Why Did General Sharon Cross The Suez Canal

General Sharon planned to cross the Suez Canal with his Armored Brigade and cut the supply routes to the advancing Egyptian Armies. The only problem was that the Third and Second Egyptian Armies remained on the West side of the Suez Canal, crossing the Suez would have been devastating to the Israelis. On the other battle front, Israeli forces had pushed the Syrians back to the pre-war ceasefire lines. The IDF then launched a four-day counter-offensive deep into Syria. Within a week, Israeli artillery began to shell the outskirts of Damascus.9 Egyptian President Sadat began to worry about the integrity of his major ally. He believed that capturing two strategic passes located deeper in the Sinai would make his position stronger during post-war negotiations and force Israel to move more military unit to the Sinai Peninsula from the Golan Heights.10 He ordered his reserve units, the Second and Third Egyptian Armies, to cross the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula.
This created the opportunity that General Sharon needed to implement his plan.
Going against higher orders, General Sharon sent a reconnaissance unit to gather intel on the defenses along the Suez Canal and asses the enemies strength along the canal. The Recon unit uncovered a narrow 1-mile gap between the two well dug in Egyptian Armies. General Sharon order an assault force to secure a fortified Egyptian fighting position at Chinese Farm, to facilitate the movement across the Suez Canal. He exercised disciplined initiative and created the opportunity to develop the situation to strategically win the war. General Sharon knew existing orders no longer fit the situation and accepted the risk in crossing the Suez Canal. General Sharon’s willingness to accept prudent risk was the key to exposing the Egyptian’s weaknesses, the 1-mile gap between its
Armies. General Sharon was able to get his division into an advantages position through planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. He accepted prudent risk by moving his unit towards the crossing point. It was not a rash decision by General Sharon, but a well calculated maneuver to catch the enemy off balance. October 14th was the start of Israel’s multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies. On October 16th, General Sharon sent 700 paratroopers to cross the Suez Canal under cover of darkness before the Chinese Farm was secured. The Israelis tasks force quickly assaulted across the Suez Canal by raft. By the next day 50 tanks had been rafted over and were establishing a beachhead. These forward Israeli units were able to destroy Egyptian Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) positions on the west side of the Suez. This audacious Israeli maneuver caught the Egyptian Army by surprise and also severely disrupted their air-defense system and supply routes. Things only continued to worsen for the Egyptians; the superior Israeli Air Force, now unimpeded by enemy SAM positions, re-engaged Egyptian positions along the Suez Canal crossing point. Further weakening Egyptian position west of the Suez Canal and increase the freedom of maneuver for Israeli ground forces. The Israelis had been preparing for an assault across the Suez Canal for years. They constructed a 180-meter, 400-ton mobile floating bridge and which took 3 days to assemble.11 On October 19th, the mobile bridge was moved into position and the full combat strength of General Ariel’s unit could cross the Suez Canal into the continent of Africa. Operations for General Sharon’s forward units shifted to locating and destroying the remaining SAM positions, clearing the airspace for the Israeli Airforce. The Israelis forces continued to push into Egypt through heavy Egyptian bombardment from field artillery and aircraft. The Egyptian Third Army was in grave danger of being encircled by the Israeli forces moving along the west side of the Suez Canal. On October 16th, the commander of the Egyptian Third Army request that unit move back across the canal to engage the advancing Israeli units, but Egyptian President Sadat clearly said to his commanders, “There will be no retreat!” President Sadat believed that reducing units on the east bank of the Sinai would mean losing everything they had fought for up to this point. It quickly became evident how mistaken President Sadat’s orders had been. On October 22, 1973 Egyptian President Sadat was ready to negotiate a cease fire with Israel. Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease fire, but Israel did not oblige to the agreement and continued pushing deeper into eastern Egypt. Israel finally came to agree to the terms on October 25th, 1973 due to indirect international pressure between USA and Russia. General Sharon had a vision to end the war swiftly. He demonstrated a willingness to decisively take action, which facilitated his ability to develop and maintain operational advantage over his enemies. His strategy and disciplined initiative were essential to Israel’s victory in the Sinai Peninsula. General Sharon demonstrated a mastery of what we know as mission command principles. General Sharon demonstrated the ability to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, created shared understanding, exercised discipline and accepted prudent risk in defeating the Egyptian Army in the Sinai Peninsula. His mastery of the mission command principles mentioned above were crucial in securing the east bank and exploiting the Egyptian hesitation to retreat. General Sharon's complex ground maneuver is regarded as a decisive move in the Yom Kippur War, undermining the Egyptian Second Army and encircling the Egyptian Third Army. This move was regarded by many Israelis as the turning point of the war in the Sinai front. General Sharon is widely viewed as the hero of the Yom Kippur War, responsible for Israel's ground victory in the Sinai in 1973.12 Future commanders and leaders can learn from General Sharon’s understanding of mission command principles and warfighting function. Sharon's victories and offensive strategy, led to international commendation by military strategists; he was judged to have inaugurated a new paradigm in operational command.13 Researchers at the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command studied General Sharon’s operational planning and concluded that it involved a number of unique innovations. It was a simultaneous attack by a multiplicity of small forces, each with a specific aim, attacking a particular unit in a synergistic Egyptian defense network.