ weapons, they had built up their army to ‘65,000 by July’ and had nearly “100,000 arms” by December 1948. To add to this, the Israelis had used the UN enforced truces to obtain more vital equipment from Europe, and as a result were “better armed for the rest of the war”. Once again this is clear evidence of the Israelis superior preparation and overall military strength and capability in comparison to their Arab opponents. To further this, Scott-Baumann argues that because roughly “25,000” Israelis had fought in the British army during the Second World War, it had led to them obtaining ‘valuable experience in training, organisation and technology’, which the Arabs didn’t receive. In comparison, the only Arab force that was as well-trained and equipped as the Israelis was the “10,000 of the Arab League of Transjordan”, which highlights the severe lack of quality training given to the Arab forces. By and large, the preparation, superior numbers, and quantity and quality of weaponry available to the Israelis was clearly a major factor in contributing to the Arab defeat and therefore highlights the Israelis as being responsible for this. An argument that also supports the view that the Israelis were responsible for the Nakba was the support and assistance they received from many western states, again which the Arabs did not have. The assistance given to the Israelis stemmed back to the fact that the Zionists had wanted Britain to agree to a separate Jewish state, and to leave Palestine. They had agreed that this was more possible to be achieved by going through the US. They would receive support from the American Zionists of whom could pressurise the American government into agreeing to a separate Jewish State. Evidence of American Zionist pressuring and lobbying congress is found in Scott-Baumann (Ibid., p.17). Here he states that they “launched a propaganda offensive” and “lobbied members of government and Congress, in order to gain support”. This in turn led to the accomplishment of their first aim; getting Truman to support the partition of Palestine. This partition, which had been formally agreed upon by the UN General Assembly, gave the Jews the larger area of land, which was shown to have strong international support. This was extremely significant during the war, and gave the Israelis an important advantage over the Arabs, which ultimately contributed to the Nakba and the defeat of the Arabs. This can backed up by evidence from Pavlov, M, The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition. Here he contributed the Israeli victory down to the fact that the forces had significant ‘financial, military and other support from the USA, and other imperialist countries’. This was a major advantage for the Israelis that once again the Arabs did not receive. This therefore supports the view further that the Israelis were responsible for their overall victory and in turn the defeat of the Arabs. However, it is also suggested that due to British Suppression during the Arab revolt of 1936-39, this indirectly contributed to the Israeli success, and hence Western support was not the only reason for the Arab defeat. Brooman, Op. Cit., p.11, gives a clear indication and reason why this contributed to the Israeli victory. He Argues that the Arabs had ‘significantly greater difficulty in preparing for war’ due to their fighting strength being ‘virtually destroyed in 1939, when the British crushed the Arab rebellion’. The consequence of the British crushing this revolt was that the Arabs simply lacked the manpower and effective leadership to succeed in the Arab-Israeli was of 1948-49. This therefore shows that the Israelis had a significant advantage over the Arabs before the war had even begun. The Palestians were both depleted in men and equipment, whilst in stark contrast the Israelis had contrinuing support from the West both before and during the war, allowing them to gain a siginifcant advantage over the Arabs, and hence significantly contribute to the overall Israeli victory. Although the Israelis were clearly a formidable fighting force, and had important advantages before the war, significant blame for the Arabs defeat must be placed in the hands of the Arab League. This was Palestinian coalition which in theory, was firmly united in fighting against the Israelis and were determined to prevent the existence of a Jewish state in the Palestianian region. However the Arab league had many divided aims, which in turn caused limited cooperation. This meant that they did not present a united and effective front against the Israelis, and for this reason, were defeated with more ease. This can be validated by Smith, C, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (p.204-205). He says that there was ‘no coordination of Arab military movements because the participants were mutually suspicious of one another’s territorial ambitions’. The main suspicion centred around President Abdullah of Transjordan. This was due to his desire to control the area allocated to the Palestinian Arabs under the partition, in order to expand his own empire. This meant that since the Israelis were well aware of Abdullah’s aspirations, their aims were only divided over the issue of Jerusalem, of which the Israelis were left the western section. There is further evidence of increased divisions between the Arab nations. Scott-Baumann, Op. Cit., p.29 states that Abdullah had decided to “remain neutral” and did not support the Egyptian forces, but at the same time “never invaded Jewish, Israeli territory”. This is further evidence to highlight the individual aims of Abdullah to expand his own territory, without cooperating with the Arab League, thus helping to deepen the already present divisions. As clearly stated by Scott-Baumann, Israel was able to exploit the understanding with Transjordan in order to “deepen the divisions in the Arab coalition and pick off its Arab opponents one by one”. The nations within the Arab League all had individual goals, all wishing to gain a piece of Palestinian territory. This view is also voiced by The History Learning Site (Israel and the 1948 War) which states that once the armistices were being agreed, the separate Arab nations ‘negotiated their own peace talks. This is a further sign that the Arab nations were simply only united by their desire to attack Israel’. In conclusion the lack of effective, and united leadership significantly contributed to the problems faced with the Arab League, which in turn greatly affected their efforts in the war. The Arabs were strongly weakened and handicapped by their inability to provide a united front against the Israelis which significantly contributed to the eventually defeat of the Arabs.

Another important factor that should be considered to support the view that the Arabs were ultimately responsible for their defeat, was that in comparison to the Israelis, the Arabs severly lacked the manpower and necessary weapons to allow for military success. This lack of effective equipment and manpower gave the Israelis a huge advantage in the war, and ultiamelly contributed to their success. By using Brooman, Op. Cit., p.12, we can see that it is clear that both Arab numbers and weaponry were inferior to those of the Israeli forces. He states that ‘the armies consisted of around 20,000 men’ in comparison to the 65,000 Israeli troops. He goes on to say that the Arabs ‘ lacked modern weapons’. This point was even more significant as the Israeli troops began building up their armaments and numbers whilst the Arab forces remained relatively stagnant in comparison. Additionally to this, their lack of initiative made it difficult to maintain modern weapons. It is stated in Militaryphotos.net that due to the fact that “complex modern weapons require on the spot maintenance” and this means “delegating authority, information, and tools”, the maintenance of weapons is difficult for Arabs as their armies “avoid doing this and prefer to use easier to control central repair shops”. The effect of this was that the Arab weapons were often faulty, lacked agility and needed to be repaired often. As aforementioned, the Israelis had access to modern weaponry from the West, plus they increased their numbers and armaments considerably throughout the war. Therefore in comparison, due to their inability to gain weapons, numbers and their lack of initiative to maintain modern weapons, the Arabs put themselves in a particularly bad position which contributed considerably to their defeat.

Overall there were many substantial factors suggesting that both the Israelis and the Arabs were responsible for the ‘Nakbar’ and Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49. Despite the arguments put forth suggesting the Arabs held primary responsibility for their defeat, such as the divided aims and limited cooperation of the Arab League, plus their inferior army and weapons, the main reasons for their defeat were those of Israeli advantages; their superior military strength, training and growth plus the support they had from the Western states. In particular, without the support of the Western states, they would not have gained the financial and military advantages they had over the Arabs in the midst of war, but also due to the British depleting Arab armies during 1936-39, they were placed in a much stronger position before the War even began. This element, beyond all else, provides grounds for the conclusion that the Israelis were most responsible for the ‘Nakbar’ and Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49.